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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 2011, the British medical journal The Lancet referred to the rising obesity rates 
across the world as a “pandemic.”1  Here in the United States, the pandemic’s global 
epicenter, obesity has been associated with many negative health outcomes, such as 
hypertension, high cholesterol, type two diabetes, respiratory problems, and 
osteoarthritis.2  But as with any pandemic, obesity’s effects extend far beyond health 
outcomes. 
This dissertation considers just one element of obesity’s far-reaching effects: the 
impact of obesity on the labor market.  Many scholars have previously examined this 
relationship, and this dissertation certainly builds on the previous work.  What makes this 
dissertation different, however, is that it reconsiders obesity in the labor market from a 
legal point of view.  Like previous authors, I examine how obesity has impacted the labor 
market.  But unlike previous authors, I am also able to consider how the legal system has 
responded to obesity in past, and how the legal system should respond to obesity in the 
future.  
Much of the previous work on obesity in the labor market comes from 
economists.  These economists have demonstrated that obese workers earn less than non-
obese workers, but they have not been able to explain why—especially for women.3  The 
poor labor market outcomes of the obese could result from obese people keeping 
                                                
1 Editorial, “Urgently Needed: A Framework Convention for Obesity Control,” The Lancet 378 (27 Aug. 
2011): 741. 
2 National Institutes of Health, Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of 
Overweight and Obesity in Adults: The Evidence Report, NIH Publication No. 98-4083, last modified Sep. 
1998, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf. 
3 See Chapter I for a discussion of these papers. 
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themselves out of certain jobs (a labor supply issue).  On the other hand, the poor labor 
market outcomes of the obese could result from employers keeping obese people out of 
certain jobs or paying obese people less money to perform the same jobs (a labor demand 
issue).  
Chapter I addresses this question.  Previous papers have compared the occupation 
and industry breakdowns of obese workers to non-obese workers.  Chapter I goes a step 
further and looks at occupational characteristics.  Specifically, Chapter I examines two 
types of occupational characteristics, physical activity requirements and communication 
requirements, and examines how obese workers sort into and out of jobs with these 
characteristics.  Men show no signs of sorting by weight into and out of jobs with these 
characteristics.  But women do: the heaviest women are less likely to work in jobs 
requiring communication but more likely to work in jobs requiring physical activity.  
Furthermore, the heaviest women are paid less than lighter women for working in jobs 
requiring communication.  For reasons discussed in Chapter I, these results indicate that 
labor demand is driving the poor labor market outcomes of obese women.   Moreover, 
these results are consistent with the existence of discrimination against obese women. 
Chapter II shifts focus to the legal system.  Although the question of whether the 
obese face discrimination has not been resolved, one U.S. state and six cities have already 
passed laws protecting the obese in the labor market.  In addition, one Federal circuit 
recognizes obesity as a disability for the purposes of the Federal Rehabilitation Act 
(FRA), which protects individuals who work for the Federal government, Federal 
contractors, and entities receiving Federal funds,4 and the Americans with Disabilities 
                                                
4 Federal Rehabilitation Act, U.S. Code, vol. 29, secs. 705-794a (2012). 
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Act (ADA), which protects individuals who work anywhere else.5  Chapter II asks if any 
of these laws have been effective in improving employment outcomes for the obese.  The 
results in this Chapter indicate that only two cities have successfully enforced their laws.  
Weak enforcement processes have paralyzed the other five local laws and the Federal 
disability laws.  
After examining how the law has previously responded to obesity in Chapter II, 
Chapter III considers how the law should respond to obesity in the future.  Chapter III 
argues that the new evidence from Chapter I combined with previous evidence from the 
economics and psychology literature strongly supports the hypothesis that the obese face 
discrimination in the labor market.  For this reason, Chapter III advocates making weight 
the next protected class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Since its passage in 
1964, Title VII has recognized five protected classes: race, sex, color, religion, and 
national origin.6  Chapter III argues that weight should be the sixth protected class.  
Nevertheless, Chapter III recognizes that passing another Federal anti-discrimination law 
may fail to help the obese as long as Federal discrimination claims continue to be 
enforced in their current manner.  As a result, Chapter III also proposes major changes to 
the current Federal administrative and adjudicative processes.  These changes will not 
only help future protected classes seek redress for their claims, but they will also help 
currently protected classes seek redress for their claims.  Thus, this chapter advocates 
these administrative changes regardless of whether Congress decides to make weight the 
next protected class. 
                                                
5 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, secs. 12101-12213 (2012). 
6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 2000e (2012). 
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Before proceeding with this study of obesity’s interaction with the labor market 
and the legal system, I pause briefly to introduce the measurement of obesity upon which 
this entire dissertation relies: body mass index (BMI).  BMI is the most commonly used 
measurement of an individual’s relative size; it is calculated using the following formula: 
! 
BMI = weight(kg)(height(m))2 =
weight(lb) " 703
(height(in))2 . 
(1) 
In medical, economics, and psychology research, authors who use BMI as a measure of 
relative size group individuals into five standardized groups.  These standardized groups 
classify individuals with a BMI of less than 18.5 as underweight, between 18.5 and 24.9 
as normal weight, between 25.0 and 29.9 as overweight, between 30.0 and 39.9 as obese, 
and 40 or greater as morbidly obese.7  I adopt these standardized BMI classification 
groups throughout the empirical studies presented in Chapters I and II.  With these BMI 
classification groups in mind, I turn now to my study of obesity and occupational 
characteristics presented in Chapter I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 Mayo Clinic Staff, “Obesity: Definition,” Mayo Clinic Online, last modified 2012, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/obesity/DS00314. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
WHY OBESE WORKERS EARN LESS: NEW EVIDENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL 
SORTING 
 
 
 
Introduction 
It is well documented that obese individuals earn less than non-obese individuals 
in the labor market.  Gortmaker et al. (1993), Sargent and Blanchflower (1994), Averett 
and Korenman (1996), Pagan and Davila (1997), and Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) 
were among the first to identify the disparity between the wages of the obese and the non-
obese.  These papers all demonstrated that a wage disparity remained for obese workers, 
particularly female obese workers, after controlling for a wide range of potentially 
confounding factors such as age and educational attainment.8  Cawley (2004) extended 
these results, demonstrating that the wage disparity remained for obese women even after 
controlling for genetic predisposition (using sibling BMI) and after addressing 
endogeneity concerns that wages may affect BMI (in case lower wages lead workers to 
consume cheaper, more fattening foods).9  Not even Cawley, however, could determine 
what lay behind the remaining wage disparity. 
For that reason, most of the recent research on obesity in the labor market has 
focused on why the obese earn less than the non-obese.  Several explanations, mostly 
                                                
8 Steven L. Gortmaker et al., “Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight in Adolescence and 
Young Adulthood,” New England Journal of Medicine 329 (30 Sept. 1993): 1008-1012; J. D. Sargent and 
D. G. Blanchflower, “Obesity and Stature in Adolescence and Earnings in Young Adulthood: Analysis of a 
British Birth Cohort,” Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 148 (1994): 681-87; Susan Averett 
and Sanders Korenman, “The Economic Reality of the Beauty Myth," Journal of Human Resources 31 
(1996): 304-30; Jose A. Pagan and Alberto Davila, "Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and Earnings,” 
Social Science Quarterly 8 (1997): 756-70; Jere R. Behrman and Mark R. Rosenzweig, “The Returns to 
Increasing Body Weight,” working paper, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Philadelphia, Pa., 2001. 
9 John Cawley, “The Impact of Obesity on Wages,“ Journal of Human Resources 39 (2004): 451-74. 
 6 
related to employer demand, have been posited.  Cawley et al. (2007), Finkelstein et al. 
(2005), and Pronk et al. (2004) have all offered evidence that obese workers are more 
likely to miss work.10  On the other hand, Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) have found 
that obese workers have higher expected medical costs, and as a result, may drive up their 
employer’s health insurance premiums.11  While these explanations may account for 
some of the discrepancy between the wages of the obese and the non-obese, none of these 
authors have been able to fully account for the discrepancy.  Why obese workers earn less 
than non-obese workers—and particularly why female obese workers earn less than 
female non-obese workers—is still very much an open question. 
As a result, this chapter posits a new explanation for the obesity wage 
discrepancy: occupational sorting.  I present evidence that obese workers are more likely 
to work in certain types of occupations, and this occupational sorting is most pronounced 
for women.  In order to identify this weight-based occupational sorting, I go beyond 
simply looking at the names of workers’ occupations.  Indeed, I look at the particular 
characteristics and job requirements associated with each occupational classification.  
The differences in the occupational characteristics of the obese and the non-obese can go 
a long way in explaining the lower hourly wages of the obese.  In particular, morbidly 
obese female workers, who experience the greatest wage discrepancy in the labor market, 
sort into occupations with characteristics associated with lower hourly wages.  Of course, 
a variety of supply- and demand-side explanations may underlie this occupational sorting.  
                                                
10 John Cawley et al., “Occupation-Specific Absenteeism Associated with Obesity and Morbid Obesity,” 
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 49 (2007): 1317-24; Eric A. Finkelstein et al., “The 
Costs of Obesity Among Full-Time Employees,” American Journal of Health Promotion 20 (2005): 45-51; 
Nicolaas P. Pronk et al., “The Association Between Work Performance and Physical Activity, 
Cardiorespiratory Fitness, and Obesity,” Journal of Occupational and Enviornmental Medicine 46 (2004): 
19-25. 
11 Jay Bhattacharya and M. Kate Bundorf, "The Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity," Journal of 
Health Economics 28 (2009): 649-658. 
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Although I cannot definitively pinpoint one explanation as the true cause of this 
occupational sorting, my evidence is able to dismiss some of these explanations and 
strongly favor others. 
This chapter will proceed as follows.  I will begin by presenting two models of 
why obese workers may sort into different occupations than non-obese workers.  The first 
model presents a supply-side explanation, where obese workers wish to avoid 
occupations with certain characteristics and, as a result, require a sufficient compensating 
differential in order to accept jobs with these characteristics.  In contrast, the second 
model presents a demand-side explanation, where employers do not want to employ 
obese workers in occupations with certain characteristics.  I then give an overview of the 
data and methodology necessary to test the validity of these two models.  Next, I present 
the evidence of weight-based sorting by occupational characteristic, and I demonstrate 
how accounting for this occupational characteristic sorting can help explain the wage 
discrepancy between the obese and non-obese.  After presenting four robustness checks, I 
conclude by comparing the occupational sorting evidence to the supply- and demand-side 
explanations presented at the beginning of the paper and by determining which of these 
explanations are consistent with the data presented.  
 
Two Models of Occupational Sorting 
 
Before exploring whether workers sort into occupations based on weight, this 
chapter must first answer a more basic question: Why would workers ever sort into 
different occupations on the basis of weight?  Trends in occupational choices on the basis 
 8 
of weight may be the result of supply-side effects, demand-side effects, or a combination 
of the two.  This section presents a simple model of both effects and offers examples of 
how these effects might manifest themselves in the labor market.  I begin with an 
investigation of supply-side effects. 
Supply-Side Effects 
To model potential supply-side effects, I look to the standard compensating 
differentials model outlined by Rosen (1986) and adapted to include considerations of 
specific job characteristics by Krueger and Schkade (2007).12  Occupations have many 
characteristics that may or may not depend on weight.  This model will focus solely on 
the job characteristics that do depend on weight.  Define c as such a job characteristic, 
where b represents a worker’s BMI: 
! 
c = f (b). (1) 
For simplicity, assume that workers derive utility, u, from only two sources: their wages, 
w, and the characteristics of their job, so that u is a function of w and c (u(w,c)).  In this 
model, workers do not save and consume the entirety of their wages.  Thus, w always 
generates positive utility.  For further simplicity, suppose that c takes only two values, 0 
(for jobs that lack the characteristic) and 1 (for jobs that have the characteristic).   
Now define obesity, O, as the critical value that determines whether c generates 
positive or negative utility.  Note that as a critical value, O need not equal the traditional 
BMI threshold for obesity (i.e. a BMI of thirty).  In reality, the BMI where the 
relationship between c and b changes signs may be greater or less than thirty.  For 
                                                
12 Sherwin Rosen, “The Theory of Equalizing Differences,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 1, ed. 
Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1986), 641-92; Alan B. 
Krueger and David Schkade, “Sorting in the Labor Market: Do Gregarious Workers Flock to Interactive 
Jobs?” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., 2007. 
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occupational characteristics that are inversely related to weight (i.e. characteristics that 
are disfavored by the obese and favored by the non-obese): 
! 
u(w,1) > u(w,0) if b <O, (2) 
and 
! 
u(w,1) < u(w,0) if b "O. (3) 
Because workers will always choose the job that maximizes their utility, obese workers 
will choose the job that lacks the characteristic (c=0) unless they are compensated enough 
to overcome the disutility generated by c=1.  Let z be this compensating differential for 
an individual worker, so that 
! 
u(w0,0) = u(w0 + z,1). (4) 
Thus, if w1>w0+z, an obese worker will accept a job for which c=1, and if w1<w0+z, an 
obese worker will accept a job for which c=0. 
 Broadening from the individual worker to the entire labor market, let !W=w1-w0, 
or the actual difference in wages between jobs with the characteristic (c=1) and jobs 
without the characteristic (c=0).  Note that !W is the same for all workers, regardless of 
their BMI, but z varies by a worker’s BMI.  In other words, !W is the market-wide 
compensating differential that is set by the marginal worker.  Let the probability density 
function of z across workers (both obese and non-obese) equal g(z) and the cumulative 
density function equal G(z).  Then the fraction of workers who apply to jobs for which 
c=1 is 
! 
g(z)dz =G("W ),
0
"W
#  
(5) 
and the fraction of workers who apply to jobs for which c=0 is 
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! 
g(z)dz =1"G(#W ).
#W
$
%  
(6) 
In equilibrium, only workers whose z is less than !W will work in occupations with the 
job characteristic c=1.  Since z is positive for obese workers, then obese workers will be 
less likely to work in c=1 occupations than non-obese workers (since not every obese 
worker’s z will be less than !W). Of course, this model can be made more complex by 
allowing c to take a range of values, with higher values of c still inversely related to b.  In 
other words, the more important that characteristic c is to the occupation in question, the 
more disutility generated for workers in this occupation whose BMI is greater than O.  
Even with this additional complexity, however, the predictions are quite similar: the 
higher the value of c, the higher the z required to compensate obese workers for working 
in that occupation, and as a result, the fewer obese workers in that occupation. 
 Not only has this idea of compensating differentials been around since the time of 
Adam Smith,13 but it also makes intuitive sense: of course, everyone wants additional 
compensation in return for performing unpleasant tasks.  But do compensating 
differentials really exist in the labor market?  Do workers actually enjoy a wage premium 
for enduring job conditions and characteristics that generate disutility?  For many job 
characteristics, the evidence supports the theory of compensating differentials.  The 
earliest studies confirming the existence of compensating differentials often focused on 
the tradeoff that workers faced between wages and job risk, as measured by variables 
such as injury rate and fatality rate.14  Some of the most thorough analyses in the job risk 
                                                
13 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Cases of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, 
Glasgow ed., The Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
111. 
14 Note that some earlier studies of compensating differentials found “some clear support for the theory” 
but with “an uncomfortable number of exceptions,” as noted in the literature review by Charles Brown in 
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compensating differential literature include Smith (1979), Viscusi (1979), Moore and 
Viscusi (1990), and Viscusi (1998).15  More recent literature has moved beyond 
traditional studies of injury and fatality rates and looked for evidence of compensating 
differentials in exchange for other “disagreeable job characteristics.”16  For example, 
Hirsch (2005) found evidence that the “large supply of workers preferring part-time 
hours” and the more pleasant job characteristics of part-time jobs led to a compensating 
differential for full-time workers (on top of the additional wages they earned by virtue of 
working more hours than part-time workers).17  Interestingly, Hersch (2011) even found 
compensating differentials present in industries with high sexual harassment rates, 
indicating that workers receive a wage premium in return for a higher probability of 
encountering sexual harassment in the workplace.18 
 Since previous literature supports the theory that workers will require additional 
compensation for unpleasant working conditions, the next step becomes identifying the 
specific occupational characteristics that are unpleasant for obese workers.  Two obvious 
candidates come to mind.  The first candidate is an emphasis on physical activity. Obesity 
is associated with a host of health problems, including higher risks of hypertension, high 
                                                
“Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 (Feb. 1980): 118.  
However, and Greg J. Duncan and Bertil Holmlund demonstrated that many of these “exceptions” were the 
result of omitted variable bias and measurement error in “Was Adam Smith Right After All?  Another Test 
of the Theory of Compensating Wage Differentials,” Journal of Labor Economics 1 (Oct. 1983): 366-79. 
15 Robert P. Smith, “Compensating Differentials and Public Policy: A Review,” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 32 (1979): 572-86; W. Kip  Viscusi, Employment Hazards: An Investigation of Market 
Performance (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore, 
Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks: Wages, Workers’ Compensation, and Product Liability 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Policy (Oxford, U.K.: 
Clarendon Press-Oxford University Press, 1998). 
16 Robert P. Smith, “Compensating Differentials and Public Policy: A Review,” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 32 (1979). 
17 Barry T. Hirsch, “Why Do Part-Time Workers Earn Less?  The Role of Worker and Job Skills,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (July 2005): 525-51. 
18 Joni Hersch, “Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment,” American Economic Review: Papers 
and Proceedings 101 (2011): 630-34. 
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cholesterol, type two diabetes, respiratory problems, and osteoarthritis.19  Therefore, 
being obese may make it more difficult for a worker to perform physical tasks because of 
reduced stamina, mobility, or reaction time.  The toll that physical activity takes on the 
body may increase with weight, and thus the disutility generated by physical activity may 
also increase with weight.  If true, the amount of money required to compensate obese 
workers for physical activities on the job would increase with weight, resulting in fewer 
obese workers in physical occupations. 
 The second candidate is an emphasis on communication and contact with others.  
How jobs that place great importance on communication could generate disutilty for 
obese workers may not be immediately obvious, but in fact some psychology studies 
have suggested that the obese prefer to avoid social situations. Rothblum et al. (1990) 
found that being obese was associated with lower self-confidence, which could plausibly 
lead an obese worker to avoid jobs emphasizing contact and communication with 
others.20  Similarly, Miller et al. (1995) discussed the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of 
weight: the results of surveys such as Tiggeman and Rothblum (1988) and Rothblum et 
al. (1990) suggested that the obese may avoid interacting with anyone who they fear 
could react negatively toward their weight as a “self-protective strateg[y].”21  Myers and 
Rosen (1999) also reported that the obese may cope with potentially stigmatizing 
                                                
19 National Institutes of Health, Clinical Guidelines on the Identification, Evaluation, and Treatment of 
Overweight and Obesity in Adults: The Evidence Report, NIH Publication No. 98-4083, last modified Sep. 
1998, http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/ob_gdlns.pdf. 
20 Esther D. Rothblum et al., “The Relationship Between Obesity, Employment Discrimination, and 
Employment-Related Victimization,” Journal of Vocational Behavior 37 (1990): 251-66. 
21 Carol T. Miller et al., “Compensating for Stigma: Obese and Nonobese Women’s Reactions to Being 
Visible,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21 (1995): 1093-1106; Marika Tiggeman and Esther 
D. Rothblum, “Gender Differences in Social Consequences of Perceived Overweight in the United States 
and Australia,” Sex Roles 18 (1988): 75-86; Esther D. Rothblum et al., “The Relationship Between Obesity, 
Employment Discrimination, and Employment-Related Victimization,” Journal of Vocational Behavior 37 
(1990): 251-66. 
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situations through “negative self-talk, isolation and avoidance.”22  Kirkland (2008) found 
that many of the fat rights activists who responded to her survey reported using the 
“scanning technique for assessing, surveilling, and planning one’s movements through 
the world to avoid discomfort and humiliation.”23  Some of her respondents even reported 
not applying for new jobs or switching jobs to avoid a co-worker or boss who made their 
weight an issue.   
Of course, not every obese person runs away from potential problems; the 
Rothblum et al. (1990) survey also reported that at least some respondents practiced “self 
love/self-acceptance” and “being visible despite stigma.”24  Similarly, many of the 
respondents to the Kirkland (2008) survey reported using “positive self-presentation” and 
“snappy comebacks” to anyone who attacked their weight.25  In sum, it is unclear from 
current evidence how many obese people avoid social situations on the basis of their 
weight (or how many confront social situations head-on).  But the evidence suggests that 
at least some obese people may experience disutility from frequent contact with others, so 
exploring whether they also avoid frequent contact with others in an employment setting 
is worth exploring. 
If the obese are sorting into certain occupations but not others, the sorting could 
be the result of pressure from one of two sides.  This section has explored the potential 
pressures of the supply side—that is, why the obese may keep themselves out of certain 
                                                
22 Anna M. Meyers and James Rosen, “Obesity Stigmatization and Coping: Relation to Mental Health 
Symptoms, Body Image, and Self-Esteem,” International Journal of Obesity 23 (1999): 221-30. 
23 Anna Kirkland, “Think of the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance Movement,” 
Law & Society Review 42 (June 2008): 411. 
24 Esther D. Rothblum et al., “The Relationship Between Obesity, Employment Discrimination, and 
Employment-Related Victimization,” Journal of Vocational Behavior 37 (1990): 251-66. 
25 Anna Kirkland, “Think of the Hippopotamus: Rights Consciousness in the Fat Acceptance Movement,” 
Law & Society Review 42 (June 2008): 410-412 
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occupations.  In the next section, I will explore the potential pressures of the demand 
side, or why the obese may be kept out of certain occupations. 
Demand-Side Effects 
According to the pure supply-side theory, an obese worker requires additional 
compensation to work in occupations with certain characteristics, which effectively 
reduces the number of obese people in these occupations.  In contrast, the pure demand-
side theory assumes that obese workers do not avoid occupations with certain 
characteristics like an emphasis on physical activity or communication.  The demand-side 
theory instead posits that employers are less willing to hire obese people into occupations 
with certain characteristics (or at least are not willing to pay obese people as much as 
non-obese people for the same occupations). 
But why would employers care about a person’s weight when making hiring 
decisions and wage determinations?  Employers would care if obese people are less 
productive or cost more to employ.  The classical model of wage determination holds that 
in a perfectly competitive market, the wage rate is set where the marginal cost of labor, 
wage, is equal to the marginal revenue product of labor.  If obese and non-obese workers 
have the same marginal revenue product and cost the same amount to employ, then 
employers should be indifferent about whether they hire an obese or a non-obese worker 
for the job.  However, if marginal revenue product of labor for obese workers were 
actually less than the marginal revenue product of labor for non-obese workers in 
occupations with certain characteristics, then employers should refuse to hire obese 
workers for these occupations at the same wage rate as non-obese workers.  As long as 
 15 
belief was erroneous), employers would refuse to hire obese workers for these 
occupations at the same wage rate as non-obese workers, as shown in the models of 
statistical discrimination by Phelps (1972), Arrow (1972, 1973), and McCall (1972).26  Of 
course, if employers’ beliefs about obese workers’ productivity were erroneous, then 
their beliefs (and as a result, the statistical discrimination) would disappear in the long 
run.27 
Suppose instead that the marginal revenue product of labor is exactly the same for 
obese and non-obese workers in all occupations, yet the marginal cost of employing 
obese workers is higher in occupations with certain characteristics than employing non-
obese workers.  In mathematical terms, let 
! 
wNO " wO = wNO + a, (7) 
where wNO is the marginal cost of employing a non-obese worker, wO is the marginal cost 
of hiring an obese worker, and a represents the increase in marginal cost from employing 
an obese worker in occupations with certain characteristics.  For occupations without any 
of the characteristics in question, a=0, and obese and non-obese workers are 
interchangeable—they have the same marginal revenue product and the same marginal 
cost.  For occupations with the characteristics, however, a>0, and obese workers are more 
expensive to employ than non-obese workers.  Note that occupations may have both 
                                                
26 Edmund S. Phelps, “The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism,” American Economic Review 62 
(1972): 659-61; Kenneth Arrow, “Models of Job Discrimination,” and “Some Mathematical Models of 
Race in the Labor Market,” in Anthony H. Pascal, ed., Racial Discrimination in Economic Life (Lexington, 
Mass. Lexington Books, 1972): 83-102, 187-204; Kenneth Arrow, “The Theory of Discrimination,” in 
Orley A. Ashenfelter and Albert Rees, eds., Discrimination in Labor Markets (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), 3-33; John J. McCall, “The Simple Mathematics of Information, Job Search, and 
Prejudice,” in Anthony H. Pascal, ed., Racial Discrimination in Economic Life (Lexington, Mass. 
Lexington Books, 1972): 205-224. 
27 For a discussion of statistical discrimination models, see Glen G. Cain, “The Economic Analysis of 
Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 1, ed. Orley Ashenfelter 
and Richard Layard (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1986), 693-785. 
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characteristics for which weight does matter (and creates an additional cost, a) and 
characteristics for which weight does not matter.  The more characteristics an occupation 
has for which weight does matter, the higher that a becomes.  Firms would not be willing 
to hire obese workers at as high of a wage rate as non-obese in any occupation where a is 
positive. 
 Whether obese workers are less productive in certain occupations or whether they 
are just more costly to employ, the result is the same: employers will not be willing to 
pay obese workers as much as non-obese workers for performing these occupations.  As a 
result, obese workers will sort out of occupations that place an emphasis on the 
characteristics in question and into occupations where these characteristics are less 
important.28 
 So far, this section has vaguely referred to the occupational characteristics for 
which weight might matter as “certain characteristics.”  But what are these certain 
characteristics?  The same two characteristics discussed in the supply-side section, 
physical activity requirements and communication requirements, could easily create an 
issue for the obese on the demand side as well.  These occupational characteristics could 
plausibly create issues for the obese in either of the ways described above: obese workers 
might be less productive in jobs that emphasize these characteristics, or obese workers 
might be more costly to employ in occupations that emphasize these characteristics. 
 If obesity lowers a worker’s marginal revenue product, then obesity becomes an 
activity limitation, and thus, resembles a disability.  Empirical studies of disability largely 
confirm the economic theory that, like obese workers, individuals with disabilities have 
                                                
28 This demand-side model is loosely based on Gary Becker’s model of taste-based discrimination in The 
Economics of Discrimination, 2d. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971). 
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worse economic outcomes than individuals without such limitations.  For example, 
Famulari (1992) used a sample of individuals with epilepsy to demonstrate that physical 
limitations were largely responsible for their lower educational attainment, employment 
rates, and earnings.29  Both Loprest and Maag (2003) and Hollenbeck and Kimmel (2008) 
further demonstrated the direct connection between activity limitations and poor 
economic outcomes by demonstrating that individuals with late-onset disabilities had a 
smaller wage gap than individuals with early-onset disabilities.  Not only were late-onset 
disabilities generally less severe, but they also had less potential to interfere with human 
capital accumulation.30  Nevertheless, some disability research such as Baldwin and 
Johnson (1994, 1995, 2000), DeLeire (2001), and Jones et al. (2006) has questioned 
whether the poor economic outcomes of the disability can be solely attributed to the 
activity limitations and has attributed at least some of the disability penalty to 
discrimination.31  But a recent article by Longhi et al. (2012) attempts to refute these 
discrimination claims, demonstrating that the disability wage gap in the United Kingdom 
can largely be explained by lower productivity, and the residuals that remain can mostly 
be explained by differences in education and occupation.32  Whether discrimination plays 
                                                
29 Melissa Famulari, “The Effects of a Disability on Labor Market Performance: The Case of Epilepsy,” 
Southern Economic Journal 58 (Apr. 1992): 1072-1087. 
30 Pamela Loprest and Elaine Maag, The Relationship Between Early Disability Onset and Education and 
Employment (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2003); Kevin Hollenbeck and Jean Kimmel, 
“Differences in Returns to Education for Males by Disability Status and Age of Disability Onset,” Southern 
Economic Journal 74 (2008): 707-24. 
31 Marjorie L. Baldwin and William G. Johnson, “Labour Market Discrimination Against Men with 
Disabilities,” Journal of Human Resources 29 (1994): 1-19; Marjorie L. Baldwin and William G. Johnson, 
“Labour Market Discrimination Against Women with Disabilities,” Industrial Relations 34 (1995):  555-
77; Marjorie L. Baldwin and William G. Johnson, “Labour Market Discrimination Against Men with 
Disabilities in the Year of the ADA,” Southern Economic Journal 66 (2000): 548-66; Thomas DeLeire, 
“The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” Journal of Human Resources 
35 (2000): 693-715; Melanie K. Jones et al., “Disability, Gender, and the British Labour Market,” Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series 58 (2006): 407-49. 
32 Simonetta Longhi et al., “Interpreting Wage Gaps of Disabled Men: The Roles of Productivity and 
Discrimination,” Southern Economic Journal 78 (Jan. 2012): 931- 53. 
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any role or not, the disability literature does agree that, as economic theory predicts, 
activity limitations explain a large portion of the lower wages, employment rates, and 
educational outcomes of the disabled. 
 If obesity is analogous to a disability, then we would expect to see a similar offset 
in wages and employment rates in occupations for which obesity created the greatest 
activity limitations.  Again, the existing medical evidence on obesity demonstrates that it 
is most likely to interfere with physical activities.  The evidence from the psychology 
literature presented in the previous section also suggests that obesity may interfere with 
communication activities.  For the same reasons that obese workers may keep themselves 
out of occupations that emphasize physical and communication activities (the supply-side 
effect), employers may also wish to keep obese people out of these occupations (the 
demand-side effect).  Consequently, looking at employment and wages in these 
occupations should provide greater insight as to what is happening to the obese in the 
labor market. 
 In contrast, obesity may not interfere with certain activities, and thus hinder 
productivity, at all.  But obese workers would still experience lower wages and lower 
rates of employment in certain occupations if being obese created an additional cost for 
employers in these occupations.  Fringe benefits, for example, might be more costly to 
provide for obese employees.  When purchasing individual policies, life and health 
insurance premiums are generally more expensive for the obese since obesity is 
associated with higher rates of morbidity and mortality.  A large employer who provides 
insurance may not experience an increase in insurance premiums from hiring an obese 
worker since the greater morbidity and mortality risk is pooled over a large group of 
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employees.  But a smaller employer might see an increase in premiums.  Bhattacharya 
and Bundorf (2009) investigated this issue and found that obese workers who were 
covered by private health insurance did see a statistically significant offset in wages.  
They found no evidence of an offset for obese workers covered by life insurance.  The 
authors then used data on average medical expenditures to argue that the difference 
between these expenditures by condition for the obese versus the non-obese was greater 
for women than for men, which they believed explained the larger wage discrepancy 
experienced by obese women in the labor market.  In reality, the data demonstrated quite 
significant differences in medical expenditures by obese men too.  Moreover, even after 
accounting for the higher medical expenditures for obese women, a large unexplained 
gap still remained between the wages of obese women and non-obese women.  In sum, 
the authors demonstrated that fringe benefits might explain some of the wage gap, but not 
the entirety of the wage gap.33   
 If the higher cost of fringe benefits cannot fully explain the wage gap between the 
obese and the non-obese, then what else could create the additional cost, a, for 
employers?  A possibility considered by many previous authors is discrimination.  In fact, 
John Cawley, the author of the definitive 2004 wage study as well as many other works 
on obesity, noted in an interview with the New York Times, “Based on my reading of the 
evidence, I think that . . . some part of the obesity wage penalty is due to 
discrimination.”34  The problem with attributing the obesity wage penalty to 
discrimination, of course, is that discrimination is not provable in this type of study.  In a 
                                                
33 Jay Bhattacharya and M. Kate Bundorf, "The Incidence of the Healthcare Costs of Obesity," Journal of 
Health Economics 28 (2009): 649-658. 
34 John Cawley, “Why the Overweight Earn Less,” Room for Debate, New York Times Online, last 
modified 29 Nov. 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/11/28/should-legislation-protect-
obese-people/the-obesity-wage-penalty. 
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courtroom setting, an employee suing her employer can prove discrimination by 
presenting both direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory remarks, preferential 
treatment, and other relevant information.   But I am not trying to prove an individual 
instance of discrimination; instead, I am interested in considering discrimination as a 
possible hypothesis for the society-wide wage gaps experienced by the obese.  In this 
type of study, which examines the causes of these society-wide wage gaps, discrimination 
is always the residual hypothesis.  As a result, the best that this study or any economics 
study can do is eliminate all other plausible explanations and speculate (with the help of 
some anecdotes about actual discriminatory incidents).  
 Nevertheless, the possibility of discrimination is considered in virtually every 
paper on obesity in the labor market and even advocated in studies from a distinct, but 
highly related field: beauty.  Most famously, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found that 
“plain people” earn less than “average-looking people,” and average-looking people earn 
less than the “good-looking.”  The authors also found that plain women lose in more 
areas than just wages: not only do they marry men with low human capital, but they also 
have lower labor-force participation rates than average-looking women.35 Hamermesh 
and Biddle (2001) extended these results to the market for lawyers.36  In both papers, the 
authors found evidence of occupational sorting, with attractive people overrepresented in 
occupations where beauty was likely to be profitable, such as sales occupations and legal 
jobs in the private sector.  Nevertheless, the authors found that the wage penalties still 
existed after controlling for these differences in occupation as well as differences in other 
                                                
35 Daniel S. Hamermesh and Jeff E. Biddle, “Beauty and the Labor Market,” American Economic Review 
84 (Dec. 1994): 1174-94. 
36 Daniel S. Hamermesh and Jeff E. Biddle, “Beauty, Productivity, and Discrimination: Lawyers’ Looks 
and Lucre,” Journal of Labor Economics 16 (1998): 172-201. 
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possible explanatory factors such as age and education.  As a result, the authors argued in 
both papers that taste-based discrimination, although untestable, was to blame for the 
poor labor market outcomes of the unattractive.  In an experimental piece, Mobius and 
Rosenblat (2006) agreed with Hamermesh and Biddle’s argument after finding that more 
attractive employees earned higher wages even though their skill level was exactly the 
same.37  Because obesity and attractiveness are intertwined,38 defaulting to discrimination 
to explain the obesity wage gap is appealing.  But before even considering 
discrimination, I must first rule out all of the hypotheses for the obesity wage gap 
presented above. 
 In sum, this chapter will test a variety of hypotheses about how occupational 
sorting of the obese may explain their poor labor market outcomes.  Whether the obese 
sort and how the obese sort into different occupations can tell a lot about why they 
ultimately earn less than their normal-weight counterparts.  The next sections introduce 
the methodology and data necessary to test these hypotheses.   
 
Empirical Methodology 
 
The previous section hypothesized that if obese workers sort into different 
occupations than non-obese workers, then the sorting would be most evident in 
occupations that emphasize communication and physical activity.  This sorting could 
                                                
37 Markus M. Mobius and Tanya S. Rosenblat, “Why Beauty Matters,” American Economic Review 96 
(Mar. 2006): 222-35. 
38 Although the correlation between obesity and attractiveness seems obvious, Dan-Olof Rooth 
demonstrated empirically that being obese lowered “attractiveness ratings,” particularly for women in 
"Obesity, Attractiveness, and Differential Treatment in Hiring: A Field Experiment," Journal of Human 
Resources 44 (Summer 2009): 710-35.  Similar results are presented in Joni Hersch, “Skin Color, Physical 
Appearance, and Perceived Discriminatory Treatment,” Journal of Socio-Economics 40 (Oct. 2011): 671-
78. 
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arise from the supply side (obese people keeping themselves out of certain occupations), 
the demand side (employers keeping obese people out of certain occupations), or both.  If 
the obese are actually sorting into different occupations than the non-obese, this sorting 
helps to explain the wage gap between the obese and the non-obese. 
This chapter tests these hypotheses in two steps.  For simplicity, I explain the two-
step model in this section assuming that only two BMI groups, obese and normal weight, 
exist.  Nevertheless, in the actual empirical analysis, I will consider all five medical 
classifications of BMI: underweight, normal weight, overweight, obese, and morbidly 
obese.  I further assume that two types of job characteristics, communication 
requirements and physical requirements, exist for the purposes of this section.  Later, in 
the actual empirical analysis, I will consider multiple types of physical and 
communication characteristics. 
For step one, I regress each of the job characteristics on BMI and other controls to 
determine whether obesity has an effect on occupational choice: 
! 
Ji = X"+ #O+$ . (8) 
Here, Ji is a rating of how important either physical activity or communication is to the 
occupation.  X is a vector of individual characteristics that commonly play a role in 
occupational choice, such as education, age, race, and geographical region.  O is an 
indicator variable equal to one when the individual is obese; here, normal weight is the 
omitted category.  Thus, if the theory is correct that obese individuals sort out of 
occupations that emphasize physical and communication activities, then " would be less 
than zero. 
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 If " is less than zero and evidence of occupational sorting is present, then the next 
step is to see what role this sorting plays in wage determination.  Thus, the second step of 
analysis requires running the following regression: 
! 
ln(wage) = X"+ #O+$1J1 +$2J2 + %1(O & J1) + %2(O & J2) +' . (9) 
In this conventional wage regression, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
real wages.  X is the same vector of individual characteristics as in equation (8), and O is 
again an indicator variable equal to one if the individual is obese.  The terms J1 and J2 are 
the same ratings used in the first step of how important physical activity and 
communication are to the occupation.  Finally, (OxJ1) and (OxJ2) are the interaction 
terms of obesity with each ratings variable.   
In step two, a positive (negative) #1 or #2 will indicate that occupations that 
emphasize either physical activity or communication pay more (less) than occupations 
that do not emphasize these characteristics.  A positive (negative) $1 or $2 will indicate 
that the obese are paid more (less) than other weight groups for jobs that emphasize 
physical activity or communication.  Finally, a value of " that is statistically different 
from zero represents the remaining wage gap for the obese that cannot be explained by 
variation in individual characteristics or by occupational emphasis on physical and 
communication activities.  In other words, a non-zero value of " would indicate that 
obesity (or an omitted variable correlated with obesity) persists as a determinant of wage 
despite the additional controls for physical and communication activities.  With both the 
wage regression and the job characteristic regression in mind, I now turn to the data 
necessary to implement them. 
 
 24 
Data 
 
Many of the previous studies on obesity and the labor market, including Averett 
and Korenman (1996), Pagan and Davila (1997), Cawley (2004), and Bhattacharya and 
Bundorf (2009), have used the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).39  The 
reliance on this dataset in the literature has been partially driven by the fact that the 
NLSY is very comprehensive, collecting data on, among other things, the height, weight, 
age, education, geographic location, employment status, occupation, wages, and hours 
worked per week of each respondent and each respondent’s siblings.  Yet much of the 
reliance on this dataset has also been driven by the fact that it used to be the only dataset 
available that collected data on both health and labor market characteristics.   
As a result, there has been little documentation of the obesity wage penalty 
outside of the NLSY.  There is no evidence that the NLSY is in any way biased, but it 
would be nice to show that the obesity wage penalty is not simply an artifact of this 
dataset.  The bigger concern about the NLSY, however, is that most of the respondents 
are young.  The first cohort of the NLSY began in 1979 and included respondents 
between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one.  The oldest respondents are only in their 
middle ages, and the majority of the observations come from much younger respondents.  
As a result, it is not known whether the NLSY results are valid for older labor force 
participants. 
                                                
39 Susan Averett and Sanders Korenman, “The Economic Reality of the Beauty Myth," Journal of Human 
Resources 31 (1996): 304-30; Jose A. Pagan and Alberto Davila, "Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and 
Earnings,” Social Science Quarterly 8 (1997): 756-70; John Cawley, “The Impact of Obesity on Wages,“ 
Journal of Human Resources 39 (2004): 451-74; Jay Bhattacharya and M. Kate Bundorf, "The Incidence of 
the Healthcare Costs of Obesity," Journal of Health Economics 28 (2009): 649-658. 
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Fortunately, a new dataset collects labor market, weight, and height data from 
respondents of all ages.  For over fifty years, the Current Population Survey (CPS) has 
collected data on employment characteristics (including wages, labor supply, occupation, 
and industry) and demographic characteristics (including age, sex, race, and education) of 
randomly selected households.  Like the NLSY, the CPS is administered by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS).  Although the BLS has administered the CPS since 1940, the BLS 
began administering an additional questionnaire, the American Time Use Survey 
(ATUS), to a subset of households participating in the CPS in 2003.  The ATUS 
“provides nationally representative estimates of how, where, and with whom Americans 
spend their time, …providing data on the full range of nonmarket activities, from 
childcare to volunteering.”40  Yet even though the ATUS provides all this detail, it still 
does not provide information on respondents’ height and weight. 
 A supplement to the ATUS, the Eating and Health Module (EHM), opportunely 
filled in this gap within the ATUS from 2006 to 2008.  The EHM asked ATUS 
respondents additional questions about their eating habits, meal preparation, and overall 
health.  More importantly for this study, the EHM asked respondents for their height and 
weight.  When all three datasets are matched, they provide information on each 
respondent’s weight, height, demographic characteristics, employment status, wages, 
industry, and occupation.  Although all of the relevant information for this study comes 
from the CPS and the EHM questionnaires, the ATUS data is required to link the CPS 
                                                
40 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Overview,” American Time Use Survey, last modified 22 June 2011, 
http://www.bls.gov/tus/overview.htm#1. 
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and the EHM, so the matched data will be referred to hereafter as the CPS-ATUS-EHM 
data.41  
Summary statistics on weight categories and demographic characteristics are 
presented for the CPS-ATUS-EHM data by gender in Table 1.  The sample contains more 
women than men, but the women and men are almost identically educated (with 71.77 
percent of women completing at least some college, and 71.70 percent of men completing 
at least some college).  The men in the sample are generally heavier than the women: 
almost half of women are normal weight, while almost half of men are overweight.  
Finally, the age statistics demonstrate that this dataset can adequately address the biggest 
weakness of the NLSY: the lack of older people.  In the CPS-ATUS-EHM, the 
respondents are almost equally divided between the 18-to-40 age range (the sole focus of 
the NLSY) and the 41-to-65 age range. 
Tables 2 and 3 begin to address the subject of this paper: occupational sorting.  
These tables present the major occupation and industry summary statistics by gender and 
BMI classification.  Appendix A provides additional details on the specific CPS industry 
and occupation variables used in this chapter.  Tables 2 and 3 also present the results of 
Bonferroni multiple comparison tests of statistical difference between the industry and 
occupation distribution of each weight group.  For men, very few trends emerge, but 
                                                
41 A note on interview timing and the matching process: I match the CPS respondent file data to the EHM 
data using the ATUS-CPS link file.  The CPS interviews participants for four consecutive months.  After 
their first four interviews, participants are not contacted for the following eight months and are out of the 
CPS.  Once eight months have expired—a year after being contacted for the initial interview—participants 
are interviewed again for four consecutive months.  The CPS data that I use for the purposes of this paper 
comes from their exit interview conducted in the final (sixteenth) month.  CPS participants are selected 
randomly after their exit interview to participate in the ATUS and EHM.  ATUS and EHM participants 
respond to the ATUS and EHM two months after completing their CPS exit interview.  In sum, two months 
pass between the collection of the CPS data and the EHM data used in this paper.  As a result, it is possible 
that a respondent could have lost a job, changed jobs, or changed wages in the two months between the 
CPS exit interview and the EHM, which would introduce measurement error.  Yet because only two 
months pass between interviews, any measurement error should be very small. 
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perhaps the most noticeable trend is the steep, statistically significant decline in leisure 
and hospitality industry participation as BMI increases.  The occupation and industry 
distribution for men in the underweight group is often quite different than the distribution 
for all other weight groups, but much of this difference is likely attributable to the small 
sample of only forty underweight men.  For women, several trends are visible.  
Interestingly, participation in the educational and health services industry and the public 
administration industry actually increases with BMI.  Participation in service occupations 
and office and administrative support occupations similarly increases with BMI, but 
participation in sales occupations declines as BMI increases.   
Even though several statistically significant trends emerge from this data, 
particularly from the women’s data, it is still not clear that any occupational or industry 
sorting occurs by BMI.  More importantly, the model section of this chapter argued that if 
sorting occurred at all, it would be most visible in occupations that emphasized 
communication and physical activities.  The major industry and occupation names reveal 
very little about the communication and physical requirements of these jobs.  A more 
detailed industry and occupation breakdown have more detailed names, but still these 
more detailed names would reveal very little about the actual skills required for each job. 
The CPS-ATUS-EHM does not contain any information on occupational skill 
requirements.  Fortunately, another dataset does.  The Occupational Information Network 
(O*NET), administered by the Department of Labor, provides objective ratings42 of a 
                                                
42 As in most of the compensating differentials literature, this paper uses objective measures of 
occupational characteristics to test for the presence of compensating differentials.  In reality, whether I use 
individuals’ subjective ratings of their occupational characteristics or more general objective measures like 
O*NET should not matter, as seen in Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, “Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, 
and Differences in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs,” Journal of Human Resources (Spring 1990): 202-27.  Hersch 
and Viscusi found evidence of compensating differentials for job risk even though subjective ratings were 
used. 
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wide variety of occupational characteristics and skill requirements, including 
communication and physical activity requirements.  O*NET was developed in 1998 as a 
replacement to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).  Not only does O*NET 
include more occupations than the DOT in its job characteristic ratings, but it also boasts 
more categories of job characteristic ratings. On a scale of one (not important) to five 
(essential), O*NET rates physical characteristics such as importance of performing 
general physical activities, importance of speed of limb movement, importance of 
stamina, importance of explosive strength, importance of dynamic strength, importance 
of static strength, and importance of trunk strength.43  Similarly, O*NET rates 
communications characteristics like importance of communicating with persons outside 
the organization, importance of communicating with supervisors, peers, or subordinates, 
how much contact with others is required by the job, importance of establishing and 
maintaining interpersonal relationships, importance of performing or working directly 
with the public, and importance of selling or influencing others, all on a scale of one to 
five.44   
O*NET ratings are based on occupation, so the only way to match the O*NET 
ratings to the CPS-ATUS-EHM data is through occupational codes.  O*NET uses its own 
numerical classification system that is closely related to the Standard Occupational 
                                                
43 Dynamic strength is the “ability to exert muscle force repeatedly or continuously over time. This 
involves muscular endurance and resistance to muscle fatigue.”  Explosive strength is the “ability to use 
short bursts of muscle force to propel oneself (as in jumping or sprinting), or to throw an object.”  Static 
strength is the “ability to exert maximum muscle force to lift, push, pull, or carry objects.”  Trunk strength 
is the “ability to use your abdominal and lower back muscles to support part of the body repeatedly or 
continuously over time without 'giving out’ or fatiguing.”  Department of Labor, “O*NET Data 
Descriptors: Abilities—Physical Abilities,” O*NET Online, last accessed 06 Feb. 2012, 
http://www.onetonline.org/find/descriptor/browse/Abilities/1.A.3. 
44 Notably, the O*NET communications ratings do not distinguish individuals whose job requires a high 
level of communication in person from individuals whose job requires a high level of communication over 
the phone or the internet.  Determining how method of communication impacts the relationship between 
obesity and communications job requirements is a ripe area for future research. 
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Classification System (SOC), while the CPS-ATUS-EHM data uses U.S. Census codes.  
Thus, matching the datasets requires a crosswalk from one classification system to the 
other.  A direct crosswalk from Census codes to SOC codes does not yet exist, so the 
matching process required two steps.  I first matched the O*NET codes to the 2010 SOC 
codes using a crosswalk available from the O*NET website.45  To match the SOC codes 
to the Census codes, I used a crosswalk available from the Census website.46  Most of the 
occupations matched directly; however, I manually matched the few Census occupations 
that did not match directly to the most closely related O*NET occupation. The summary 
statistics for the matched CPS-ATUS-EHM-O*NET data are presented by weight group 
in Table 4 for men and Table 5 for women. 
The summary statistics in Tables 4 and 5 present the means of all variables of 
interest, including the means of the six communication variables and the seven physical 
activity variables.  As in the original O*NET data, I retain the original ordinal rating 
scale from one to five in accordance with previous authors using the O*NET data, such 
as Hirsch (2005).47  For those troubled by treating this ordinal rating scale as an interval 
scale, however, I present a robustness check of my main results at the end of the chapter 
using a modified, three-tier rating scale (low, medium, and high). 
Looking first at the men in Table 4, the underweight and normal weight men are 
noticeably younger than the heavier men, and many of these characteristics differ 
significantly by weight category.  Morbidly obese men are more concentrated in the 
                                                
45 Department of Labor, “Crosswalk Search,” O*NET Online, last accessed 06 Feb. 2012, 
http://www.onetonline.org/crosswalk/. 
46 U.S. Census Bureau Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, “Industry and Occupation: 
Codes and Crosswalks,” U. S. Census Bureau Online, last modified 07 Dec. 2011, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/crosswalks.html. 
47 Barry T. Hirsch, “Why Do Part-Time Workers Earn Less?  The Role of Worker and Job Skills,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (July 2005): 525-51. 
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South, while underweight men are more concentrated in the West.  A quarter of the 
underweight men are Hispanic.  Underweight men earn remarkably lower real hourly 
wages than the other weight groups, with normal weight and overweight men earning the 
highest real hourly wages.  Throughout this paper, I define wages as the natural logarithm 
of real hourly wages in 2008 dollars.  The CPS collects weekly earnings information 
from all respondents; it only collects hourly wage information from workers paid by the 
hour.  The problem with weekly earnings data, of course, is that it contains both wage 
and labor supply information.  As a result, I use the hourly wage data available for hourly 
workers, and I convert the weekly earnings data available for all other workers into 
hourly wage data by dividing weekly earnings by hours worked.  I multiply the wages of 
workers whose wages were top coded by 1.5.48  Finally, I use the Consumer Price Index 
to convert the hourly wages of respondents from 2006 and 2007 into 2008 dollars. 
With regards to the main variables of interest, the communication and physical 
activity job characteristics, few trends are notable.  Interestingly, morbidly obese men 
have the highest average ratings for every communications variable, meaning that they 
work in jobs that emphasize communications most.  Underweight men and obese men 
have the highest average ratings for physical activity, meaning that they work in jobs that 
require the greatest amount of physical activity.  Nonetheless, very few of the differences 
in ratings for men by BMI group are statistically significant, and the ones that are 
statistically significant do not follow a consistent pattern. 
                                                
48 This treatment of top coding is customary among authors who use the CPS.  See, for example, Lawrence 
F. Katz and David H. Autor, “Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings Inequality,” in Handbook of 
Labor Economics, vol. 3A, ed. Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, 1999), 1463-1558. 
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The trends for women in Table 5, however, are much clearer.  For almost every 
variable, morbidly obese women are statistically different from normal weight women 
(see Bonferroni test “3”).  The means for years of education and age are statistically 
different for almost every group, with obese and morbidly obese women having the 
highest average ages but the fewest years of education.  Obese and morbidly obese 
women are highly concentrated in the South, and blacks are overrepresented in these two 
largest BMI groups.  Nevertheless, underweight women have the lowest average real 
hourly wages.  Perhaps the most striking trends, however, are visible in the primary 
variables of interest, the communication and physical activity ratings.  For all six 
communication variables, the trend is consistent: the average rating is highest for normal 
weight women and steadily decreases as a woman moves up in BMI classification.  The 
ratings differences are always statistically different for morbidly obese women compared 
to normal weight women, obese women compared to normal weight women, and 
overweight women compared to normal weight women (see Bonferroni tests “3,” “6,” 
and “8”).  In contrast, the physical activity ratings follow exactly the opposite trend: the 
average rating is lowest for normal weight women but highest for morbidly obese 
women.  With the exception of the speed of limb movement variable, the average ratings 
for morbidly obese women are always statistically different than the average ratings for 
normal weight women (see Bonferroni test “3”). 
The consistency of the trends for women in the occupational characteristic ratings 
is remarkable.  Still, the summary statistics demonstrate that larger women differ from 
smaller women in more than just occupational characteristics.  Therefore, before drawing 
any inferences about whether weight is causing this occupational sorting in the labor 
 32 
market, I must first control for these other differences.  The next section implements 
these controls through regression analysis. 
 
Results 
 
As outlined in the previous two sections, my analysis requires two steps.  First, I 
regress each job characteristic on individual characteristics and BMI classification to look 
for evidence of occupational sorting.  Second, if evidence of occupational sorting exists, I 
regress wages on individual characteristics, BMI classification, job characteristics, and 
interaction terms between BMI classification and job characteristics.  The O*NET data 
allows me to consider six types of occupational characteristics related to communication 
and contact and seven types of occupational characteristics related to physical activity.  
My analysis also treats members of each BMI classification (underweight, normal 
weight, overweight, obese, and morbidly obese) separately. 
The results of step one are presented in Tables 6 through 9.  Tables 6 and 7 
present the six communication ratings regression results for men and women, 
respectively, while Tables 8 and 9 present the seven physical activity ratings regression 
results.  These tables report only the variables of interest, the BMI classifications.  The 
top section of each table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) results.  In many of the 
regressions, the coefficients for the overweight and obese groups are similar in sign, 
magnitude, and significance level.  Thus, I test whether the overweight coefficient is 
equal to the obese coefficient, and for most regressions, I cannot reject the hypothesis that 
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the coefficients are equal.  Thus, in the middle of each table, I present the OLS results 
again with the overweight and obese groups pooled.   
The bottom of each table repeats my preferred specification with overweight and 
obese individuals pooled using ordered probit analysis.  Because my dependent variables 
are ordinal rating scales from one to five, OLS is not consistent and cannot constrain 
predicted values between one and five.  Thus, the more appropriate regression technique 
is ordered probit, a type of maximum likelihood estimation.49 
All three sets of regressions—OLS, pooled OLS, and pooled ordered probit—
report the marginal effects.  For example, according to Table 7, being morbidly obese 
decreases the importance that a woman’s occupation places on communication with 
persons outside the organization rating between 0.094 points and 0.117 points.  This 
decrease does not seem like much, but it is important to remember that these ratings are 
only scaled from one to five.  The wage regressions in step two of the analysis will also 
be better able to explain how this rating decrease translates into wages. 
Although the exact meaning of the results may be difficult to grasp, the pattern in 
the results for morbidly obese women is still striking.  In Table 7, the coefficients on 
morbid obesity are all negative, statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than for 
any other weight group.50  No matter how importance of communication and contact with 
others is measured, morbidly obese women are less likely to work in occupations that 
emphasize these factors.  Indeed, the pattern begins to emerge as a woman gets heavier.  
                                                
49 William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 
2008), 831-35. 
50 The lone exception is the coefficient on morbid obesity in the importance of performing for or working 
directly with the public ordered probit pooled regression.  Although this coefficient is not statistically 
significant, it is close to 10 percent significance and has the same sign and magnitude as the morbid obesity 
coefficients in the other regressions. 
 34 
After overweight and obese women are pooled, they too appear less likely to hold jobs 
that emphasize communication and contact with others.  Still, the evidence of 
occupational sorting for morbidly obese women is the strongest: the magnitude of the 
morbid obesity coefficients is over twice as large as the magnitude of the significant 
overweight/obese coefficients.  Together, the results indicate that the heavier the woman, 
the less likely she is to work in an occupation that emphasizes communication and 
contact with others. 
Surprisingly, the opposite pattern emerges for women in Table 9.  The results in 
this table indicate that the heavier the woman, the more likely she is to work in an 
occupation that emphasizes physical activity.  This result runs contrary to any of the 
theories presented in the supply- or demand-side models.  If any sorting occurred in 
occupations that emphasize physical activity, the model predicted that it would be 
negative.  Regardless of whether sorting was the product of obese workers keeping 
themselves out of certain jobs or of employers refusing to hire obese workers for certain 
jobs, the model predicted that obese workers would be less likely to work in occupations 
emphasizing physical activity because of the links between obesity and other health 
problems.  As in Table 7, these results are strongest and most consistent for morbidly 
obese women.  Being a morbidly obese woman increases the importance that her 
occupation places on performing general physical activities by between 0.150 and 0.152 
points.  Once overweight and obese women are pooled, they too appear more likely to 
work in occupations emphasizing physical activity. 
Despite the clear patterns of occupational sorting that emerge from the data for 
women, no real pattern emerges for men in either the communication or the physical 
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activity ratings.  Very little is significant in Table 6 for men, and the coefficients do not 
follow a clear pattern of getting progressively smaller (or progressively larger) as they do 
for women.  The only noticeable trend in the data is that the coefficient on underweight is 
negative and significant in several of the communication regressions.  Revisiting the 
summary statistics in Table 4 cautions me from drawing too many conclusions about the 
underweight men, however.  Recall that this dataset contains only forty underweight men.  
A quarter of these men are Hispanic, and the men are younger, less educated, and 
concentrated in the Western United States.  Thus, the underweight results in these 
regressions may be a product of the uniqueness of this small sample. 
Table 8 also fails to reveal much evidence of sorting on the basis of occupational 
characteristics for men.  This table, which regresses the physical activity variables on 
weight, does provide some evidence that underweight, overweight, and obese men are 
more likely to work in occupations emphasizing physical activity than normal weight and 
morbidly obese men.  But the results do not follow a clear pattern as they do for women: 
it is not clear that the heavier a man becomes, the more (or less) likely he is to work in an 
occupation emphasizing physical activity.  Indeed, the underweight terms have the most 
positive coefficients that are greatest in magnitude (which could again be the result of the 
idiosyncratic nature of underweight men sample), followed by the obese and overweight 
terms.  Overweight and obese men do seem more likely to work in jobs that emphasize 
physical activity.  But if weight is truly driving this occupational sorting for men, it is 
unclear why the sorting drops off for morbidly obese men, especially considering that the 
physical activity sorting results are strongest for morbidly obese women. 
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All in all, the results in Tables 6 through 9 support the hypothesis that women sort 
into occupations on the basis of weight.  The sorting theory is less convincing for obese 
men, but then again, obese women’s labor market outcomes require the most explanation.  
Previous researchers have repeatedly documented that obese women experience wage 
discrepancy that is robust to a variety of controls, but they could not explain why.51  
Perhaps the fact that obese women sort into occupations that emphasize physical 
activities and away from occupations that emphasize communications may explain their 
heretofore unexplained wage discrepancy.  Only actual wage regressions will reveal if 
and how much of the wage discrepancy for obese women that occupational sorting can 
explain. 
For this reason, step two of my analysis regresses wages on BMI classifications, 
communication and physical occupation characteristics, and the interactions between 
BMI classifications and occupation characteristics.  The results are presented in Table 10 
(with overweight and obese BMI classifications considered separately) and Table 11 
(with overweight and obese BMI classifications pooled).  In both tables, columns one and 
five present regressions of wages on weight and individual characteristics for men and 
women, respectively.  Columns two and six add controls for communication and physical 
occupation characteristics.  Columns three and seven add interaction terms between BMI 
classifications and the occupational characteristics.  Columns four and eight, the 
preferred specifications, only include the interaction terms that were significant in 
columns three and seven.52 
                                                
51 See the introduction for a description of previous papers documenting the unexplained wage disparity 
faced by obese women.  
52 Note that the F-tests for both men and women on the joint significance of the communication interaction 
terms and the physical activity interaction terms fail to reject the hypotheses that these terms are all equal to 
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Note that the results presented in Tables 10 and 11 use the “importance of 
communicating with persons outside the organization” rating as the communication 
characteristic and “importance of performing general physical activities” rating as the 
physical activity characteristic.  I chose to present the results that used these two 
variables because these variables seemed to be the most general indicators of an 
occupational emphasis on communication and physical activities.  Nevertheless, I did run 
the regressions with every other combination of the communication and physical activity 
variables as a robustness check, and the results were very similar. 
In both tables, when wages are regressed on weight and individual controls only 
(columns one and five), both men and women appear to experience a wage penalty for 
being morbidly obese.  But the penalty for women is almost twice as large as the penalty 
for men; in fact, the penalty for morbid obesity in men is of a similar magnitude to the 
penalty for regular obesity in women.  The morbid obesity penalty increases slightly for 
men when occupational characteristics controls are added but decreases slightly for 
women (columns two and six).   All of the coefficients on the BMI classifications lose 
significance for men once the interaction terms are added in column three, and all 
classifications for women except for the obese lose significance once the interaction 
terms are added in column seven.  The problem with the regressions in columns three and 
seven is that the majority of the interaction terms are insignificant (and in fact, are jointly 
insignificant together), so these interaction terms simply flood the regression with 
                                                
zero.  Yet the main reason that the F-statistic is so low for these tests is because only one interaction term is 
statistically significant, and the rest of the terms simply flood the model.  Thus, the final columns (four and 
eight) that include only the significant interaction terms are my preferred specifications, despite the results 
of the F-tests in columns three and seven. 
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extraneous terms.   As a result, columns four and eight only include the significant 
interaction terms from columns three and seven.   
Column four reveals that even after controlling for occupational characteristics 
and the relevant interactions of weight with these occupational characteristics, a 
statistically significant wage discrepancy for morbidly obese men remains in both Tables 
10 and 11.  According to Table 10, morbidly obese men still earn 9.97 percent lower 
wages than normal weight men, even after controlling for individual characteristics, 
occupational characteristics, and the relevant interaction terms.53  This result runs 
somewhat contrary to Cawley (2004), who found that the wage discrepancy disappeared 
for obese men once he introduced controls for individual characteristics and sibling BMI.  
Two differences in my estimation may explain why I find an unexplained wage 
discrepancy for morbidly obese men and Cawley does not.  I treat morbidly obese and 
obese men separately, while Cawley groups them together.  Perhaps Cawley too would 
have found a wage discrepancy for morbidly obese men if he had separated them from 
obese men.  More than likely, however, the remaining wage discrepancy for morbidly 
obese men is due to the fact that the NLSY contains more potential controls than the 
CPS-ATUS-EHM.  I am unable to control for sibling BMI, which Cawley uses as a proxy 
for genetic propensity towards obesity.  Thus, genetic propensity towards obesity may be 
driving the wage discrepancy for men that appears in my estimates but not in Cawley’s.  I 
am also unable to control for intelligence except through educational attainment. The 
NLSY contains intelligence test score data, but the CPS-ATUS-EHM does not.  If 
                                                
53 This percentage was calculated using the coefficient (-0.105) in Table 10 using the method outlined in R. 
Halvorsen and P. Palmquist, "The Interpretation of Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations,” 
American Economic Review 70 (1980): 474-75; P. Kennedy, "Estimation with Correctly Interpreted 
Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations,” American Economic Review 71 (1981): 801. 
 39 
educational attainment is a better indicator of motivation than of intelligence, then the 
absence of intelligence test score data may result in omitted variable bias, thus explaining 
the discrepancy for morbidly obese men.  Regardless of what is behind the wage 
discrepancy for morbidly obese men seen in column one, occupational sorting is not the 
culprit since the coefficient on morbidly obese actually gets larger once I introduce 
controls for occupational characteristics in the subsequent columns. 
In contrast, the wage penalty for morbidly obese women disappears once I control 
for occupational characteristics and the relevant interactions of weight with these 
occupational characteristics in column eight.  Over the course of columns four through 
eight, the wage discrepancy for women decreases and loses statistical significance as 
additional occupational characteristic controls and interaction terms are introduced.  In 
fact, in column eight, the coefficient on the morbidly obese variable loses significance as 
soon as I control for the one significant interaction term from column seven, the 
interaction between being morbidly obese and the communications rating.  
The loss in magnitude and statistical significance of the morbidly obese 
coefficient over the course of columns four through eight indicates that two forces are 
driving the wage discrepancies for women seen in my column four estimate as well as the 
in the estimates of previous authors like Cawley.  First, the regressions in Tables 7 and 9 
demonstrate that morbidly obese women are more likely to work in occupations that 
emphasize physical activity but less likely to work in occupations that emphasize 
communication.  The wage regressions in columns four through eight of Tables 10 and 
11 demonstrate that occupations that emphasize physical activity are associated with 
lower wages, while occupations that emphasize communication are associated with 
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higher wages.  Thus, unlike for men, women’s occupational sorting does explain at least 
part of the wage discrepancy between morbidly obese and normal weight women.  
Second, morbidly obese women who work in occupations that emphasize communication 
appear to earn less than women with lower BMIs who work in occupations with a similar 
emphasis.  The one significant interaction term, which interacts occupational emphasis on 
communication with being morbidly obese, indicates that a normal weight woman who 
works at an occupation with a particular communication rating would earn more than a 
morbidly obese woman with exactly the same communication rating for her occupation. 
In sum, previous authors have found that a higher BMI has a negative effect on 
wages, and once they controlled for a wide range of individual characteristics, the 
negative effects generally disappeared for men but not for women.  Although these 
previous authors have controlled for many things—including occupation and industry 
name—they have not controlled for occupational characteristics.  They have not 
considered that certain occupational skills and requirements may be more affected by 
weight than others.  The results of this chapter have demonstrated that a combination of 
sorting and wage penalties for certain types of occupational characteristics lay behind at 
least some—if not all—of the previously unexplained discrepancy in wages experienced 
by the heaviest women in the labor market. 
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Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, I perform four robustness checks of my results.  I first question 
one of the assumptions of my paper and all other previous papers in this literature.  I have 
assumed that absolute weight (as defined by the medical classifications of BMI) matters 
more than relative weight, and thus, that the BMI classifications are the correct way to 
group individuals when studying the effect of weight on wages.  Consequently, the first 
robustness check tests the effect of relative weight on occupational sorting and wages.  
Next, I reconsider my use of ordinal scale ratings for communication and physical 
activity characteristics.  Instead of using the raw O*NET scale, my second robustness 
converts this scale into low, medium, and high ratings.  In my third robustness check, I 
consider whether correcting for the fact that my weight data is self-reported changes my 
results.  Finally, my fourth robustness check explores the effects of introducing additional 
industry and occupation controls into my regressions. 
The Effect of Relative Weight on Occupational Sorting and Wages 
 Until this point in the chapter, I have assumed that the most logical grouping of 
individuals by weight is the standard BMI grouping used in the medical literature: 
underweight, normal weight, overweight, obese, and morbidly obese.  This assumption is 
not unique; all other previous authors examining the effect of obesity on wages have also 
made this assumption.  But authors working in other areas of obesity research have called 
the usefulness of the BMI classification into question.  Smalley et al. (1990) criticized the 
“false positive” problem: individuals who were very muscular, particularly men, could be 
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erroneously classified as obese under the traditional BMI classifications.54  Kragelund 
and Omland (2005) pointed out that other measures of obesity, such as the amount of 
abdominal visceral fat, were a better predictor of poor health outcomes.55  Moreover, 
after researching the history of BMI, Oliver (2006) pointed out that the BMI standards 
were not medical in origin.  The five current groups were actually developed in the 1940s 
by an insurance actuary at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.  This actuary 
developed tables classifying the average weight of twenty-five year old men as “normal 
weight” because men with this weight had the longest life expectancy (without 
controlling for any other, potentially confounding factors).  Because BMI was simply a 
weight-to-height ratio, and thus, easy to collect, it was quickly and widely adopted by 
medical researchers, epidemiologists, and federal agencies.56 
The fact that the BMI standards were promulgated seventy years ago suggests 
another potential problem with them: people were much smaller in the 1940s than they 
are today.  The obesity rate has doubled since 1980, making one-third of the country 
either obese or morbidly obese.  Because another third of the country is overweight, the 
“normal weight” BMI standard no longer represents anyone’s average weight.57  As a 
result, it may make more sense to look at weight relative to the rest of the population—
instead of the absolute standards provided by the BMI classifications—when conducting 
an obesity study. 
                                                
54 K. J. Smalley et al., “Reassessment of Body Mass Indices,” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 52 
(1990): 405-08. 
55 Charlotte Kragelund and Tobjorn Omland, “A Farewell to Body Mass Index?” The Lancet 366 (2005): 
1589-91. 
56 J. Eric Oliver, Fat Politics: The Real Story Behind America’s Obesity Epidemic (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 18-20. 
57 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Facts about Obesity in the United States,” Overweight and 
Obesity, last accessed 11 Feb. 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/pdf/facts_about_obesity_in_the_united_states.pdf. 
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Tables 12 through 17 do just that: these tables replicate the earlier results using 
relative weight categories instead of the five BMI classifications.  To examine the effect 
of relative weight, I divide both the men and the women’s BMI data into deciles.  Table 
12 defines all ten BMI deciles by gender also provides information on the BMIs of the 
top and bottom 5 percent of the sample.  Interestingly, women’s BMIs span a larger range 
than men’s BMIs: the bottom 5 percent of women have a smaller BMI than the bottom 5 
percent of men, but the top 5 percent of women have a larger BMI than the top 5 percent 
of men. 
Tables 13 through 16 reexamine the results in Tables 6 through 9 by testing the 
effect of BMI decile on communications and physical activities ratings.  In all 
regressions, BMI decile five is the omitted category.  Very little in these tables is 
significant.  The results in Table 13 indicate that men in decile ten are more likely to 
work in occupations that emphasize communication.  In contrast, women in the lowest 
three deciles are more likely to work in occupations that emphasize communication 
according to Table 14.  No clear pattern emerges from the regressions of physical 
activities ratings on BMI deciles for men in Table 15, but the women in the top four 
deciles appear more likely to work in occupations emphasizing physical activities 
according to Table 16. 
The signs of the decile coefficients, particularly for women, follow the same 
general pattern that they did in the principal results.  Lighter women appear more likely 
to work in occupations emphasizing communication, while heavier women appear more 
likely to work in occupations emphasizing physical activities.  But the overall loss of 
significance for both genders suggests that this grouping is not correct.  The five standard 
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BMI classifications—no matter who developed them and how arbitrary they seem—
matter. 
The results in Table 17, which replicates the wage results in Table 10 using BMI 
deciles, continues the pattern of overall loss in significance from using BMI deciles 
instead of the five standard BMI classifications.  Specifications one and five regress 
wages on BMI deciles and individual characteristics for men and women, while 
specifications two and six add in the communication and physical activities ratings.  
Specifications three and seven add interaction terms between BMI decile and the 
communication and physical activities ratings.  Specification four repeats specification 
three for men removing all insignificant interaction terms; there is no analogous 
specification for women since all of their interaction terms were insignificant in 
specification seven.  In specifications one, two, five, and six (the specifications without 
the interaction terms), evidence of a wage discrepancy is present for the men in decile ten 
and the women in the top three deciles. 
As in the principal results, the wage disparity still remains for the heaviest men 
even after the interaction terms are introduced in specifications three and four.  For 
women, the wage disparity disappears for the heaviest women after the interaction terms 
are introduced, also like the principal results.  The only difference is that none of the 
interaction terms for women are significant.  Thus, the additional penalty that appeared 
for the heaviest women in occupations emphasizing communication is no longer visible 
(recall the negative, statistically significant interaction term between communication and 
morbid obesity for women in Table 10).  Table 10 demonstrated that the wage 
discrepancy faced by the heaviest women was largely driven by women in occupations 
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emphasizing communication.  With this BMI decile grouping, however, this connection 
is no longer visible.   
The overall loss of significance in the Table 17 wage regressions matches the 
overall loss of significance in the occupational characteristic ratings regressions in Tables 
13 through 16.  Just like these previous tables, Table 17 indicates that relative weight is 
not what matters.  Instead, an absolute standard of weight matters, and this absolute 
standard of weight closely matches the five BMI classifications used in the principal 
results.  Even if normal weight no longer reflects the average weight of the population, 
something about it still matters for the purposes of occupational sorting.  Normal weight 
women choose occupations with different characteristics and, ultimately, earn more than 
overweight, obese, and morbidly obese women.  This finding that absolute weight 
matters more than relative weight is not completely surprising.  Anthropologists and 
psychologists such as Cassidy (1991), Sobal (1991), and Cogan et al. (1996) have 
documented that even though average weight has increased in the U.S. over the past 
century, standards of ideal weight have remained relatively constant.58  This unchanging 
standard of ideal weight can help explain why absolute weight appears to matter so much 
more than relative weight for women in the labor market.   
Reconsidering the Ordinal Scale Ratings 
Moving beyond the broader concerns about how obesity should be measured—
concerns that are certainly subject to debate—I now address the somewhat narrower 
concerns about the methodology specific to this chapter.  One potential criticism of my 
                                                
58 C. M. Cassidy, “The Good Body: When Big is Better,” Medical Anthropology 13 (1991): 181-213; J. 
Sobal, “Obesity and Socioeconomic Status: A Framework for Examining Relationships Between Physical 
and Social Variables,” Medical Anthropology 13 (1991): 231-47; Jeanine C. Cogan et al., “A Comparison 
Study of United States and African Students on Perceptions of Obesity and Thinness,” Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology 27 (1996): 98-113. 
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methodology is that the measurement of occupational emphasis on communication and 
physical activities could be flawed.  I chose to preserve the O*NET scale ratings from 
one (not important) to five (essential) in my regressions.  This choice was not groundless; 
Hirsch (2005) also maintained the original scale ratings in his work with O*NET data.59  
Still, it is not clear that moving from one to two on the ratings scale is the same as 
moving from three to four or four to five, which calls the validity of the ordinal scale 
measurement into question. 
Consequently, I test an alternative specification with low, medium, and high 
ratings.  I divide the ordinal scale into thirds, with a rating of low signifying an original 
rating of 1.000 to less than 2.333, medium signifying and original rating of 2.333 to less 
than 3.666, and high signifying an original rating of 3.666 to 5.000.  As in the previous 
robustness check, I replicate Tables 6 through 10.  This time, however, I replace the 
ordinal scale ratings of occupational emphasis on communication and physical activities 
with low, medium, and high ratings. 
The results of this robustness check are presented in Tables 18 through 22.  The 
results in these tables are remarkably similar to the principal results.  For the men in 
Tables 18 and 20, there is still no apparent relationship between weight and occupational 
emphasis on communication and physical activity.  But for the women in Tables 19 and 
21, the same pattern emerges as in Tables 7 and 9: heavier women (particularly the 
                                                
59 Barry T. Hirsch, “Why Do Part-Time Workers Earn Less?  The Role of Worker and Job Skills,” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (July 2005): 525-51.  Note that Hirsch actually went beyond my 
methodology and added several related, scaled variables together for use in his compensating differentials 
study.  I do not do add similar variables together because it is not clear that the ratings should be additive.  
A one-point difference in one rating may be quite different than a one-point difference in another rating.  
More importantly, it is unclear how to interpret added ratings variables. 
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morbidly obese) are less likely to work in occupations that emphasize communication but 
more likely to work in occupations that emphasize physical activity.  
The similarity continues in the regressions of wages on BMI classifications, 
presented in Table 22.  In this table, specifications one and four present the results with 
controls for individual characteristics and the low, medium, and high occupational 
characteristic ratings.  Specifications two and five add interaction terms between BMI 
classification and the occupational characteristic ratings.  Finally, specifications three and 
six include only the significant interaction terms from specifications two and five.  As in 
Table 10, morbid obesity consistently has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for men; differences in occupational emphasis on communication and physical 
activities cannot explain much of the wage discrepancy between morbidly obese men and 
normal weight men. 
For women, on the other hand, the controls and interaction terms involving 
communication and physical activities explain the entire wage penalty faced by morbidly 
obese women in the labor market.  Recall that in Table 10, controlling for the interaction 
between morbid obesity and occupational emphasis on communication destroyed the 
significance of the coefficient on morbid obesity for women.  Although this interaction 
term is individually insignificant in specification five, all of the communication and 
physical activities terms are jointly significant, making specification five the preferred 
specification (instead of specification six).  In sum, no matter how I use the O*NET 
ratings in my regressions—whether in their original, ordinal scale format or in revised 
low, medium, and high format—the results are the same.  Occupational characteristics 
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explain much of the previously unexplained wage discrepancy experienced by the 
heaviest women in the labor market.   
Predicting Actual Weight from Self-Reported Weight 
The next potential concern with my principal results arises from the data.  The 
EHM, like most surveys collecting weight and height information, asks respondents to 
self-report their weight.  But as anyone who has filled out a drivers’ license application 
knows, people are not always honest about their weight and height. 
Random measurement error will, of course, bias the estimates of the coefficient of 
interest towards zero.  But the potential measurement error associated with self-reported 
height and weight is particularly problematic since the measurement error may be 
systematic.  With this concern in mind, Cawley and Burkhauser (2006) investigated 
whether survey respondents systematically misreported their weight using the only 
survey that collects both self-reported weight and actual weight, the National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES).  The authors did find evidence that 
underweight people tend to overestimate their weight, while overweight and obese people 
tend to underestimate their weight.  As a result, Cawley and Burkhauser developed 
corrective equations using the NHANES to predict actual weight and height from self-
reported weight and height.  Recognizing that individuals may differ in how they 
misreport, the authors developed different corrections for each race and gender group.60 
                                                
60 John Cawley and Richard V. Burkhauser, “Beyond BMI: The Value of More Accurate Measures of 
Fatness and Obesity in Social Science Research,” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Mass., 2006. 
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The corrections have been widely adopted by obesity researchers, including 
Cawley et al. (2007), Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007), and Baum and Chou (2011).61  
Although these authors were all using datasets other than the NHANES, they 
extrapolated Cawley and Burkauser’s NHANES corrections for use with their datasets.  
These authors have found that the corrections make very little different in their results.  
Nonetheless, I implement the Cawley and Burkhauser corrections as a robustness check 
of my principal results.   
The results of this robustness check are present in Tables 23 through 27. Like the 
results of previous authors, my results with these corrections are virtually identical to my 
results without these corrections.  The sign and significance of the coefficients generally 
remain unchanged, and interestingly, changes in magnitude go in both directions.  For 
example, comparing Table 7 to Table 24, the coefficient on morbid obesity is more 
negative for women in the Table 24 regression of the importance of communicating with 
persons outside the organization rating on BMI classifications.  In contrast, the 
coefficient on morbid obesity is less negative for women in the Table 24 regression of 
how much contact with others is required by the job rating on BMI classifications. 
Turning to the wage regression results in Table 27, specifications one and five 
present the regression of wages on BMI classifications and individual characteristics 
only.  Specifications two and six add controls for the importance of communication and 
physical activities ratings.  Specifications three and seven add interaction terms between 
the BMI classifications and the communications and physical activities ratings.  
                                                
61 John Cawley et al., “Occupation-Specific Absenteeism Associated with Obesity and Morbid Obesity,” 
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 49 (2007): 1317-24; Darius Lakdawalla and Tomas 
Philipson, “Labor Supply and Weight,” Journal of Human Resources 42 (2007): 85-116; Charles L. Baum 
and Shin-Yi Chou, “The Socio-Economic Causes of Obesity,” working paper, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., 2011. 
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Specification four includes only the significant interaction terms from specification three 
for men.  Specification eight includes only the communication rating-morbid obesity 
interaction term for women. 
Comparing Table 27 to Table 10, the results for men are quite similar.  It is still 
the case that an unexplained wage discrepancy remains for morbidly obese men in 
specification four after controlling for occupational emphasis on communication and 
physical activities as well as the relevant interaction terms.  The wage results for women, 
however, are slightly different.  The sign of the communication rating-morbid obesity 
term is still negative in specification seven, but it is no longer statistically significant.  
Nevertheless, including this interaction term in specification eight is still enough to 
destroy the significance of the morbid obesity term for women.  The relationship between 
the morbid obesity term and the communication rating-morbid obesity interaction term is 
still present after introducing the predicted actual weight correction.  But in all likelihood, 
the additional error introduced by extrapolating the corrections developed with one 
dataset for use on another dataset has destroyed the significance of the communication 
rating-morbid obesity term for women. 
In sum, using predicted actual weight instead of self-reported weight makes very 
little difference for my results.  Although the use of self-reported weight appears 
problematic, in reality, it has affected neither my results nor the results of other obesity 
researchers.  No matter how the BMI classifications or the occupational ratings are 
measured, I still find that heavier women sort out of occupations with a communication 
emphasis and into occupations with a physical activities emphasis.  Thus, my final 
robustness check examines the effect of introducing additional controls. 
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Reconsidering Controls for the Occupation and Industry Name 
In my final robustness check, I control for major occupation and industry 
classifications in addition to occupational characteristics.  I have been reluctant to 
introduce these controls until this point because Cawley (2004) and his predecessors have 
shown that introducing controls for major industry and occupation groups cannot 
completely eliminate the wage disparity experienced by obese women in the labor 
market.  For this reason, this paper has advocated using more refined controls than just 
the names of workers’ industries and occupations.  Instead of these standard industry and 
occupation controls, this paper proposes looking at the characteristics and skill 
requirements associated with each occupation.  Occupations that might sound different on 
the basis of their names might actually be quite similar when the requisite skills for them 
are compared.   
The theory presented at the beginning of this chapter posits that obese workers 
might be less likely to work in jobs emphasizing certain types characteristics, namely 
communication and physical activity job characteristics, either because they avoid these 
jobs (the supply-side explanation) or because employers do not want them in these jobs 
(the demand-side explanation).  As a result, the occupational characteristic controls have 
served as a sort of alternative for the standard occupation and industry controls.  In other 
words, with the occupational characteristic controls, it is not clear that the additional 
occupation and industry controls are necessary.  Moreover, even if these additional 
industry and occupation controls are added, they are likely to be correlated with the 
occupational characteristic ratings already included.  It is unclear how any changes in the 
coefficients on occupational characteristic ratings results should be interpreted after 
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introducing these controls.  At best, if the communication and physical activities 
characteristic ratings are still significant after including standard occupation and industry 
controls, it will show that these characteristic ratings pick up an effect beyond what the 
standard industry and occupation controls can.  
Tables 28 through 32 replicate Tables 6 through 10 one final time with the 
addition of controls for major industry and occupation.  The biggest change in results 
comes in the regressions of communications ratings on BMI classifications and 
individual characteristics for women in Table 29.  Although the coefficients on morbid 
obesity are still negative, they are no longer statistically significant.  Not surprisingly, the 
industry and occupation controls are correlated with the communications ratings, and 
since they are also correlated with being a morbidly obese woman, the morbid obesity 
term loses significance. 
Interestingly, however, the morbid obesity term remains positive and statistically 
significant for women in the Table 31 regressions of physical activities ratings on BMI 
classifications and individual characteristics.  Comparing the Table 31 results to the 
analogous results in Table 9, the coefficients on the morbid obesity term are smaller in 
magnitude, but they are still positive and statistically significant.  The reduction in 
magnitude is again not surprising since the physical activities ratings are correlated with 
industry and occupation controls.  Nevertheless, the results in Table 31 demonstrate that 
the occupational characteristic ratings are capturing an effect beyond what the standard 
industry and occupation controls are able to capture. 
Perhaps the importance of the occupational characteristic ratings is most apparent, 
however, in the final table, Table 32.  Table 32 replicates the wage regression results 
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once more adding in the controls for industry and occupation.  Specifications one and 
five regress wages on BMI classifications, individual characteristics, and the industry and 
occupation controls.  Specifications two and six add controls for the communication and 
physical activities characteristic ratings.  Specifications three and seven add interaction 
terms between the characteristic ratings and BMI classification.  Specifications four and 
eight repeat specifications three and seven but only include the interaction terms that 
were significant. 
Even with the addition of the industry and occupation controls, the main results 
for women in Table 32 are very similar to the results in Table 10.  Comparing 
specification four for men in the two tables, a large wage discrepancy still remains for 
morbidly obese men even after controlling for occupational skill ratings and the relevant 
interaction terms.  Comparing specification eight for women in the two tables, controlling 
for the interaction between the communications rating and morbid obesity for women still 
destroys the significance of the morbid obesity term for women. 
Indeed, the only real change in the wage regression results comes with the 
controls for the importance of communication and the importance of physical activities 
ratings.  Without the industry and occupation controls, the coefficient on the 
communication rating is always positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient 
on the physical activity rating is negative and statistically significant.  But with the 
industry and occupation controls, the magnitude of the coefficient on the communication 
rating is much smaller for men, and the coefficient on the physical activities variable also 
loses significance for men.  For women, the coefficient on the physical activities rating 
becomes smaller in magnitude, while the coefficient on the communications rating 
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actually flips signs.  It is unclear how to interpret why the coefficient on the importance 
of communication rating flips signs, especially since the coefficient remains positive and 
statistically significant for men.  But this change in sign is certainly a product of the fact 
that the occupational characteristic ratings and the standard industry and occupation 
controls are highly correlated. 
All in all, even after adding in controls that are highly correlated with the 
occupational characteristic ratings that are the focus of this paper, most of the results 
remain unchanged.  It is still the case that the heaviest women are more likely to work in 
jobs that emphasize physical activities.  It is also still the case that morbidly obese 
women face a wage discrepancy in occupations that emphasize communication that 
normal weight women do not face.  This discrepancy appears to be the driving force 
behind the previously unexplained wage penalty for the heaviest women in the labor 
market. 
This section has demonstrated that the principal results presented in Tables 6 
through 10 are indeed robust to changes in specification and changes in variable 
measurement.  This section has further supported the theory that occupational 
characteristics, which have not been considered in the literature, are driving a substantial 
portion of the previously unexplained wage discrepancy for the heaviest women in the 
labor market.  The models presented at the beginning of the chapter hypothesized that 
obese workers of both sexes would be less likely to work in occupations emphasizing 
communication and physical activities.  In reality, the empirical results have shown that 
occupational characteristics impact female workers only.  The empirical results have 
demonstrated that morbidly obese female workers are less likely to work in occupations 
 55 
emphasizing communication, but they are actually more likely to work in occupations 
emphasizing physical activities.  With these results in mind, the final section considers 
how to explain these empirical findings using the models presented at the beginning of 
the chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The empirical results have definitively rejected one of the hypotheses advanced in 
the model section of this chapter: obese workers are not less likely to work in occupations 
that emphasize physical activity.  Obese men are no less likely than normal-weight men 
to work in occupations that require physical activity, and obese women are actually more 
likely than normal-weight women to work in these occupations.  Obese workers are not 
keeping themselves out of occupations that require physical activity, nor are employers 
refusing to hire obese workers for occupations that require physical activity.  Obese 
workers of both genders are at least as likely to work in occupations both requiring 
physical fitness (as measured by the general physical activities, speed of limb movement, 
and stamina ratings) and physical strength (as measured by the four strength ratings) as 
normal-weight workers.  Consequently, concerns that the health conditions associated 
with obesity create physical limitations that prevent obese workers from performing their 
jobs are simply unfounded.   
In contrast, the empirical results have supported the other hypothesis: at least 
some obese workers are less likely to work in occupations that emphasize communication 
and customer contact.  Not all obese workers sort away from these occupations, just 
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morbidly obese women.  Moreover, morbidly obese women encounter a wage 
discrepancy in occupations requiring communication that is not encountered by any other 
weight group.  So what explains the fact that morbidly obese women experience a wage 
discrepancy and sort out of communication occupations? 
To answer this question, I turn once more to the models presented at the 
beginning of the chapter.  Sorting on the basis of occupational characteristic could be the 
result of morbidly obese women keeping themselves out (the supply-side effect) or 
employers keeping them out (the demand-side effect).  Some psychology studies have 
presented evidence that obese individuals prefer to avoid social situations.  If true, I have 
previously suggested that occupations requiring communication and customer contact 
would generate disutility for obese workers.  As a result, obese workers would only be 
willing to work in these occupations if they were paid a wage premium, or a 
compensating differential. 
In fact, the evidence shows that obese workers are not paid a wage premium for 
occupations that emphasize communication.  In fact, morbidly obese women actually 
encounter a wage penalty.  This evidence alone discredits the theory that the occupational 
sorting of morbidly obese women is coming from the supply side.  Yet the supply-side 
theory has another problem: it fails to explain why obese women, but not men, would 
keep themselves out of occupations emphasizing communication.  The psychology 
evidence discussed in the Supply-Side Effects Section does not indicate that obese 
women have a stronger desire to avoid social situations than do obese men. 
Given the empirical results, the demand-side explanation seems much more 
plausible.  The demand-side theory held that obese workers would be less likely to work 
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in occupations emphasizing communication if obese workers were less productive in 
these occupations or if obesity created some additional cost for employers in these 
occupations.  It could be the case that obesity interferes with an individual’s ability to 
communicate with others.  But it is difficult to explain why obesity would interfere with 
the communication skills of women only, and not men.  Future research from the fields of 
psychology and gender studies may reveal that obesity impacts the personalities of 
women differently than men, but for now, that hypothesis seems tenuous at best. 
Since the previous explanations appear unlikely, I consider one final demand-side 
explanation: discrimination.  Discrimination, as explained previously, is always the 
residual hypothesis and can never be proven directly in a study of wage gaps because the 
unexplained pay gap on the basis of obesity may be driven by omitted productivity 
characteristics correlated with obesity.  My wage equations control for an extensive set of 
occupational characteristics, and as shown in Cawley (2004), an explained obesity gap 
for women remains even with additional controls for characteristics such as aptitude 
scores and family factors.  Still, my results are consistent with discrimination.  Taste-
based discrimination could explain why obesity impacts women differently than men: 
obesity in women may be less palatable than obesity in men.  This idea is not without 
basis in the literature.  For example, Taylor (2011) interviewed adolescent boys and girls 
about their attitudes regarding obesity and found that they would “rather be a fat guy than 
a fat girl” and believed that “it’s more normal for guys to be overweight.”62  Indeed, ever 
since the publication of Orbach’s 1978 self-help book entitled Fat is a Feminist Issue, 
                                                
62 Nicole L. Taylor, “Guys She’s Humongous!”: Gender and Weight-Based Teasing in Adolescence,” 
Journal of Adolescent Research 26 (2011): 178-99. 
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gender study scholars have argued that weight impacts the lives of women more 
negatively and more comprehensively than weight impacts the lives of men.63 
Taste-based discrimination would explain why occupational sorting and wage 
penalties show up most clearly in occupations requiring communication and customer 
contact.  These occupations require employees to deal with customers, co-workers, and 
supervisors more frequently.  If customers do not like dealing with morbidly obese 
women, they may not buy from her.  If co-workers and supervisors do not like 
associating with morbidly obese women, they may not cooperate with her.  All of these 
effects would generate costs for the employer.  As a result, the employer would either 
have to avoid this cost by refusing to hire morbidly obese women, or the employer would 
have to make up the cost of employing a morbidly obese woman by paying her less than 
other workers. 
Using discrimination to explain the results of this chapter is appealing because it 
fits so well with the evidence.  It also echoes the existing gender studies literature on 
obesity, which has argued for many years that women are more negatively impacted by 
their weight than are men.  Nonetheless, I cannot completely rule out other demand-side 
explanations for my results, including the possibility that obesity impacts communication 
skills differentially by gender.  Future studies from other disciplines, particularly 
psychology, can further clarify the role of gender in how obese individuals view 
themselves and how obese individuals are viewed by others. 
                                                
63 Susie Orbach, Fat is a Feminist Issue (New York: Paddington Press, 1978).  For a review of the gender 
studies literature on the disproportionate impact of weight on women, see Janna L. Fikkan and Esther D. 
Rothblum, “Is Fat a Feminist Issue?  Exploring the Gendered Nature of Weight Bias,” Sex Roles 
(forthcoming). 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1.  CPS-ATUS-EHM Summary Statistics By Gender 
 Men Women 
 Number in Sample Percent of Total Number in Sample Percent of Total 
Total Observations 8,928 100.00 10,007 100.00 
Weight Category     
Underweight 40 0.45 208 2.08 
Normal Weight 2,372 26.57 4,511 45.08 
Overweight 4,055 45.42 2,848 28.46 
Obese 2,224 24.91 2,071 20.70 
Morbidly Obese 237 2.65 369 3.69 
Years of Education     
Less than 9 210 2.35 154 1.54 
9 to 12 412 4.61 398 3.98 
High School Graduate 1,905 21.34 2,273 22.71 
Some College 2,514 28.16 3,196 31.94 
College Graduate 2,378 26.64 2,594 25.92 
Advanced Degree 1,509 16.90 1,392 13.91 
Age     
20 or less 233 2.61 283 2.83 
21 to 40 4,035 45.19 4,410 44.07 
41 to 60 4,276 47.89 4,814 48.14 
61 or over 384 4.30 500 5.00 
Region     
Northeast 1,563 17.51 1,669 16.68 
Midwest 2,201 24.65 2,576 25.74 
South 3,060 34.27 3,620 36.17 
West 2,104 23.57 2,142 21.41 
Race/Ethnicity     
Black 806 9.03 1,401 14.00 
Hispanic 1,129 12.65 1,051 10.50 
Notes: Reported estimates use respondents aged 18 to 65 from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, and EHM data.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 2.  CPS-ATUS-EHM Industry and Occupation Distribution for Men By Weight Group (In Percents) 
 Underweight Normal 
Weight 
Overweight Obese Morbidly 
Obese 
Full Sample Bonferroni 
Test 
Industry        
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and 
Hunting 
2.50 2.66 2.19 2.07 1.69 2.27  
Mining 0.00 0.80 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.78  
Construction 10.00 12.02 13.07 13.58 6.33 12.72 1, 2 
Manufacturing 10.00 9.87 11.74 9.67 10.55 10.69  
Wholesale and Retail Trade 12.50 11.89 12.43 15.33 14.77 13.07 5, 6 
Transportation and Utilities 0.00 3.92 4.56 5.67 8.02 4.74 3, 6 
Information 5.00 3.67 3.63 3.55 3.38 3.62  
Financial Activities 5.00 8.56 8.24 8.14 7.59 8.27  
Professional and Business Services 10.00 15.01 13.83 11.11 9.70 13.34 5, 6 
Educational and Health Services 15.00 14.38 12.95 12.81 17.72 13.43  
Leisure and Hospitality 20.00 7.80 5.72 5.08 5.91 6.18 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10 
Other Services 5.00 4.30 3.67 4.54 3.80 4.07  
Public Administration 5.00 5.14 7.15 7.73 9.70 6.82 3, 6, 8 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
        
Occupation        
Management, Business, and Financial 
Occupations 
7.50 22.05 23.30 21.22 24.05 22.40  
Professional and Related Occupations 25.00 28.29 23.77 21.76 28.27 24.60 6, 8 
Service Occupations 30.00 12.82 13.69 13.62 13.92 13.52 4, 7, 9, 10 
Sales and Related Occupations 17.50 10.67 11.86 13.13 8.02 11.78 6 
Office and Administrative Support 
Occupations 
2.50 7.93 6.78 8.72 7.17 7.56 4 
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 
Occupations 
2.50 1.43 1.04 0.85 1.27 1.11  
Construction and Extraction 
Occupations 
7.50 10.73 12.08 11.11 6.75 11.32  
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
Occupations 
7.50 6.07 7.47 9.58 10.55 7.71 5, 6 
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Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
Notes: Reported estimates use respondents aged 18 to 65 from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, and EHM data. Estimates based on 8,928 observations for 
men. The Bonferroni test column reports significant differences in means of weight group at the 10-percent level based on Bonferroni multiple comparison test, 
where “1” compares morbidly obese to obese, “2” compares morbidly obese to overweight, “3” compares morbidly obese to normal weight, “4” compares 
morbidly obese to underweight, “5” compares obese to overweight, “6” compares obese to normal weight, “7” compares obese to underweight, “8” compares 
overweight to normal weight, “9” compares overweight to underweight, and “10” compares normal weight to underweight. 
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Table 3. CPS-ATUS-EHM Industry and Occupation Distribution for Women By Weight Group (In Percents) 
 
 Underweight Normal 
Weight 
Overweight Obese Morbidly 
Obese 
Full Sample Bonferroni 
Test 
Industry        
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and 
Hunting 
1.92 0.91 0.74 0.68 0.54 0.82  
Mining 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.09  
Construction 0.96 2.13 1.79 1.55 1.36 1.86  
Manufacturing 4.33 4.77 4.39 4.64 3.79 4.59  
Wholesale and Retail Trade 13.46 12.02 12.43 11.15 11.38 11.96  
Transportation and Utilities 2.40 2.04 2.04 2.80 1.36 2.18  
Information 3.37 2.64 2.18 2.61 2.71 2.52  
Financial Activities 12.02 9.24 10.36 9.22 7.86 9.56  
Professional and Business Services 9.62 11.42 9.48 8.74 8.67 10.17 6, 8 
Educational and Health Services 34.13 36.98 39.40 40.03 45.80 38.56 3, 4 
Leisure and Hospitality 8.65 7.60 6.92 6.52 6.50 7.16  
Other Services 6.73 5.19 4.49 4.97 2.71 4.89  
Public Administration 2.40 4.99 5.72 6.95 7.32 5.64 6, 7 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
        
Occupation        
Management, Business, and Financial 
Occupations 
13.46 18.09 16.47 14.63 14.91 16.70 6 
Professional and Related Occupations 37.02 33.34 27.81 26.65 23.85 30.11 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 
Service Occupations 15.87 16.49 20.54 21.78 23.58 18.99 3, 6, 8 
Sales and Related Occupations 13.94 11.46 11.97 9.95 8.67 11.24  
Office and Administrative Support 
Occupations 
17.79 19.44 22.26 25.74 27.10 21.79 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 
Occupations 
1.44 0.29 0.35 0.43 1.08 0.39 10 
Construction and Extraction 
Occupations 
0.48 0.53 0.25 0.43 0.27 0.42  
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 
Occupations 
0.00 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.54 0.36  
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
 63 
Notes: Reported estimates use respondents aged 18 to 65 from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, and EHM data. Estimates based on 10,007 observations for 
women. Sample excludes pregnant women. The Bonferroni test column reports significant differences in means of weight group at the 10-percent level based on 
Bonferroni multiple comparison test, where “1” compares morbidly obese to obese, “2” compares morbidly obese to overweight, “3” compares morbidly obese 
to normal weight, “4” compares morbidly obese to underweight, “5” compares obese to overweight, “6” compares obese to normal weight, “7” compares obese 
to underweight, “8” compares overweight to normal weight, “9” compares overweight to underweight, and “10” compares normal weight to underweight. 
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Table 4. CPS-ATUS-EHM-O*NET Summary Statistics for Men by Weight Group 
 Underweight Normal 
Weight 
Overweight Obese Morbidly 
Obese 
Full Sample Bonferroni 
Test 
Years of Education 13.500 14.711 14.615 14.195 14.352 14.540 5, 6, 10 
Age 32.450 39.320 42.093 42.315 41.962 41.365 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10 
Northeast 0.225 0.188 0.174 0.164 0.160 0.175  
Midwest 0.225 0.237 0.243 0.260 0.270 0.247  
South 0.175 0.315 0.343 0.371 0.392 0.343 4, 6, 7 
West 0.375 0.261 0.240 0.205 0.177 0.236 3, 4, 5, 6 
Black 0.075 0.087 0.082 0.107 0.114 0.090 5 
Hispanic 0.250 0.112 0.132 0.131 0.110 0.126 10 
Importance of Communicating with 
Persons Outside the Organization 
1.976 2.448 2.420 2.334 2.497 2.406 6 
Importance of Communicating with 
Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates 
2.489 2.897 2.934 2.852 3.047 2.905 1, 4, 5, 9 
How Much Contact with Others 
Required by the Job 
2.211 2.536 2.560 2.477 2.595 2.533 5 
Importance of Establishing and 
Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships 
1.910 2.282 2.328 2.256 2.400 2.298 4, 5 
Importance of Performing for or 
Working Directly with the Public 
1.640 1.733 1.698 1.680 1.782 1.705  
Importance of Selling or Influencing 
Others 
1.363 1.646 1.681 1.631 1.731 1.659  
Importance of Performing General 
Physical Activities 
2.988 2.738 2.764 2.823 2.786 2.774 6 
Importance of Speed of Limb 
Movement 
1.937 1.760 1.767 1.805 1.725 1.774  
Importance of Stamina 1.838 1.686 1.703 1.724 1.698 1.704  
Importance of Dynamic Strength 1.856 1.754 1.773 1.829 1.790 1.783 5, 6 
Importance of Explosive Strength 2.008 1.728 1.753 1.807 1.753 1.761 5, 6 
Importance of Static Strength 2.493 2.097 2.114 2.168 2.041 2.123 4, 6, 9 
Importance of Trunk Strength 2.546 2.318 2.335 2.360 2.332 2.338  
Real Hourly Wage ($2008) 18.262 28.258 28.151 26.219 25.266 27.563 5, 6, 9, 10 
        
Number of Observations 40 2,372 4,055 2,224 237 8,928 8,928 
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Notes: Reported estimates use respondents aged 18 to 65 from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, and EHM, and O*NET data.  Note that the real hourly wage 
summary statistics only contain 7,484 observations.  The Bonferroni test column reports significant differences in means of weight group at the 10-percent level 
based on Bonferroni multiple comparison test, where “1” compares morbidly obese to obese, “2” compares morbidly obese to overweight, “3” compares 
morbidly obese to normal weight, “4” compares morbidly obese to underweight, “5” compares obese to overweight, “6” compares obese to normal weight, “7” 
compares obese to underweight, “8” compares overweight to normal weight, “9” compares overweight to underweight, and “10” compares normal weight to 
underweight. 
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Table 5. CPS-ATUS-EHM-O*NET Summary Statistics for Women by Weight Group 
 Underweight Normal 
Weight 
Overweight Obese Morbidly 
Obese 
Full Sample Notes 
Years of Education 14.522 14.822 14.134 13.842 13.785 14.379 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
Age 36.563 40.186 42.899 43.161 42.978 41.601 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10 
Northeast 0.183 0.184 0.158 0.149 0.119 0.167 3, 6, 8 
Midwest 0.212 0.250 0.259 0.265 0.320 0.257 3, 4 
South 0.385 0.333 0.376 0.399 0.379 0.362 8 
West 0.221 0.232 0.208 0.188 0.182 0.214 6 
Black 0.067 0.074 0.169 0.227 0.279 0.140 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9 
Hispanic 0.125 0.094 0.108 0.125 0.089 0.105 6 
Importance of Communicating with 
Persons Outside the Organization 
2.110 2.133 1.995 1.958 1.889 2.048 3, 6, 8 
Importance of Communicating with 
Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates 
2.632 2.686 2.577 2.533 2.473 2.615 3, 6, 8 
How Much Contact with Others 
Required by the Job 
2.389 2.399 2.279 2.257 2.166 2.326 3, 6, 8 
Importance of Establishing and 
Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships 
2.180 2.214 2.121 2.107 2.004 2.157 3, 6, 8 
Importance of Performing for or 
Working Directly with the Public 
1.644 1.637 1.558 1.555 1.473 1.591 3, 6, 8 
Importance of Selling or Influencing 
Others 
1.535 1.529 1.483 1.454 1.407 1.496 3, 6, 8 
Importance of Performing General 
Physical Activities 
2.941 2.964 3.041 3.063 3.163 3.013 3, 4, 6, 8 
Importance of Speed of Limb 
Movement 
1.889 1.908 1.928 1.944 2.009 1.924 3 
Importance of Stamina 1.805 1.834 1.844 1.842 1.918 1.841  
Importance of Dynamic Strength 1.894 1.927 1.973 1.979 2.050 1.955 3 
Importance of Explosive Strength 1.880 1.888 1.958 1.964 2.090 1.931 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 
Importance of Static Strength 2.277 2.286 2.357 2.374 2.465 2.330 3, 6, 8 
Importance of Trunk Strength 2.443 2.465 2.479 2.486 2.572 2.477 2, 3 
Real Hourly Wage ($2008) 13.816 22.662 20.537 18.596 15.712 21.313 2, 3, 5, 6 
        
 67 
Number of Observations 208 4,511 2,848 2,071 369 10.007 10,007 
Notes: Reported estimates use respondents aged 18 to 65 from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data. Note that the real hourly wage 
summary statistics only contain 8,915 observations. Sample excludes pregnant women. The Bonferroni test column reports significant differences in means of 
weight group at the 10-percent level based on Bonferroni multiple comparison test, where “1” compares morbidly obese to obese, “2” compares morbidly obese 
to overweight, “3” compares morbidly obese to normal weight, “4” compares morbidly obese to underweight, “5” compares obese to overweight, “6” compares 
obese to normal weight, “7” compares obese to underweight, “8” compares overweight to normal weight, “9” compares overweight to underweight, and “10” 
compares normal weight to underweight. 
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Table 6.  The Effect of Weight Group on Working in Jobs Requiring Communication and Customer Contact for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight -0.248* 
(0.145) 
-0.258* 
(0.135) 
-0.136 
(0.126) 
-0.215** 
(0.106) 
0.028 
(0.118) 
-0.172*** 
(0.059) 
Overweight -0.034 
(0.031) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.013 
(0.026) 
0.041 
(0.026) 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
Obese -0.062* 
(0.036) 
-0.016 
(0.030) 
-0.028 
(0.030) 
0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
Morbidly Obese 0.077 
(0.080) 
0.159** 
(0.068) 
0.071 
(0.070) 
0.135* 
(0.069) 
0.072 
(0.057) 
0.090 
(0.064) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.376 0.099 0.131 0.217 0.525 0.270 
R2 0.114 0.090 0.101 0.084 0.076 0.052 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.248* 
(0.146) 
-0.258* 
(0.135) 
-0.136 
(0.126) 
-0.215** 
(0.106) 
0.028 
(0.118) 
-0.172*** 
(0.059) 
Overweight/Obese -0.044 
(0.029) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.025) 
0.030 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
Morbidly Obese 0.078 
(0.080) 
0.160** 
(0.068) 
0.072 
(0.070) 
0.135** 
(0.069) 
0.072 
(0.057) 
0.090 
(0.064) 
R2 0.114 0.090 0.101 0.084 0.076 0.052 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.165 
(0.135) 
-0.256* 
(0.136) 
-0.217 
(0.154) 
-0.189 
(0.120) 
0.089 
(0.166) 
-0.097 
(0.135) 
Overweight/Obese -0.033 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.011 
(0.025) 
0.022 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.026) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
Morbidly Obese 0.054 
(0.067) 
0.174** 
(0.070) 
0.029 
(0.067) 
0.151** 
(0.069) 
0.108 
(0.071) 
0.108 
(0.072) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.017 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All 
dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All 
regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  
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Table 7.  The Effect of Weight Group on Working in Jobs Requiring Communication and Customer Contact for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight 0.032 
(0.073) 
-0.010 
(0.069) 
0.039 
(0.077) 
0.008 
(0.061) 
0.042 
(0.064) 
0.032 
(0.051) 
Overweight -0.053** 
(0.026) 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
-0.053** 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
-0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
Obese -0.051* 
(0.029) 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
-0.043 
(0.029) 
-0.012 
(0.025) 
-0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
Morbidly Obese -0.117** 
(0.054) 
-0.102* 
(0.054) 
-0.132** 
(0.054) 
-0.111** 
(0.047) 
-0.086** 
(0.042) 
-0.068** 
(0.033) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.962 0.754 0.745 0.524 0.425 0.551 
R2 0.098 0.079 0.064 0.071 0.051 0.039 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.032 
(0.073) 
-0.010 
(0.069) 
0.039 
(0.077) 
0.008 
(0.061) 
0.038 
(0.064) 
0.032 
(0.051) 
Overweight/Obese -0.052** 
(0.023) 
-0.036* 
(0.021) 
-0.049** 
(0.022) 
-0.021 
(0.019) 
-0.022 
(0.019) 
-0.015 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese -0.117** 
(0.054) 
-0.102* 
(0.054) 
-0.132** 
(0.054) 
-0.111** 
(0.047) 
-0.082** 
(0.042) 
-0.067** 
(0.033) 
R2 0.098 0.078 0.064 0.071 0.050 0.039 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.013 
(0.070) 
-0.004 
(0.069) 
0.004 
(0.074) 
0.021 
(0.068) 
0.021 
(0.074) 
0.081 
(0.071) 
Overweight/Obese -0.043* 
(0.022) 
-0.027 
(0.021) 
-0.046** 
(0.022) 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
-0.053** 
(0.023) 
-0.039* 
(0.022) 
Morbidly Obese -0.094* 
(0.056) 
-0.099* 
(0.057) 
-0.160*** 
(0.057) 
-0.107* 
(0.055) 
-0.085 
(0.057) 
-0.099* 
(0.057) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.010 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All 
dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All 
regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant 
women. 
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Table 8.  The Effect of Weight Group on Working in Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight 0.159 
(0.144) 
0.126 
(0.090) 
0.136 
(0.104) 
0.208* 
(0.112) 
0.027 
(0.094) 
0.294** 
(0.128) 
0.198** 
(0.083) 
Overweight 0.039 
(0.024) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
0.036* 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
Obese 0.077*** 
(0.027) 
0.037** 
(0.019) 
0.040** 
(0.019) 
0.074*** 
(0.022) 
0.066*** 
(0.021) 
0.054** 
(0.025) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
Morbidly Obese 0.055 
(0.061) 
-0.036 
(0.042) 
0.017 
(0.044) 
0.030 
(0.050) 
0.039 
(0.049) 
-0.056 
(0.056) 
0.019 
(0.042) 
        
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.116 0.134 0.291 0.047 0.041 0.209 0.274 
R2 0.037 0.030 0.004 0.034 0.036 0.057 0.011 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.159 
(0.144) 
0.126 
(0.090) 
0.136 
(0.104) 
0.208* 
(0.112) 
0.027 
(0.094) 
0.294** 
(0.128) 
0.198** 
(0.083) 
Overweight/Obese 0.052* 
(0.022) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
0.040** 
(0.017) 
0.036 
(0.020) 
0.028* 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese 0.054 
(0.061) 
-0.036 
(0.042) 
0.017 
(0.044) 
0.029 
(0.050) 
0.038 
(0.049) 
-0.056 
(0.056) 
0.019 
(0.042)_ 
R2 0.036 0.029 0.004 0.033 0.036 0.057 0.011 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.145 
(0.153) 
0.216 
(0.135) 
0.191 
(0.153) 
0.302** 
(0.141) 
0.043 
(0.135) 
0.361*** 
(0.137) 
0.336*** 
(0.130) 
Overweight/Obese 0.059** 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.025) 
0.040 
(0.025) 
0.067*** 
(0.025) 
0.052** 
(0.025) 
0.041* 
(0.025) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
Morbidly Obese 0.068 
(0.065) 
-0.078 
(0.071) 
-0.025 
(0.074) 
0.049 
(0.071) 
0.077 
(0.070) 
-0.048 
(0.067) 
0.021 
(0.068) 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All dependent 
variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  
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Table 9.  The Effect of Weight Group on Working in Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight -0.060 
(0.067) 
-0.033 
(0.044) 
-0.029 
(0.050) 
-0.039 
(0.054) 
-0.052 
(0.053) 
-0.045 
(0.062) 
-0.027 
(0.046) 
Overweight 0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.025 
(0.018) 
0.036* 
(0.019) 
0.032* 
(0.019) 
0.035 
(0.022) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
Obese 0.047* 
(0.026) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
0.030 
(0.019) 
0.024 
(0.021) 
0.030 
(0.021) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.024 
(0.018) 
Morbidly Obese 0.152*** 
(0.052) 
0.086*** 
(0.033) 
0.113** 
(0.039) 
0.148*** 
(0.042) 
0.107*** 
(0.041) 
0.128*** 
(0.047) 
0.112*** 
(0.034) 
        
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.873 0.538 0.803 0.573 0.921 0.951 0.654 
R2 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.039 0.015 0.035 0.003 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.060 
(0.067) 
-0.035 
(0.044) 
-0.029 
(0.050) 
-0.039 
(0.054) 
-0.052 
(0.053) 
-0.045 
(0.062) 
-0.027 
(0.046) 
Overweight/Obese 0.045** 
(0.021) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.031* 
(0.016) 
0.031* 
(0.016) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
Morbidly Obese 0.152*** 
(0.052) 
0.086*** 
(0.033) 
0.113*** 
(0.039) 
0.149*** 
(0.042) 
0.107** 
(0.041) 
0.128*** 
(0.047) 
0.112*** 
(0.034) 
R2 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.039 0.015 0.035 0.003 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.066 
(0.069) 
-0.052 
(0.073) 
-0.034 
(0.070) 
-0.031 
(0.073) 
-0.064 
(0.072) 
-0.041 
(0.069) 
-0.044 
(0.071) 
Overweight/Obese 0.042* 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
0.046** 
(0.022) 
0.038* 
(0.022) 
0.040* 
(0.022) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.025 
(0.022) 
Morbidly Obese 0.150*** 
(0.057) 
0.141*** 
(0.053) 
0.168*** 
(0.053) 
0.204*** 
(0.057) 
0.138*** 
(0.054) 
0.139*** 
(0.053) 
0.164*** 
(0.052) 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All dependent 
variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
Table 10.  The Effect of Weight Group and Job Requirements on Real Hourly Wage 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Real Hourly Wage ($2008)) 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Underweight -0.168*** 
(0.065) 
-0.120* 
(0.068) 
-0.155 
(0.347) 
-0.119* 
(0.068) 
0.009 
(0.040) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.026 
(0.215) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
Overweight 0.035** 
(0.014) 
0.032** 
(0.016) 
-0.050 
(0.078) 
-0.022 
(0.038) 
-0.040*** 
(0.013) 
-0.030** 
(0.014) 
-0.050 
(0.064) 
-0.030** 
(0.014) 
Obese 0.005 
(0.016) 
0.032 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.085) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.079*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
-0.147** 
(0.072) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese -0.086** 
(0.038) 
-0.105*** 
(0.041) 
-0.296 
(0.187) 
-0.105** 
(0.041) 
-0.177*** 
(0.026) 
-0.165*** 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.149) 
-0.068 
(0.051) 
Importance of 
Communication 
--- 0.059*** 
(0.006) 
0.070*** 
(0.012) 
0.060*** 
(0.006) 
--- 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.044*** 
(0.009) 
0.040*** 
(0.006) 
Importance of Physical 
Activities 
--- -0.061*** 
(0.008) 
-0.088*** 
(0.016) 
-0.069*** 
(0.010) 
--- -0.087*** 
(0.007) 
-0.096*** 
(0.010) 
-0.087*** 
(0.007) 
Communication* 
Underweight 
--- --- -0.058 
(0.081) 
--- --- --- -0.007 
(0.039) 
--- 
Communication* 
Overweight 
--- --- -0.010 
(0.014) 
--- --- --- -0.010 
(0.013) 
--- 
Communication*Obese --- --- -0.023 
(0.016) 
--- --- --- 0.001 
(0.016) 
--- 
Communication* 
Morbidly Obese 
--- --- 0.017 
(0.036) 
--- --- --- -0.064** 
(0.029) 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
Physical*Underweight --- --- 0.054 
(0.080) 
--- --- --- 0.013 
(0.047) 
--- 
Physical*Overweight --- --- 0.039** 
(0.019) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
--- --- 0.013 
(0.015) 
--- 
Physical*Obese --- --- 0.034 
(0.021) 
--- --- --- 0.023 
(0.017) 
--- 
Physical*Morbidly Obese --- --- 0.053 
(0.045) 
--- --- --- -0.014 
(0.035) 
--- 
         
Test: Overweight=Obese 
(P-Value) 
0.019 0.322 0.703 0.291 0.010 0.004 0.209 0.004 
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Test: Communication* 
Overweight= 
Communication*Obese  
(P-Value) 
--- --- 0.338 --- --- --- 0.512 --- 
Test: 
Physical*Overweight= 
Physical*Obese (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.795 --- --- --- 0.569 --- 
Test Communication 
Interaction Terms=0  
(P-Value) 
--- --- 0.516 --- --- --- 0.241 --- 
Test Physical Interaction 
Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.327 --- --- --- 0.653 --- 
         
R2 0.321 0.344 0.345 0.344 0.307 0.336 0.337 0.337 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates use OLS to analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions for men contain 7,475 
observations; all regressions for women contain 8,905 observations.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  Each individual’s rating 
for “importance of communicating with persons outside the organization” is used to represent importance of communication, and each individual’s rating for 
“importance of performing general physical activities” is used to represent the importance of physical activities.  All regressions include controls for years of 
education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 11.  The Effect of Weight Group and Job Requirements on Real Hourly Wage (Overweight and Obese Pooled) 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Real Hourly Wage ($2008)) 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Underweight -0.168*** 
(0.065) 
-0.120* 
(0.068) 
-0.154 
(0.347) 
-0.116* 
(0.069) 
0.009 
(0.040) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.026 
(0.215) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
Overweight/Obese 0.024* 
(0.013) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.039 
(0.072) 
-0.090** 
(0.042) 
-0.056*** 
(0.012) 
-0.048*** 
(0.012) 
-0.091* 
(0.056) 
-0.048*** 
(0.012) 
Morbidly Obese -0.086** 
(0.038) 
-0.105*** 
(0.041) 
-0.295 
(0.187) 
-0.103** 
(0.041) 
-0.177*** 
(0.026) 
-0.164*** 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.149) 
-0.067 
(0.051) 
Importance of Communication --- 0.060*** 
(0.006) 
0.070*** 
(0.012) 
0.060*** 
(0.006) 
--- 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.043*** 
(0.009) 
0.040*** 
(0.006) 
Importance of Physical Activities --- -0.061*** 
(0.008) 
-0.088*** 
(0.016) 
-0.090*** 
(0.013) 
--- -0.087*** 
(0.007) 
-0.096*** 
(0.010) 
-0.087*** 
(0.007) 
Communication*Underweight --- --- -0.058 
(0.081) 
--- --- --- -0.007 
(0.039) 
--- 
Communication*Overweight/Obese --- --- -0.015 
(0.013) 
--- --- --- -0.005 
(0.012) 
--- 
Communication*Morbidly Obese --- --- 0.017 
(0.036) 
--- --- --- -0.064** 
(0.029) 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
Physical*Underweight --- --- 0.054 
(0.080) 
--- --- --- 0.013 
(0.047) 
--- 
Physical*Overweight/Obese --- --- 0.037** 
(0.018) 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
--- --- 0.018 
(0.013) 
--- 
Communication*Morbidly Obese --- --- 0.053 
(0.045) 
--- --- --- -0.013 
(0.035) 
--- 
         
Test Communication Interaction 
Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.530 --- --- --- 0.169 --- 
Test Physical Interaction Terms=0 
(P-Value) 
--- --- 0.209 --- --- --- 0.537 --- 
         
R2 0.320 0.343 0.345 0.344 0.306 0.336 0.336 0.336 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Reported estimates use OLS to analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions for men contain 7,475 
observations; all regressions for women contain 8,905 observations.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses. Each individual’s rating 
for “importance of communicating with persons outside the organization” is used to represent importance of communication, and each individual’s rating for 
“importance of performing general physical activities” is used to represent the importance of physical activities.  All regressions include controls for years of 
education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 12.  Robustness Check 1: Body Mass Index Deciles Summary Statistics 
 Men Women 
 Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum 
       
Decile 1 12.900 20.911 22.400 11.600 19.191 20.400 
Decile 2 22.500 23.312 24.000 20.500 21.165 21.800 
Decile 3 24.100 24.716 25.100 21.900 22.459 23.000 
Decile 4 25.200 25.756 26.200 23.100 23.674 24.200 
Decile 5 26.300 26.768 27.300 24.300 25.027 25.700 
Decile 6 27.400 27.927 28.500 25.800 26.654 27.400 
Decile 7 28.600 29.211 29.800 27.500 28.354 29.300 
Decile 8 29.900 30.727 31.600 29.300 30.419 31.600 
Decile 9 31.700 33.029 34.700 31.700 33.419 35.700 
Decile 10 34.800 38.879 62.300 35.800 41.419 64.400 
       
Bottom 5% 12.900 19.971 21.300 11.600 18.396 19.400 
Top 5% 37.700 41.616 62.300 40.000 45.378 64.400 
Notes: Reported estimates use respondents aged 18 to 65 from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, and 
EHM data. Estimates based on 8,928 observations for men and 10,007 observations for women. Sample 
excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 13.  Robustness Check 1: The Effect of Relative Weight on Working in Jobs Requiring Communication and Customer Contact for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Decile 1 0.092* 
(0.055) 
-0.024 
(0.044) 
0.007 
(0.047) 
-0.024 
(0.046) 
0.047 
(0.037) 
-0.027 
(0.039) 
Decile 2 0.037 
(0.053) 
-0.043 
(0.043) 
-0.016 
(0.045) 
-0.042 
(0.044) 
0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.013 
(0.039) 
Decile 3 -0.003 
(0.051) 
-0.023 
(0.042) 
-0.008 
(0.044) 
-0.024 
(0.043) 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
-0.015 
(0.039) 
Decile 4 0.044 
(0.057) 
0.0322 
(0.046) 
0.009 
(0.048) 
0.021 
(0.048) 
-0.021 
(0.037) 
0.013 
(0.042) 
Decile 6 0.065 
(0.056) 
-0.006 
(0.044) 
-0.014 
(0.046) 
0.018 
(0.046) 
0.016 
(0.036) 
0.014 
(0.041) 
Decile 7 0.066 
(0.056) 
0.023 
(0.034) 
0.051 
(0.047) 
0.039 
(0.047) 
0.035 
(0.037) 
0.010 
(0.041) 
Decile 8 -0.027 
(0.056) 
-0.096** 
(0.046) 
-0.074 
(0.047) 
-0.079* 
(0.045) 
0.001 
(0.036) 
-0.069* 
(0.039) 
Decile 9 -0.035 
(0.056) 
-0.048 
(0.036) 
-0.037 
(0.047) 
-0.044 
(0.046) 
-0.015 
(0.036) 
-0.018 
(0.041) 
Decile 10 0.116** 
(0.058) 
0.079* 
(0.047) 
0.051 
(0.049) 
0.108** 
(0.049) 
0.090** 
(0.040) 
0.062 
(0.044) 
R2 0.115 0.091 0.102 0.085 0.077 0.053 
Ordered Probit 
Decile 1 0.062 
(0.046) 
-0.029 
(0.036) 
0.015 
(0.047) 
-0.017 
(0.036) 
0.061 
(0.048) 
0.005 
(0.047) 
Decile 2 0.016 
(0.045) 
-0.047 
(0.045) 
0.002 
(0.045) 
-0.033 
(0.045) 
0.013 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.046) 
Decile 3 -0.015 
(0.043) 
-0.029 
(0.045) 
-0.015 
(0.044) 
-0.018 
(0.044) 
-0.017 
(0.045) 
-0.024 
(0.045) 
Decile 4 0.021 
(0.049) 
0.027 
(0.048) 
0.006 
(0.047) 
0.019 
(0.048) 
-0.029 
(0.048) 
0.022 
(0.049) 
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Decile 6 0.034 
(0.048) 
-0.008 
(0.046) 
-0.019 
(0.046) 
0.027 
(0.047) 
0.016 
(0.047) 
-0.010 
(0.048) 
Decile 7 0.030 
(0.048) 
0.011 
(0.047) 
0.060 
(0.046) 
0.049 
(0.047) 
0.041 
(0.048) 
0.015 
(0.048) 
Decile 8 -0.040 
(0.048) 
-0.123*** 
(0.048) 
-0.066 
(0.046) 
-0.077* 
(0.047) 
0.0004 
(0.048) 
-0.053 
(0.047) 
Decile 9 -0.044 
(0.048) 
-0.060 
(0.049) 
-0.015 
(0.046) 
-0.052 
(0.048) 
-0.025 
(0.049) 
-0.029 
(0.049) 
Decile 10 -0.044 
(0.048) 
0.083* 
(0.049) 
0.050 
(0.048) 
0.105** 
(0.049) 
0.102** 
(0.050) 
0.070 
(0.050) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.017 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All 
dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Weight deciles are determined by weight relative to the rest of the sample from 
the same gender.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, 
presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. 
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Table 14.  Robustness Check 1: The Effect of Relative Weight on Working in Jobs Requiring Communication and Customer Contact for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Decile 1 0.129*** 
(0.046) 
0.049 
(0.042) 
0.093** 
(0.045) 
0.035 
(0.038) 
0.066* 
(0.038) 
0.045 
(0.031) 
Decile 2 0.095** 
(0.047) 
0.060 
(0.043) 
0.077* 
(0.046) 
0.034 
(0.039) 
0.038 
(0.039) 
0.014 
(0.031) 
Decile 3 0.097** 
(0.045) 
0.041 
(0.043) 
0.083* 
(0.045) 
0.041 
(0.038) 
0.045 
(0.038) 
0.034 
(0.030) 
Decile 4 0.070 
(0.047) 
0.061 
(0.044) 
0.064 
(0.046) 
0.048 
(0.040) 
0.009 
(0.038) 
0.040 
(0.032) 
Decile 6 0.085* 
(0.046) 
0.039 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.045) 
0.016 
(0.038) 
0.029 
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.031) 
Decile 7 -0.026 
(0.047) 
-0.041 
(0.044) 
-0.021 
(0.046) 
-0.030 
(0.040) 
-0.031 
(0.038) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
Decile 8 -0.018 
(0.047) 
-0.046 
(0.045) 
-0.035 
(0.047) 
-0.041 
(0.040) 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
-0.046 
(0.030) 
Decile 9 0.055 
(0.047) 
0.026 
(0.045) 
0.080* 
(0.048) 
0.055 
(0.041) 
0.052 
(0.040) 
0.040 
(0.031) 
Decile 10 0.026 
(0.048) 
0.026 
(0.046) 
0.002 
(0.047) 
0.006 
(0.040) 
-0.017 
(0.038) 
-0.003 
(0.030) 
R2 0.099 0.079 0.065 0.072 0.051 0.040 
Ordered Probit 
Decile 1 0.109** 
(0.044) 
0.053 
(0.043) 
0.066 
(0.043) 
0.030 
(0.043) 
0.100** 
(0.045) 
0.108** 
(0.045) 
Decile 2 0.091** 
(0.045) 
0.090** 
(0.044) 
0.068 
(0.043) 
0.057 
(0.043) 
0.071 
(0.037) 
0.040 
(0.046) 
Decile 3 0.087** 
(0.044) 
0.062 
(0.043) 
0.094** 
(0.042) 
0.040 
(0.043) 
0.090** 
(0.045) 
0.109** 
(0.044) 
Decile 4 0.072 
(0.045) 
0.071 
(0.045) 
0.070 
(0.044) 
0.042 
(0.045) 
0.018 
(0.047) 
0.068 
(0.047) 
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Decile 6 0.088** 
(0.045) 
0.078* 
(0.043) 
0.036 
(0.043) 
0.020 
(0.043) 
0.051 
(0.046) 
0.083* 
(0.045) 
Decile 7 -0.025 
(0.047) 
-0.030 
(0.045) 
-0.018 
(0.046) 
-0.063 
(0.046) 
-0.040 
(0.048) 
-0.021 
(0.048) 
Decile 8 -0.009 
(0.047) 
-0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.011 
(0.046) 
-0.048 
(0.045) 
-0.031 
(0.050) 
-0.060 
(0.048) 
Decile 9 0.039 
(0.047) 
0.050 
(0.046) 
0.054 
(0.047) 
0.056 
(0.045) 
0.022 
(0.050) 
0.055 
(0.048) 
Decile 10 0.055 
(0.047) 
0.043 
(0.047) 
-0.013 
(0.047) 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.013 
(0.048) 
0.047 
(0.047) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.010 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All 
dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Weight deciles are determined by weight relative to the rest of the sample from 
the same gender.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, 
presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 15.  Robustness Check 1: The Effect of Relative Weight on Working in Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Decile 1 -0.026 
(0.042) 
-0.018 
(0.028) 
-0.045 
(0.028) 
-0.052 
(0.033) 
-0.061* 
(0.033) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
-0.033 
(0.028) 
Decile 2 -0.044 
(0.041) 
-0.008 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.029) 
-0.050 
(0.032) 
-0.036 
(0.033) 
-0.036 
(0.038) 
-0.030 
(0.027) 
Decile 3 0.019 
(0.040) 
0.011 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.028) 
-0.012 
(0.032) 
-0.036 
(0.032) 
-0.013 
(0.037) 
-0.031 
(0.027) 
Decile 4 -0.001 
(0.043) 
-0.010 
(0.030) 
-0.026 
(0.030) 
-0.025 
(0.035) 
-0.060* 
(0.034) 
-0.019 
(0.041) 
-0.042 
(0.029) 
Decile 6 -0.005 
(0.042) 
-0.023 
(0.028) 
-0.009 
(0.029) 
-0.034 
(0.034) 
-0.038 
(0.033) 
-0.026 
(0.039) 
-0.007 
(0.028) 
Decile 7 0.055 
(0.043) 
0.041 
(0.029) 
0.024 
(0.029) 
0.022 
(0.034) 
0.008 
(0.034) 
0.021 
(0.030) 
0.008 
(0.029) 
Decile 8 0.037 
(0.043) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.034) 
0.027 
(0.039) 
-0.007 
(0.029) 
Decile 9 0.069 
(0.043) 
0.048 
(0.029) 
0.045 
(0.030) 
0.061* 
(0.035) 
0.049 
(0.035) 
0.044 
(0.040) 
0.034 
(0.029) 
Decile 10 0.038 
(0.043) 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.013 
(0.030) 
-0.006 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.035) 
-0.045 
(0.040) 
-0.020 
(0.030) 
R2 0.037 0.030 0.005 0.034 0.037 0.057 0.011 
Ordered Probit 
Decile 1 -0.023 
(0.046) 
-0.012 
(0.045) 
-0.049 
(0.045) 
-0.070 
(0.048) 
-0.080* 
(0.048) 
-0.023 
(0.045) 
-0.056 
(0.046) 
Decile 2 -0.055 
(0.045) 
-0.016 
(0.046) 
-0.047 
(0.046) 
-0.073 
(0.047) 
-0.044 
(0.048) 
-0.055 
(0.047) 
-0.045 
(0.045) 
Decile 3 0.023 
(0.044) 
0.023 
(0.045) 
-0.013 
(0.045) 
-0.022 
(0.046) 
-0.039 
(0.046) 
-0.024 
(0.045) 
-0.059 
(0.044) 
Decile 4 0.008 
(0.047) 
-0.012 
(0.049) 
-0.053 
(0.049) 
-0.037 
(0.051) 
-0.073 
(0.050) 
-0.027 
(0.049) 
-0.078 
(0.048) 
 86 
Decile 6 -0.001 
(0.046) 
-0.050 
(0.047) 
-0.035 
(0.047) 
-0.059 
(0.049) 
-0.047 
(0.049) 
-0.051 
(0.048) 
-0.020 
(0.046) 
Decile 7 0.057 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.047) 
0.026 
(0.047) 
0.021 
(0.049) 
0.012 
(0.049) 
0.032 
(0.047) 
0.006 
(0.047) 
Decile 8 0.033 
(0.047) 
0.047 
(0.046) 
0.005 
(0.046) 
0.033 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.049) 
0.026 
(0.047) 
-0.015 
(0.047) 
Decile 9 0.077 
(0.048) 
0.081* 
(0.048) 
0.061 
(0.047) 
0.076 
(0.050) 
0.070 
(0.050) 
0.048 
(0.048) 
0.054 
(0.047) 
Decile 10 0.053 
(0.047) 
-0.046 
(0.49 
-0.056 
(0.049) 
-0.012 
(0.051) 
0.006 
(0.050) 
-0.054 
(0.048) 
-0.041 
(0.048) 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All 
dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Weight deciles are determined by weight relative to the rest of the sample from 
the same gender.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, 
presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. 
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Table 16.  Robustness Check 1: The Effect of Relative Weight on Working in Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Decile 1 -0.077* 
(0.042) 
-0.011 
(0.027) 
-0.040 
(0.032) 
-0.030 
(0.033) 
-0.071** 
(0.033) 
-0.074* 
(0.039) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
Decile 2 -0.085** 
(0.042) 
-0.019 
(0.027) 
-0.053* 
(0.033) 
-0.043 
(0.033) 
-0.060* 
(0.034) 
-0.060 
(0.039) 
-0.043* 
(0.028) 
Decile 3 -0.058 
(0.042) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
-0.047 
(0.032) 
-0.019 
(0.033) 
-0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.042 
(0.038) 
-0.012 
(0.028) 
Decile 4 -0.095** 
(0.042) 
-0.015 
(0.026) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
-0.033 
(0.033) 
-0.033 
(0.035) 
-0.077* 
(0.040) 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
Decile 6 -0.111*** 
(0.041) 
-0.047* 
(0.026) 
-0.073** 
(0.030) 
-0.046 
(0.032) 
-0.066** 
(0.033) 
-0.103*** 
(0.038) 
-0.046* 
(0.028) 
Decile 7 0.033 
(0.042) 
0.055** 
(0.027) 
0.042 
(0.033) 
0.081** 
(0.035) 
0.050 
(0.034) 
0.059 
(0.040) 
0.039 
(0.029) 
Decile 8 -0.008 
(0.043) 
0.055** 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.033) 
0.032 
(0.034) 
0.018 
(0.035) 
0.010 
(0.030) 
0.033 
(0.030) 
Decile 9 -0.048 
(0.042) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
-0.033 
(0.031) 
-0.042 
(0.033) 
-0.038 
(0.033) 
-0.061 
(0.039) 
-0.032 
(0.029) 
Decile 10 0.024 
(0.044) 
0.040 
(0.027) 
0.025 
(0.033) 
0.066* 
(0.035) 
0.024 
(0.035) 
0.031 
(0.030) 
0.037 
(0.029) 
R2 0.030 0.015 0.008 0.041 0.016 0.037 0.005 
Ordered Probit 
Decile 1 -0.072* 
(0.044) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
-0.054 
(0.045) 
-0.023 
(0.045) 
-0.084* 
(0.045) 
-0.084* 
(0.045) 
-0.049 
(0.043) 
Decile 2 -0.090** 
(0.044) 
-0.030 
(0.044) 
-0.063 
(0.045) 
-0.051 
(0.045) 
-0.076* 
(0.046) 
-0.066 
(0.044) 
-0.080* 
(0.044) 
Decile 3 -0.062 
(0.044) 
0.001 
(0.043) 
-0.054 
(0.45) 
-0.027 
(0.044) 
-0.043 
(0.044) 
-0.047 
(0.044) 
-0.012 
(0.043) 
Decile 4 -0.079* 
(0.045) 
-0.028 
(0.044) 
-0.073 
(0.046) 
-0.044 
(0.046) 
-0.049 
(0.047) 
-0.088* 
(0.046) 
-0.034 
(0.045) 
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Decile 6 -0.109** 
(0.043) 
-0.079* 
(0.043) 
-0.077* 
(0.043) 
-0.063 
(0.043) 
-0.084* 
(0.044) 
-0.121*** 
(0.044) 
0.069 
(0.043) 
Decile 7 0.041 
(0.044) 
0.090** 
(0.045) 
0.061 
(0.046) 
0.116** 
(0.046) 
0.070 
(0.046) 
0.063 
(0.046) 
0.061 
(0.046) 
Decile 8 -0.013 
(0.046) 
0.092** 
(0.045) 
0.042 
(0.046) 
0.031 
(0.036) 
0.015 
(0.047) 
0.009 
(0.046) 
0.047 
(0.046) 
Decile 9 -0.052 
(0.044) 
-0.048 
(0.044) 
-0.037 
(0.045) 
-0.050 
(0.044) 
-0.048 
(0.044) 
-0.080* 
(0.044) 
-0.056 
(0.045) 
Decile 10 0.023 
(0.036) 
0.071 
(0.045) 
0.052 
(0.046) 
0.094** 
(0.046) 
0.036 
(0.046) 
0.033 
(0.046) 
0.056 
(0.045) 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All 
dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Weight deciles are determined by weight relative to the rest of the sample from 
the same gender.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, 
presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 17.  Robustness Check 1: The Effect of Relative Weight and Job Requirements on Real Hourly Wage 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Real Hourly Wage ($2008)) 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Decile 1 -0.072*** 
(0.027) 
-0.080*** 
(0.027) 
0.049 
(0.135) 
-0.081*** 
(0.027) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.026) 
0.119 
(0.127) 
Decile 2 -0.022 
(0.027) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
0.124 
(0.146) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
0.005 
(0.025) 
0.019 
(0.121) 
Decile 3 -0.004 
(0.025) 
-0.003 
(0.024) 
0.224* 
(0.125) 
0.056 
(0.046) 
-0.007 
(0.025) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
0.067 
(0.117) 
Decile 4 0.005 
(0.028) 
0.004 
(0.027) 
0.209 
(0.146) 
0.071 
(0.049) 
0.047* 
(0.026) 
0.036 
(0.025) 
0.189 
(0.118) 
Decile 6 0.027 
(0.027) 
0.022 
(0.027) 
0.117 
(0.144) 
0.022 
(0.027) 
-0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.036 
(0.024) 
0.117 
(0.113) 
Decile 7 -0.037 
(0.027) 
-0.038 
(0.026) 
0.063 
(0.139) 
0.083* 
(0.049) 
-0.034 
(0.025) 
-0.031 
(0.025) 
0.100 
(0.122) 
Decile 8 -0.021 
(0.026) 
-0.015 
(0.025) 
0.094 
(0.138) 
-0.013 
(0.025) 
-0.071*** 
(0.025) 
-0.073*** 
(0.025) 
0.130 
(0.124) 
Decile 9 -0.023 
(0.026) 
-0.019 
(0.025) 
0.107 
(0.132) 
0.086* 
(0.045) 
-0.058** 
(0.025) 
-0.067*** 
(0.024) 
-0.097 
(0.121) 
Decile 10 -0.062** 
(0.027) 
-0.063** 
(0.027) 
0.086 
(0.137) 
-0.062** 
(0.027) 
-0.115*** 
(0.025) 
-0.116*** 
(0.025) 
-0.090 
(0.127) 
Importance of Communication --- 0.060*** 
(0.006) 
0.086*** 
(0.018) 
0.075*** 
(0.007) 
--- 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.057*** 
(0.018) 
Importance of Physical 
Activities 
--- -0.060*** 
(0.008) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
-0.061*** 
(0.008) 
--- -0.087*** 
(0.007) 
-0.071*** 
(0.021) 
Communication* 
Decile 1 
--- --- -0.014 
(0.026) 
--- --- --- -0.026 
(0.025) 
Communication* 
Decile 2 
--- --- 0.004 
(0.026) 
--- --- --- 0.006 
(0.025) 
Communication* Decile 3 --- --- -0.043* 
(0.023) 
-0.025 
(0.015) 
--- --- -0.025 
(0.026) 
Communication* Decile 4 --- --- -0.044* 
(0.026) 
-0.028 
(0.017) 
--- --- -0.010 
(0.026) 
Communication* Decile 6 --- --- -0.014 
(0.026) 
--- --- --- -0.037 
(0.023) 
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Communication* Decile 7 --- --- -0.049* 
(0.026) 
-0.050*** 
(0.017) 
--- --- -0.037 
(0.025) 
Communication* Decile 8 --- --- -0.024 
(0.025) 
-0.046*** 
(0.016) 
--- --- -0.037 
(0.027) 
Communication* Decile 9 --- --- -0.049** 
(0.024) 
--- --- --- 0.002 
(0.026) 
Communication* Decile 10 --- --- -0.030 
(0.026) 
--- --- --- -0.019 
(0.026) 
Physical*Decile 1 --- --- -0.035 
(0.033) 
--- --- --- -0.020 
(0.031) 
Physical*Decile 2 --- --- -0.058 
(0.036) 
--- --- --- -0.010 
(0.029) 
Physical*Decile 3 --- --- -0.044 
(0.031) 
--- --- --- -0.010 
(0.028) 
Physical*Decile 4 --- --- -0.036 
(0.035) 
--- --- --- -0.045 
(0.028) 
Physical*Decile 6 --- --- -0.022 
(0.035) 
--- --- --- -0.026 
(0.027) 
Physical*Decile 7 --- --- 0.005 
(0.033) 
--- --- --- -0.019 
(0.028) 
Physical*Decile 8 --- --- -0.018 
(0.034) 
--- --- --- -0.042 
(0.029) 
Physical*Decile 9 --- --- -0.004 
(0.032) 
--- --- --- 0.009 
(0.029) 
Physical*Decile 10 --- --- -0.028 
(0.033) 
--- --- --- 0.003 
(0.030) 
        
Test Communication 
Interaction Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.274 --- --- --- 0.510 
Test Physical Interaction 
Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.717 --- --- --- 0.629 
        
R2 0.316 0.344 0.346 0.345 0.308 0.337 0.338 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Reported estimates use OLS to analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions for men contain 7,475 
observations; all regressions for women contain 8,905 observations. Weight deciles are determined by weight relative to the rest of the sample from the same 
gender.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses. Each 
individual’s rating for “importance of communicating with persons outside the organization” is used to represent importance of communication, and each 
individual’s rating for “importance of performing general physical activities” is used to represent the importance of physical activities.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 18.  Robustness Check 2: The Effect of Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication Using Low, Medium, and High Occupation Characteristic 
Scores for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight -0.149 
(0.094) 
-0.186 
(0.117) 
-0.075 
(0.094) 
-0.127* 
(0.070) 
-0.017 
(0.060) 
-0.108*** 
(0.014) 
Overweight -0.010 
(0.019) 
0.026 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
Obese -0.032 
(0.022) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
-0.019 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
Morbidly Obese 0.019 
(0.050) 
0.130** 
(0.052) 
0.074 
(0.053) 
0.081* 
(0.048) 
0.020 
(0.035) 
0.051 
(0.036) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.264 0.130 0.108 0.227 0.223 0.653 
R2 0.107 0.080 0.095 0.060 0.034 0.012 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.149 
(0.094) 
-0.186 
(0.117) 
-0.075 
(0.094) 
-0.127* 
(0.070) 
-0.017 
(0.060) 
-0.108*** 
(0.014) 
Overweight/Obese -0.018 
(0.018) 
0.015 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
Morbidly Obese 0.019 
(0.050) 
0.130** 
(0.052) 
0.074 
(0.053) 
0.082* 
(0.048) 
0.019 
(0.035) 
0.051 
(0.036) 
R2 0.107 0.080 0.094 0.059 0.034 0.012 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.240 
(0.184) 
-0.336 
(0.209) 
-0.150 
(0.189) 
-0.313* 
(0.185) 
-0.036 
(0.220) 
-0.383*** 
(0.070) 
Overweight/Obese -0.019 
(0.029) 
0.025 
(0.027) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
0.053* 
(0.030) 
-0.039 
(0.034) 
0.073* 
(0.043) 
Morbidly Obese 0.041 
(0.077) 
0.194** 
(0.078) 
0.134* 
(0.081) 
0.153* 
(0.080) 
0.059 
(0.095) 
0.192* 
(0.111) 
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Pseudo R2 0.058 0.039 0.054 0.037 0.031 0.018 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All 
dependent variables were originally ratings on a scale from 1 to 5.  In these regressions, the dependent variables take three values: 1 (corresponding to low, or an 
original score of 1 to less than 2.333), 2 (corresponding to medium, or an original score of 2.333 to less than 3.666), and 3 (corresponding to high, or an original 
score of 3.666 to 5).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age 
squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. 
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Table 19.  Robustness Check 2: The Effect of Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication Using Low, Medium, and High Occupation Characteristic 
Scores for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight 0.018 
(0.047) 
0.004 
(0.053) 
0.025 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.045) 
0.022 
(0.035) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
Overweight -0.018 
(0.017) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.040** 
(0.018) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.010 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
Obese -0.020 
(0.019) 
-0.036* 
(0.020) 
-0.030 
(0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Morbidly Obese -0.085** 
(0.035) 
-0.076* 
(0.039) 
-0.080** 
(0.039) 
-0.073** 
(0.033) 
-0.046** 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.943 0.556 0.640 0.857 0.945 0.623 
R2 0.077 0.092 0.052 0.032 0.034 0.006 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.018 
(0.047) 
0.004 
(0.053) 
0.025 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.045) 
0.022 
(0.035) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
Overweight/Obese -0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Morbidly Obese -0.085** 
(0.035) 
-0.076* 
(0.039) 
-0.080** 
(0.039) 
-0.073** 
(0.033) 
-0.046** 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
R2 0.077 0.092 0.052 0.032 0.034 0.006 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.013 
(0.083) 
-0.007 
(0.084) 
0.036 
(0.085) 
-0.030 
(0.089) 
0.035 
(0.102) 
0.001 
(0.136) 
Overweight/Obese -0.034 
(0.027) 
-0.043* 
(0.025) 
-0.058** 
(0.027) 
-0.025 
(0.026) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
0.050 
(0.038) 
Morbidly Obese -0.140** 
(0.071) 
-0.118* 
(0.006) 
-0.133* 
(0.072) 
-0.159** 
(0.073) 
-0.143 
((0.090) 
-0.103 
(0.106) 
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Pseudo R2 0.047 0.049 0.034 0.022 0.039 0.008 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All 
dependent variables were originally ratings on a scale from 1 to 5.  In these regressions, the dependent variables take three values: 1 (corresponding to low, or an 
original score of 1 to less than 2.333), 2 (corresponding to medium, or an original score of 2.333 to less than 3.666), and 3 (corresponding to high, or an original 
score of 3.666 to 5).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age 
squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 20.  Robustness Check 2: The Effect of Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication Using Low, Medium, and High Occupation Characteristic 
Scores for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight 0.182 
(0.117) 
0.041 
(0.070) 
0.045 
(0.063) 
0.123 
(0.077) 
0.007 
(0.072) 
0.173* 
(0.089) 
0.193*** 
(0.072) 
Overweight 0.031* 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
Obese 0.046** 
(0.021) 
0.013 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.048*** 
(0.014) 
0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
Morbidly Obese 0.011 
(0.048) 
-0.009 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
0.018 
(0.031) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.034 
(0.038) 
0.033 
(0.036) 
        
Test: 
Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.451 0.415 0.946 0.084 0.069 0.323 0.835 
R2 0.042 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.033 0.014 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.182 
(0.117) 
0.041 
(0.070) 
0.045 
(0.063) 
0.124 
(0.077) 
0.007 
(0.072) 
0.173* 
(0.089) 
0.193*** 
(0.072) 
Overweight/Obese 0.036** 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.019* 
(0.011) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
Morbidly Obese 0.011 
(0.048) 
-0.009 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.029) 
0.018 
(0.031) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.035 
(0.038) 
0.033 
(0.036) 
R2 0.042 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.021 0.033 0.014 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.283 
(0.179) 
0.138 
(0.218) 
0.167 
(0.211) 
0.333* 
(0.190) 
0.018 
(0.203) 
0.340** 
(0.163) 
0.422*** 
(0.155) 
Overweight/Obese 0.058** 
(0.028) 
0.025 
(0.034) 
0.040 
(0.036) 
0.106*** 
(0.032) 
0.064** 
(0.033) 
0.045 
(0.029) 
0.046 
(0.030) 
Morbidly Obese 0.019 
(0.075) 
-0.032 
(0.097) 
0.037 
(0.100) 
0.060 
(0.090) 
-0.015 
(0.091) 
-0.067 
(0.083) 
0.078 
(0.083) 
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Pseudo R2 0.021  0.002 0.010 0.008 0.018 0.020 0.009 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All 
dependent variables were originally ratings on a scale from 1 to 5.  In these regressions, the dependent variables take three values: 1 (corresponding to low, or an 
original score of 1 to less than 2.333), 2 (corresponding to medium, or an original score of 2.333 to less than 3.666), and 3 (corresponding to high, or an original 
score of 3.666 to 5).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age 
squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. 
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Table 21.  Robustness Check 2: The Effect of Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication Using Low, Medium, and High Occupation Characteristic 
Scores for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight -0.026 
(0.052) 
-0.004 
(0.032) 
-0.047 
(0.033) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.036 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
-0.024 
(0.040) 
Overweight 0.036** 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
(0.015) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
Obese 0.023 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.024 
(0.016) 
0.038** 
(0.016) 
Morbidly Obese 0.113*** 
(0.039) 
0.051** 
(0.025) 
0.048* 
(0.028) 
0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.041 
(0.028) 
0.083*** 
(0.032) 
0.116*** 
(0.030) 
        
Test: 
Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.552 0.921 0.751 0.933 0.835 0.931 0.221 
R2 0.029 0.007 0.037 0.019 0.013 0.015 0.005 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.026 
(0.052) 
-0.004 
(0.032) 
-0.047 
(0.034) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.036 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
-0.024 
(0.040) 
Overweight/Obese 0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.022** 
(0.011) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
0.025** 
(0.013) 
0.026** 
(0.012) 
Morbidly Obese 0.113*** 
(0.039) 
0.051** 
(0.025) 
0.048* 
(0.028) 
0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.041 
(0.028) 
0.083*** 
(0.032) 
0.116*** 
(0.030) 
R2 0.029 0.007 0.037 0.019 0.013 0.015 0.005 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.039 
(0.080) 
-0.015 
(0.095) 
-0.159 
(0.106) 
-0.088 
(0.092) 
-0.101 
(0.094) 
-0.034 
(0.082) 
-0.050 
(0.083) 
Overweight/Obese 0.046* 
(0.024) 
0.004 
(0.028) 
0.054* 
(0.029) 
0.056** 
(0.027) 
0.025 
(0.027) 
0.049** 
(0.025) 
0.053** 
(0.025) 
Morbidly Obese 0.173*** 
(0.059) 
0.145** 
(0.071) 
0.127* 
(0.074) 
0.172** 
(0.067) 
0.109 
(0.070) 
0.159*** 
(0.059) 
0.233*** 
(0.060) 
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Pseudo R2 0.014 0.006 0.027 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.003 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All 
dependent variables were originally ratings on a scale from 1 to 5.  In these regressions, the dependent variables take three values: 1 (corresponding to low, or an 
original score of 1 to less than 2.333), 2 (corresponding to medium, or an original score of 2.333 to less than 3.666), and 3 (corresponding to high, or an original 
score of 3.666 to 5).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age 
squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 22.  Robustness Check 2: The Effect of Weight and Job Requirements on Real Hourly Wage Using Low, Medium, and High Occupation 
Characteristic Scores 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Real Hourly Wage ($2008)) 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Underweight -0.118* 
(0.067) 
-0.283 
(0.207) 
-0.113* 
(0.067) 
0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.154 
(0.140) 
0.001 
(0.039) 
Overweight 0.032** 
(0.015) 
-0.078 
(0.049) 
-0.037 
(0.039) 
-0.030** 
(0.014) 
-0.123*** 
(0.046) 
-0.120*** 
(0.044) 
Obese 0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.082 
(0.055) 
-0.080* 
(0.045) 
-0.076*** 
(0.015) 
-0.207*** 
(0.050) 
-0.186*** 
(0.049) 
Morbidly Obese -0.104** 
(0.041) 
-0.244* 
(0.148) 
-0.103** 
(0.041) 
-0.164*** 
(0.026) 
-0.086 
(0.104) 
-0.164*** 
(0.026) 
Importance of Communication 
(Low, Medium, High) 
0.102*** 
(0.009) 
0.114*** 
(0.014) 
0.103*** 
(0.010) 
0.066*** 
(0.009) 
0.038*** 
(0.014) 
0.050*** 
(0.011) 
Importance of Physical Activities 
(Low, Medium, High) 
-0.079*** 
(0.010) 
-0.112*** 
(0.019) 
-0.109*** 
(0.017) 
-0.109*** 
(0.008) 
-0.135*** 
(0.013) 
-0.128*** 
(0.012) 
Communication* 
Underweight 
--- -0.035 
(0.168) 
--- --- 0.115 
(0.090) 
--- 
Communication* 
Overweight 
--- 0.029 
(0.028) 
--- --- 0.058* 
(0.035) 
0.055* 
(0.031) 
Communication*Obese --- -0.010 
(0.034) 
--- --- 0.125*** 
(0.042) 
0.079** 
(0.036) 
Communication*Morbidly Obese --- 0.010 
(0.104) 
--- --- -0.134 
(0.087) 
--- 
Physical*Underweight --- 0.088 
(0.087) 
--- --- 0.064 
(0.056) 
--- 
Physical*Overweight --- 0.058** 
(0.024) 
0.038* 
(0.020) 
--- 0.040** 
(0.020) 
0.037* 
(0.019) 
Physical*Obese --- 0.058** 
(0.026) 
0.052** 
(0.023) 
--- 0.056** 
(0.022) 
0.045** 
(0.021) 
Physical*Morbidly Obese --- 0.074 
(0.062) 
--- --- -0.023 
(0.044) 
--- 
       
Test: Overweight=Obese (P-Value) 0.321 0.933 0.293 0.003 0.137 0.227 
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Test: Communication*Overweight 
=Communication*Obese (P-Value) 
--- 0.310 --- --- 0.178 0.559 
Test: Physical*Overweight= 
Physical*Obese (P-Value) 
--- 0.991 0.483 --- 0.506 0.735 
Test Communication Interaction 
Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- 0.839 --- --- 0.006 --- 
Test Physical Interaction Terms=0 
(P-Value) 
--- 0.105 --- --- 0.048 --- 
       
R2 0.346 0.348 0.346 0.335 0.333 0.348 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates use OLS to analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  All regressions for men contain 7,475 
observations; all regressions for women contain 8,905 observations. The communication and physical activities variables were originally ratings on a scale from 
1 to 5.  In this regression, the communication and physical activities take three values: 1 (corresponding to low, or an original score of 1 to less than 2.333), 2 
(corresponding to medium, or an original score of 2.333 to less than 3.666), and 3 (corresponding to high, or an original score of 3.666 to 5).  Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  Each individual’s rating for “importance of communicating with persons outside the organization” is used to 
represent importance of communication, and each individual’s rating for “importance of performing general physical activities” is used to represent the 
importance of physical activities.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic 
region. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 23.  Robustness Check 3: The Effect of Predicted Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS* 
Underweight -0.174 
(0.140) 
-0.233* 
(0.124) 
-0.054 
(0.132) 
-0.143 
(0.109) 
0.066 
(0.112) 
-0.130* 
(0.071) 
Overweight -0.028 
(0.031) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.026) 
0.044* 
(0.026) 
-0.026 
(0.021) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
Obese -0.067* 
(0.035) 
-0.015 
(0.028) 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
0.007 
(0.029) 
-0.024 
(0.024) 
-0.0003 
(0.025) 
Morbidly Obese 0.042 
(0.073) 
0.132** 
(0.062) 
0.048 
(0.063) 
0.121** 
(0.062) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
0.054 
(0.056) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.232 0.108 0.220 0.165 0.932 0.052 
R2 0.114 0.090 0.101 0.084 0.075 0.204 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.174 
(0.140) 
-0.233* 
(0.125) 
-0.054 
(0.132) 
-0.143 
(0.109) 
0.066 
(0.112) 
-0.130* 
(0.071) 
Overweight/Obese -0.042 
(0.029) 
0.011 
(0.023) 
0.003 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.024) 
-0.025 
(0.020) 
0.018 
(0.021) 
Morbidly Obese 0.042 
(0.073) 
0.132** 
(0.062) 
0.049 
(0.063) 
0.122** 
(0.062) 
0.063 
(0.053) 
0.055 
(0.056) 
R2 0.114 0.090 0.101 0.084 0.076 0.052 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.113 
(0.123) 
-0.216* 
(0.124) 
-0.188 
(0.158) 
-0.125 
(0.115) 
0.104 
(0.157) 
-0.091 
(0.132) 
Overweight/Obese -0.034 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
-0.027 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
Morbidly Obese 0.023 
(0.062) 
0.143** 
(0.063) 
0.019 
(0.061) 
0.143** 
(0.062) 
0.089 
(0.065) 
0.079 
(0.064) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.017 0.017 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Actual weight is calculated from the predicted 
weight reported in the EHM using a correction developed by Cawley (2006) with NHANES data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All dependent 
variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. 
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Table 24.  Robustness Check 3: The Effect of Predicted Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight 0.024 
(0.073) 
0.021 
(0.071) 
0.064 
(0.078) 
0.035 
(0.063) 
0.039 
(0.065) 
-0.005 
(0.046) 
Overweight -0.052* 
(0.027) 
-0.032 
(0.025) 
-0.057** 
(0.026) 
-0.036 
(0.022) 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
-0.014 
(0.018) 
Obese -0.048* 
(0.028) 
-0.037 
(0.027) 
-0.036 
(0.028) 
-0.006 
(0.024) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
-0.018 
(0.018) 
Morbidly Obese -0.130*** 
(0.049) 
-0.078* 
(0.048) 
-0.116** 
(0.049) 
-0.080* 
(0.042) 
-0.071* 
(0.039) 
-0.060* 
(0.031) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.902 0.874 0.470 0.238 0.420 0.823 
R2 0.098 0.078 0.064 0.071 0.051 0.039 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.024 
(0.073) 
0.021 
(0.071) 
0.064 
(0.078) 
0.035 
(0.063) 
0.039 
(0.065) 
-0.005 
(0.03 6) 
Overweight/Obese -0.050** 
(0.023) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese -0.130*** 
(0.049) 
-0.078* 
(0.048) 
-0.116** 
(0.049) 
-0.081* 
(0.043) 
-0.072* 
(0.039) 
-0.059* 
(0.031) 
R2 0.098 0.078 0.064 0.071 0.050 0.039 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.028 
(0.069) 
0.025 
(0.069) 
0.031 
(0.074) 
0.050 
(0.069) 
0.039 
(0.074) 
0.056 
(0.070) 
Overweight/Obese -0.040* 
(0.022) 
-0.029 
(0.022) 
-0.047** 
(0.022) 
-0.027 
(0.022) 
-0.055** 
(0.023) 
-0.045** 
(0.023) 
Morbidly Obese -0.102** 
(0.050) 
-0.087* 
(0.051) 
-0.133*** 
(0.049) 
-0.084* 
(0.049) 
-0.082 
(0.051) 
-0.094* 
(0.051) 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.010 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Actual weight is calculated from the predicted 
weight reported in the EHM using a correction developed by Cawley (2006) with NHANES data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All dependent 
variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 25. Robustness Check 3: The Effect of Predicted Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Men 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight 0.195 
(0.126) 
0.117 
(0.084) 
0.102 
(0.095) 
0.204* 
(0.104) 
0.017 
(0.087) 
0.290** 
(0.118) 
0.154* 
(0.086) 
Overweight 0.035 
(0.024) 
0.010 
(0.016) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
0.027 
(0.018) 
-0.032 
(0.018) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
0.022 
(0.016) 
Obese 0.067** 
(0.027) 
0.039 
(0.018) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.070 
(0.021) 
0.065*** 
(0.021) 
0.053** 
(0.025) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
Morbidly Obese 0.109* 
(0.057) 
-0.010 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.040) 
0.043 
(0.045) 
0.046 
(0.44) 
-0.010 
(0.052) 
0.020 
(0.038) 
        
Test: 
Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.195 0.087 0.278 0.028 0.022 0.252 0.288 
R2 0.037 0.030 0.004 0.033 0.036 0.057 0.011 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.195 
(0.126) 
0.117 
(0.084) 
0.102 
(0.096) 
0.250** 
(0.104) 
0.017 
(0.087) 
0.290** 
(0.118) 
0.154* 
(0.086) 
Overweight/Obese 0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.043** 
(0.017) 
0.037** 
(0.017) 
0.036* 
(0.020) 
0.029** 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese 0.108* 
(0.057) 
-0.010 
(0.038) 
0.028 
(0.040) 
0.042 
(0.045) 
0.045 
(0.044) 
-0.011 
(0.052) 
0.020 
(0.038) 
R2 0.037 0.029 0.004 0.033 0.036 0.057 0.011 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.183 
(0.133) 
0.193 
(0.129) 
0.142 
(0.145) 
0.295** 
(0.132) 
0.015 
(0.128) 
0.339*** 
(0.131) 
0.254* 
(0.143) 
Overweight/Obese 0.052** 
(0.024) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
0.048* 
(0.025) 
0.041* 
(0.024) 
0.044* 
(0.024) 
Morbidly Obese 0.123** 
(0.061) 
-0.035 
(0.065) 
-0.010 
(0.067) 
0.062 
(0.064) 
0.081 
(0.063) 
-0.005 
(0.061) 
0.026 
(0.062) 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Actual weight is calculated from the predicted 
weight reported in the EHM using a correction developed by Cawley (2006) with NHANES data.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All dependent 
variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region. 
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Table 26.  Robustness Check 3: The Effect of Predicted Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Women 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight -0.037 
(0.068) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
0.007 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.043) 
-0.017 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.063) 
-0.004 
(0.046) 
Overweight 0.034 
(0.024) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
0.031* 
(0.019) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
0.031 
(0.022) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
Obese 0.030 
(0.025) 
0.013 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
0.016 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.020) 
0.022 
(0.023) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
Morbidly Obese 0.158*** 
(0.046) 
0.097*** 
(0.209) 
0.102*** 
(0.034) 
0.149*** 
(0.037) 
0.115*** 
(0.036) 
0.134*** 
(0.041) 
0.100*** 
(0.030) 
        
Test: 
Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.881 0.481 0.968 0.485 0.805 0.723 0.889 
R2 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.039 0.015 0.035 0.003 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.037 
(0.068) 
0.004 
(0.044) 
0.007 
(0.051) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
-0.017 
(0.053) 
-0.009 
(0.063) 
-0.004 
(0.046) 
Overweight/Obese 0.033 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
0.026* 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.017) 
0.027 
(0.019) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
Morbidly Obese 0.158*** 
(0.046) 
0.097*** 
(0.029) 
0.102*** 
(0.034) 
0.149*** 
(0.037) 
0.115*** 
(0.036) 
0.135*** 
(0.041) 
0.100*** 
(0.030) 
R2 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.039 0.015 0.035 0.003 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.037 
(0.072) 
0.016 
(0.072) 
0.008 
(0.072) 
0.011 
(0.074) 
-0.014 
(0.072) 
0.001 
(0.072) 
-0.008 
(0.071) 
Overweight/Obese 0.029 
(0.022) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
0.042* 
(0.022) 
0.028 
(0.022) 
0.028 
(0.023) 
0.028 
(0.022) 
0.023 
(0.022) 
Morbidly Obese 0.159*** 
(0.050) 
0.162*** 
(0.047) 
0.151*** 
(0.048) 
0.198*** 
(0.049) 
0.156 
(0.047) 
0.147*** 
(0.047) 
0.147*** 
(0.046) 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.005 0.001 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Actual weight is calculated from the predicted 
weight reported in the EHM using a correction developed by Cawley (2006) with NHANES data.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All dependent 
variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include 
controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 27.  Robustness Check 3: The Effect of Predicted Actual Weight and Job Requirements on Real Hourly Wage 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Real Hourly Wage ($2008)) 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Underweight -0.164*** 
(0.058) 
-0.129** 
(0.062) 
-0.416 
(0.284) 
-0.477** 
(0.226) 
-0.012 
(0.039) 
-0.021 
(0.039) 
-0.116 
(0.199) 
-0.021 
(0.039) 
Overweight 0.032** 
(0.014) 
0.029* 
(0.015) 
-0.063 
(0.078) 
-0.090** 
(0.045) 
-0.034** 
(0.014) 
-0.024* 
(0.014) 
-0.024 
(0.066) 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
Obese 0.005 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.052 
(0.085) 
-0.061 
(0.074) 
-0.075*** 
(0.014) 
-0.071*** 
(0.015) 
-0.125* 
(0.070) 
-0.071*** 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese -0.081** 
(0.033) 
-0.088** 
(0.035) 
-0.223 
(0.161) 
-0.085** 
(0.036) 
-0.138*** 
(0.024) 
-0.123*** 
(0.025) 
-0.086 
(0.135) 
-0.073 
(0.048) 
Importance of Communication --- 0.059*** 
(0.006) 
0.070*** 
(0.012) 
0.066*** 
(0.007) 
--- 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.006) 
Importance of Physical 
Activities 
--- -0.060*** 
(0.008) 
-0.091*** 
(0.015) 
-0.091*** 
(0.013) 
--- -0.087*** 
(0.007) 
-0.096*** 
(0.010) 
-0.088*** 
(0.007) 
Communication* 
Underweight 
--- --- -0.019 
(0.059) 
--- --- --- 0.024 
(0.037) 
--- 
Communication* 
Overweight 
--- --- -0.008 
(0.014) 
--- --- --- -0.017 
(0.014) 
--- 
Communication*Obese --- --- -0.026* 
(0.016) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
--- --- -0.002 
(0.015) 
--- 
Communication*Morbidly 
Obese 
--- --- 0.012 
(0.032) 
--- --- --- -0.032 
(0.027) 
-0.026 
(0.022) 
Physical*Underweight --- --- 0.113* 
(0.068) 
0.120* 
(0.069) 
--- --- 0.015 
(0.043) 
--- 
Physical*Overweight --- --- 0.040** 
(0.019) 
0.043*** 
(0.016) 
--- --- 0.011 
(0.016) 
--- 
Physical*Obese --- --- 0.045** 
(0.021) 
0.044** 
(0.020) 
--- --- 0.019 
(0.017) 
--- 
Physical*Morbidly Obese --- --- 0.038 
(0.038) 
--- --- --- 0.008 
(0.032) 
--- 
         
Test: Overweight=Obese (P-
Value) 
--- 0.290 0.890 0.689 --- 0.001 0.170 0.001 
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Test: Communication* 
Overweight= 
Communication*Obese  
(P-Value) 
--- --- 0.216 --- --- --- 0.333 --- 
Test: Physical*Overweight= 
Physical*Obese (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.812 0.936 --- --- 0.664 --- 
Test Communication 
Interaction Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.483 --- --- --- 0.506 --- 
Test Physical Interaction 
Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.136 --- --- --- 0.845 --- 
         
R2 0.321 0.343 0.345 0.345 0.036 0.336 0.336 0.336 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data. All regressions for men contain 7,475 observations; all 
regressions for women contain 8,905 observations.  Actual weight is calculated from the predicted weight reported in the EHM using a correction developed by 
Cawley (2006) with NHANES data.  Each individual’s rating for “importance of communicating with persons outside the organization” is used to represent 
importance of communication, and each individual’s rating for “importance of performing general physical activities” is used to represent the importance of 
physical activities.  The communication and physical activities variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and 
geographic region. Sample excludes pregnant women.  
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Table 28.  Robustness Check 4: The Effect of Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication for Men (Including Industry and Occupation Controls) 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight -0.138 
(0.099) 
-0.040 
(0.083) 
-0.017 
(0.085) 
-0.056 
(0.091) 
0.027 
(0.100) 
-0.039 
(0.054) 
Overweight 0.011 
(0.020) 
0.049*** 
(0.017) 
0.045** 
(0.018) 
0.075*** 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
0.046*** 
(0.017) 
Obese 0.015 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.021) 
0.050** 
(0.022) 
0.018 
(0.021) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
Morbidly Obese 0.023 
(0.050) 
0.095** 
(0.046) 
0.011 
(0.050) 
0.093* 
(0.051) 
0.045 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.047) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.872 0.063 0.045 0.224 0.355 0.477 
R2 0.646 0.572 0.586 0.482 0.339 0.477 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.138 
(0.099) 
-0.040 
(0.083) 
-0.017 
(0.086) 
-0.056 
(0.091) 
0.027 
(0.100) 
-0.039 
(0.054) 
Overweight/Obese 0.013 
(0.019) 
0.037** 
(0.016) 
0.032* 
(0.017) 
0.066*** 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
0.042*** 
(0.016) 
Morbidly Obese 0.023 
(0.050) 
0.095** 
(0.046) 
0.012 
(0.050) 
0.094* 
(0.051) 
0.045 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.047) 
R2 0.646 0.572 0.586 0.482 0.339 0.477 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.154 
(0.141) 
-0.065 
(0.137) 
-0.120 
(0.146) 
-0.035 
(0.144) 
0.061 
(0.168) 
0.088 
(0.136) 
Overweight/Obese 0.015 
(0.025) 
0.051** 
(0.024) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
0.080*** 
(0.025) 
0.006 
(0.026) 
0.049* 
(0.026) 
Morbidly Obese 0.010 
(0.068) 
0.145** 
(0.067) 
0.003 
(0.069) 
0.117* 
(0.066) 
0.078 
(0.075) 
0.063 
(0.072) 
Pseudo R2 0.147 0.114 0.082 0.103 0.082 0.143 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Regressions include controls for major industry and 
occupation.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, 
and geographic region. 
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Table 29.  Robustness Check 4: The Effect of Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Communication for Women (Including Industry and Occupation 
Controls) 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Communicating 
with Persons 
Outside the 
Organization 
Importance of 
Communicating 
with Supervisors, 
Peers, or 
Subordinates 
How Much Contact 
with Others 
Required by the Job 
Importance of 
Establishing and 
Maintaining 
Interpersonal 
Relationships 
Importance of 
Performing for or 
Working Directly 
with the Public 
Importance of 
Selling or 
Influencing Others 
OLS 
Underweight 0.041 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.054) 
0.018 
(0.062) 
-0.001 
(0.017) 
0.005 
(0.059) 
0.035 
(0.045) 
Overweight -0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.029 
(0.020) 
-0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
Obese -0.002 
(0.020) 
-0.015 
(0.021) 
-0.013 
(0.022) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.021) 
0.002 
(0.015) 
Morbidly Obese -0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.049 
(0.042) 
-0.056 
(0.044) 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
-0.037 
(0.039) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
       
Test: Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.377 0.977 0.492 0.277 0.339 0.942 
R2 0.575 0.440 0.414 0.405 0.240 0.386 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.041 
(0.053) 
0.011 
(0.054) 
0.018 
(0.062) 
-0.001 
(0.051) 
0.005 
(0.059) 
0.035 
(0.045) 
Overweight/Obese -0.013 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
Morbidly Obese -0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.049 
(0.042) 
-0.057 
(0.044) 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
-0.038 
(0.039) 
-0.024 
(0.026) 
R2 0.575 0.440 0.414 0.405 0.240 0.386 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight 0.027 
(0.073) 
0.019 
(0.069) 
-0.018 
(0.072) 
0.007 
(0.069) 
0.011 
(0.076) 
0.085 
(0.074) 
Overweight/Obese -0.014 
(0.022) 
-0.010 
(0.021) 
-0.028 
(0.022) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.032 
(0.023) 
-0.017 
(0.023) 
Morbidly Obese -0.021 
(0.056) 
-0.066 
(0.057) 
-0.100* 
(0.058) 
-0.080 
(0.056) 
-0.017 
(0.059) 
-0.047 
(0.058) 
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Pseudo R2 0.129 0.081 0.058 0.083 0.057 0.107 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data. Regressions include controls for major industry and 
occupation.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, 
black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 30.  Robustness Check 4: The Effect of Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Men (Including Industry and Occupation 
Controls) 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight -0.014 
(0.113) 
0.017 
(0.081) 
0.004 
(0.090) 
0.017 
(0.082) 
-0.105 
(0.071) 
-0.093 
(0.093) 
0.086 
(0.070) 
Overweight 0.021 
(0.018) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
Obese 0.034 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
0.038** 
(0.016) 
0.031* 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.016) 
Morbidly Obese 0.040 
(0.046) 
-0.033 
(0.034) 
-0.001 
(0.037) 
0.033 
(0.036) 
0.038 
(0.039) 
-0.043 
(0.041) 
0.028 
(0.037) 
        
Test: 
Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.458 0.525 0.766 0.121 0.183 0.654 0.481 
R2 0.438 0.392 0.291 0.469 0.433 0.520 0.263 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.014 
(0.113) 
0.017 
(0.081) 
0.004 
(0.090) 
0.017 
(0.082) 
-0.105 
(0.071) 
0.093 
(0.093) 
0.086 
(0.070) 
Overweight/Obese 0.025 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.024* 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.015) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
Morbidly Obese 0.040 
(0.046) 
-0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.037) 
0.032 
(0.036) 
0.037 
(0.038) 
-0.043 
(0.041) 
0.027 
(0.037) 
R2 0.438 0.391 0.291 0.469 0.433 0.520 0.262 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.045 
(0.152) 
0.070 
(0.159) 
-0.026 
(0.155) 
0.038 
(0.145) 
-0.192 
(0.137) 
0.182 
(0.141) 
0.173 
(0.129) 
Overweight/Obese 0.036 
(0.025) 
-0.001 
(0.025) 
0.015 
(0.025) 
0.040 
(0.027) 
0.027 
(0.026) 
0.009 
(0.025) 
0.019 
(0.025) 
Morbidly Obese 0.067 
(0.064) 
-0.089 
(0.072) 
-0.023 
(0.073) 
0.070 
(0.071) 
0.114 
(0.073) 
-0.052 
(0.070) 
0.041 
(0.070) 
 117 
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.102 0.085 0.141 0.127 0.118 0.054 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data. Regressions include controls for major industry and 
occupation.  All regressions contain 8,928 observations.  All dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, 
and geographic region. 
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Table 31.  Robustness Check 4: The Effect of Actual Weight on Jobs Requiring Physical Activity for Men (Including Industry and Occupation 
Controls) 
 Dependent Variables 
Weight Group Importance of 
Performing 
General Physical 
Activities 
Importance of 
Speed of Limb 
Movement 
Importance of 
Stamina 
Importance of 
Explosive 
Strength 
Importance of 
Dynamic 
Strength 
Importance of 
Static Strength 
Importance of 
Trunk Strength 
OLS 
Underweight -0.071 
(0.056) 
-0.053 
(0.039) 
-0.054 
(0.046) 
-0.045 
(0.046) 
-0.078* 
(0.047) 
-0.057 
(0.051) 
-0.033 
(0.041) 
Overweight 0.018 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
Obese 0.016 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
0.021 
(0.020) 
0.008 
(0.016) 
Morbidly Obese 0.087** 
(0.043) 
0.065** 
(0.027) 
0.088*** 
(0.034) 
0.121*** 
(0.034) 
0.067* 
(0.035) 
0.096** 
(0.038) 
0.083*** 
(0.030) 
        
Test: 
Overweight= 
Obese (P-Value) 
0.928 0.716 0.937 0.890 0.782 0.877 0.836 
R2 0.332 0.278 0.189 0.332 0.272 0.358 0.194 
OLS Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.071 
(0.056) 
-0.053 
(0.039) 
-0.054 
(0.046) 
-0.045 
(0.046) 
-0.078* 
(0.047) 
-0.057 
(0.051) 
-0.032 
(0.041) 
Overweight/Obese 0.017 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
Morbidly Obese 0.087** 
(0.043) 
0.065 
(0.027) 
0.088*** 
(0.034) 
0.122*** 
(0.034) 
0.067* 
(0.035) 
0.096** 
(0.038) 
0.083*** 
(0.030) 
R2 0.332 0.277 0.189 0.332 0.271 0.358 0.194 
Ordered Probit Pooled: Overweight and Obese 
Underweight -0.088 
(0.072) 
-0.093 
(0.076) 
-0.073 
(0.072) 
-0.038 
(0.075) 
-0.114 
(0.075) 
-0.064 
(0.071) 
-0.054 
(0.070) 
Overweight/Obese 0.018 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.022) 
0.034 
(0.022) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
0.020 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.022) 
Morbidly Obese 0.102* 
(0.055) 
0.125** 
(0.051) 
0.154*** 
(0.052) 
0.197*** 
(0.055) 
0.103* 
(0.053) 
0.128** 
(0.052) 
0.135*** 
(0.053) 
 119 
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.063 0.063 0.092 0.074 0.072 0.039 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Regressions include controls for major industry and 
occupation.  All regressions contain 10,007 observations.  All dependent variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, 
black, Hispanic, and geographic region.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 32.  Robustness Check 4: The Effect of Weight and Job Requirements on Real Hourly Wage (Including Industry and Occupation Controls) 
 Dependent Variable: ln(Real Hourly Wage ($2008)) 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Underweight -0.100* 
(0.060) 
-0.055 
(0.062) 
-0.230 
(0.328) 
-0.053 
(0.063) 
-0.00002 
(0.038) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.050 
(0.212) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
Overweight 0.030** 
(0.013) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.030 
(0.075) 
0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.038*** 
(0.013) 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
-0.067 
(0.062) 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
Obese 0.006 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
0.043 
(0.083) 
0.064** 
(0.029) 
-0.077*** 
(0.014) 
-0.077*** 
(0.014) 
-0.149** 
(0.070) 
-0.077*** 
(0.014) 
Morbidly Obese -0.099*** 
(0.035) 
-0.114*** 
(0.040) 
-0.246 
(0.179) 
-0.114 
(0.040) 
-0.169*** 
(0.024) 
-0.165*** 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.142) 
-0.049 
(0.049) 
Importance of 
Communication 
--- 0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
--- -0.029*** 
(0.008) 
-0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.027*** 
(0.008) 
Importance of Physical 
Activities 
--- -0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
--- -0.044*** 
(0.007) 
0.053*** 
(0.010) 
-0.043*** 
(0.007) 
Communication* 
Underweight 
--- --- -0.040 
(0.072) 
--- --- --- -0.008 
(0.039) 
--- 
Communication* 
Overweight 
--- --- -0.011 
(0.014) 
--- --- --- -0.005 
(0.013) 
--- 
Communication*Obese --- --- -0.034** 
(0.015) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
--- --- 0.002 
(0.015) 
--- 
Communication*Morbidly 
Obese 
--- --- 0.007 
(0.036) 
--- --- --- -0.072*** 
(0.027) 
-0.061*** 
(0.022) 
Physical*Underweight --- --- 0.090 
(0.077) 
--- --- --- 0.022 
(0.046) 
--- 
Physical*Overweight --- --- 0.028 
(0.019) 
--- --- --- 0.015 
(0.015) 
--- 
Physical*Obese --- --- 0.015 
(0.021) 
--- --- --- 0.023 
(0.017) 
--- 
Physical*Morbidly Obese --- --- 0.041 
(0.096) 
--- --- --- -0.010 
(0.034) 
--- 
         
Test: Overweight=Obese 
(P-Value) 
0.053 0.232 0.313 0.134 0.005 0.002 0.268 0.002 
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Test: Communication* 
Overweight= 
Communication*Obese  
(P-Value) 
--- --- 0.086 --- --- --- 0.653 --- 
Test: 
Physical*Overweight= 
Physical*Obese (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.458 --- --- --- 0.678 --- 
Test Communication 
Interaction Terms=0  
(P-Value) 
--- --- 0.220 --- --- --- 0.119 --- 
Test Physical Interaction 
Terms=0 (P-Value) 
--- --- 0.473 --- --- --- 0.630 --- 
         
R2 0.400 0.400 0.401 0.400 0.386 0.390 0.391 0.390 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates analyze data from combined 2006-2008 CPS, ATUS, EHM, and O*NET data.  Regressions include controls for major industry and 
occupation. All regressions for men contain 7,475 observations; all regressions for women contain 8,905 observations.  All dependent variables range between a 
score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).  Each individual’s rating for “importance of communicating with persons outside the organization” is used to represent 
importance of communication, and each individual’s rating for “importance of performing general physical activities” is used to represent the importance of 
physical activities.  The communication and physical activities variables range between a score of 1 (not important) to 5 (essential).   Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are below in parentheses.  All regressions include controls for years of education, age, age squared, presence of a child, black, Hispanic, and 
geographic region.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE IMPACT OF EXISTING DISCRIMINATION LAWS ON EMPLOYMENT 
OUTCOMES OF THE OBESE 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter I demonstrated that obese workers earn less than the non-obese.  Previous 
authors have explained away this wage discrepancy for obese men, but an unexplained 
wage discrepancy has remained for obese women, even after controlling for potential 
correlates like genetic predisposition and intelligence.  The previous chapter introduced 
evidence that this unexplained wage discrepancy results from a combination of sorting on 
the basis of occupational characteristics and of wage penalties for certain occupational 
characteristics.  Chapter I concluded that the sorting and wage penalties could result from 
one of two demand-side effects.  Obese women (but not obese men) might be less 
productive or generate some other added cost to employers in certain types of 
occupations.  Alternatively, obese women may face discrimination that is particularly 
acute in certain types of occupations.   
Ideally, legislators would know which explanation—cost or discrimination—was 
correct before passing a law to improve outcomes of the obese in the labor market.  
Whether society cares about passing a law to remedy the poor labor market outcomes of 
the obese may depend on the underlying cause.  Moreover, the type of law passed (and 
the remedies provided) may also depend on the underlying cause. 
Nevertheless, legislators have already passed laws to remedy the poor labor 
market outcomes of the obese without knowing the underlying cause.  Two types of laws 
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currently protect the obese in the labor market.  First, Federal law protects workers who 
have, previously had, or are regarded as having an actual disability that “substantially 
limits one or more major life activities”64 under the ADA and the FRA.65  The ADA and 
FRA attempt to balance the dual objectives of expanding the opportunities available for 
the disabled in the labor market while recognizing that some disabled workers are simply 
too costly to accommodate.  A disabled individual must be able to “perform the essential 
functions of the employment position . . . with or without reasonable accommodation” to 
enjoy the protections of these laws.66  Moreover, if the disabled individual requires an 
accommodation, this accommodation cannot impose an “undue hardship” on the 
employer.67   
Although the ADA and FRA were not passed to address obesity specifically, 
obesity has been recognized as a disability for the purposes of these statutes since 1993 in 
one circuit.  In that year, the severe health conditions associated with obesity convinced 
the First Circuit that it constituted a disability for the purposes of the ADA in Cook v. 
Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps.68  Although other circuits have 
subsequently distinguished or disagreed with Cook, it remains good law in the First 
Circuit.69   Moreover, the Cook decision may become good law in other circuits very 
soon.  The 2008 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) broadened 
                                                
64 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 12102(1) (2012). 
65 Federal Rehabilitation Act, U.S. Code, vol. 29, sec. 794 (2012).  Note that the evaluation standards are 
the same for the ADA and FRA.  Moreover, other states and cities have disability laws that supplement 
these two Federal laws. 
66 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 12111(8) (2012). 
67 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 12111(10) (2012). 
68 Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, 10 F3d 17 (1st Cir 1993). 
69 The cases that have distinguished Cook include Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 
F3d 1258 (11th Cir 2007); E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F3d 436 (6th Cir 2006); Francis v. City of 
Meriden, 129 F3d 281 (2nd Cir 1997); Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F3d 803 (6th Cir 1997); Torcasio v. 
Murray, 57 F3d 1340 (4th Cir 1995); Smaw v. Com. Of Va. Dept. of State Police, 862 FSupp. 1469 (E.D. 
Va. 1994). 
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the definition of disability, emphasizing that the term should “be construed in favor of 
broad coverage of individuals.”70  As a result, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which used to take the position that even morbid obesity had to be 
accompanied by another related condition in order to qualify as a disability under the 
original ADA, now views morbid obesity alone as enough to qualify for protection under 
the amended ADA.71 
Second, legislators in one state and six cities across the United States have opted 
to protect obese individuals in the workplace more directly by passing laws that prohibit 
all discrimination on the basis of weight or personal appearance.  In the state of Michigan 
as well as the cities of Binghamton, NY, Madison, WI, San Francisco, CA, Santa Cruz, 
CA, Urbana, IL, and Washington, DC, weight and personal appearance are protected 
classes for the purposes of employment—just as race, sex, color, religion, and national 
origin are protected classes nationwide under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.72 
As U.S. obesity rates climb, so do the relevance of these laws.  Yet these laws 
have been virtually ignored in the literature. Carpenter (2006) studied the effect of the 
Cook decision on nationwide employment,73 but no one has examined the effect of the 
seven Title VII-esque laws.  In fact, no one has ever examined why these seven local 
laws were passed or how they work.  This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by 
studying both the Cook decision and the seven local laws in more detail, and ultimately, 
by questioning whether these laws work.  The results are somewhat discouraging; the 
                                                
70 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 12102(4)(a)(4)(A) (2012). 
71 Katharine Kores, District Director of Memphis Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
telephone conversation with author, 09 Jan. 2012.  
72 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 2000e (2012). 
73 Christopher S. Carpenter, “The Effects of Employment Protection for Obese People,” Industrial 
Relations 45 (July 2006): 393-415. 
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Cook decision and five of the seven Title VII-esque laws have not improved employment 
outcomes for the obese.  Only the Title VII-esque laws that have strong enforcement 
mechanisms show any signs of promise in eliminating the barriers faced by the obese in 
the labor market. 
My study of U.S. obesity laws will begin by describing the Cook decision and the 
seven local laws.  Next, I will explore the methodology and data necessary to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these laws.  I will then analyze the effect of the Cook decision on 
employment of the obese, revisiting the estimates in Carpenter (2006).  I will 
subsequently analyze the effects of the seven local laws on employment of the obese.  I 
will conclude by comparing how the ADA and the seven Title VII-esque laws are 
enforced, exploring how differences in administration can explain why some of these 
laws have improved employment outcomes for the obese, while others have not. 
 
Obesity as a Disability: Coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
 
In 1990, Congress revolutionized treatment of the disabled in the American 
workforce through the passage of the ADA.  Although the 1973 FRA already protected 
the disabled working in Federal agencies and in other workplaces receiving Federal 
financial assistance, the ADA extended these protections to the private sector.74  After 
ADA implementation in July 1992, any employer with fifteen or more employees had “to 
provide reasonable accommodation to an employee or job applicant with a disability, 
                                                
74 Amie A. Thompson, “Comment, Obesity as a Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act and the Amendments’ Effect on Obesity Claims under the Pennsylvania Human 
Relations Act: Should Employers Anticipate a Big Change?“ Duquesne Business Law Journal 12 (Summer 
2010): 259-72. 
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unless doing so would cause significant difficulty or expense for the employer (‘undue 
hardship’).”75 
The requirements for a successful ADA or FRA claim are the same.  The plaintiff 
must first prove that she is disabled.  She must then show that the employer defendant 
actually discriminated against her on account of her disability even though she was 
otherwise qualified for the position in question.  To prove disability, the plaintiff must 
show that she currently has, used to have, or is regarding as having a physical or mental 
impairment that “substantially limits one or more major life activities.”76  To prove actual 
discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable accommodation for her 
disability existed, the accommodation did not create undue hardship for the employer, 
and yet the employer still refused to provide it.77  Finally, to prove that she was qualified, 
the plaintiff must prove that she can “perform the essential functions of the employment 
position . . . with or without reasonable accommodation.”78 
The broad disability coverage of both private- and public-sector employers 
provided by the ADA and FRA has brought a flood of employment discrimination 
litigation into Federal courts.79  The focus of this litigation will likely change once the 
                                                
75 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “Disability Discrimination,” Laws, Regulations, and 
Guidance, last modified 2010, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability.cfm. 
76 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 12102(1) (2012). 
77 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “Disability Discrimination,” Laws, Regulations, and 
Guidance, last modified 2010, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability.cfm. 
78 Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 12111(8) (2012).  For a broad overview of the 
structure of ADA claims, see Joel Wm. Friedman, The Law of Employment Discrimination, 7th ed. (New 
York: Foundation Press, 2009), 891-893; George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination Law: Visions of 
Equality in Theory and Doctrine, 2d ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2007), 224-236. 
79 For example, although the EEOC only filed three ADA enforcement suits in fiscal year 1993, it filed 
eight-two of these suits in fiscal year 1995.  U.S, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC 
Litigation Statistics, FY 1992 through FY 1996, last modified 31 Jan. 2007, 
http://archive.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation-a.html#fn1.  For a discussion of more recent statistics on the number 
of employment discrimination claims filed, see Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, “Employment 
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?” Harvard Law & Policy Review 3 (2009): 
103-32. 
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new ADAAA cases reach the courts.  But until the 2008 amendments, the principal focus 
of ADA and FRA litigation has been defining who is disabled.  While a worker confined 
to a wheelchair might have had an easy time proving this threshold question, many 
workers suffering from common, but debilitating medical conditions have not.  Workers 
whose diabetes, epilepsy, and HIV interfere with their ability to perform their job have 
often been denied coverage.80 
 Like diabetes, epilepsy, and HIV, obesity also fell within this grey area of 
ADA/FRA coverage before the 2008 amendments.  Because obesity is such a prevalent 
condition in the US, the question of whether obesity was a disability emerged quickly 
after the passage of the original ADA.  In 1993, the First Circuit answered this question 
in the affirmative.  Cook v. Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. upheld a jury 
award of $100,000 to a job applicant after the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health 
refused to rehire her as an institutional attendant because she was morbidly obese. The 
plaintiff, Bonnie Cook, had held this position twice previously, voluntarily leaving both 
times with a clean employee record, and she had always been morbidly obese.81   
Although obesity could be “mutable” and could arise from “voluntary conduct,” 
the First Circuit had no trouble finding that Cook qualified for ADA protection.82  In fact, 
the court noted that Cook could not just “simply lose weight and rid herself of any 
concomitant disability”; the evidence demonstrated that Cook would have to deal with a 
dysfunctional metabolism for the rest of her life no matter how much weight she lost.83  
                                                
80 For a discussion of the types of conditions that courts have denied ADA coverage, see Amie A. 
Thompson, “Comment, Obesity as a Disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act 
and the Amendments’ Effect on Obesity Claims under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act: Should 
Employers Anticipate a Big Change?“ Duquesne Business Law Journal 12 (Summer 2010): 259-72. 
81 Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, 10 F3d 17 (1st Cir 1993). 
82 Ibid., 23-24. 
83 Ibid., 24. 
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The court concluded, “In a society that all too often confuses ‘slim’ with ‘beautiful’ or 
‘good,’ morbid obesity can present formidable barriers to employment. Where, as here, 
the barriers transgress Federal law, those who erect and seek to preserve them must suffer 
the consequences.”84  The court’s strong language suggested that employers in the First 
Circuit would be well advised henceforth to provide reasonable accommodations for at 
least their morbidly obese workers and job applicants. 
Even though the First Circuit had no trouble concluding that morbid obesity was a 
disability for the purposes of the original ADA, other circuits have.  Since Cook, the 
Second, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have all distinguished or disagreed with Cook. In 
Andrews v. State of Ohio, the Sixth Circuit refused to grant relief to Ohio State Highway 
Patrol officers who had been disciplined at work after failing to meet the weight limits set 
by the Highway Patrol Fitness Program.  The court noted that the appendix to the relevant 
rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), held that the “definition 
of the term ‘impairment’ does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair 
color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that are within ‘normal’ range 
and are not the result of a physiological disorder.”85  Thus, to hold that “a mere physical 
characteristic, without more, equal[s] a physiological disorder,” the court concluded, 
“would debase [the] high purpose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly 
handicapped.”86  The Sixth Circuit distinguished their holding from the Cook case by 
noting that the plaintiff in Cook had presented expert testimony that her morbid obesity 
                                                
84 Ibid., 31. 
85 Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F3d 803 (6th Cir 1997). 
86 Ibid., 810. 
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arose from a physiological impairment of the metabolism. Almost a decade later, the 
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed this decision in E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines.87 
The Second and Eleventh Circuits have also been less generous than the First 
Circuit to the obese.  In Francis v. City of Meriden, the Second Circuit declined to grant 
relief to a firefighter who had been suspended without pay after failing to meet the 
department weight standard and refusing to take a body fat or fitness test.88  The Second 
Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit that physical characteristics not arising from a 
physiological condition were not impairments for the purposes of the ADA.  In 
Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit declined to grant 
ADA protection to an obese worker who actually did suffer from diabetes, hypertension, 
and hypothyroidism, and other physiological conditions because the worker failed to 
show that he was “unable to work in a broad class of jobs.”89 
Despite the subsequent negative treatment in other circuits, Cook’s record remains 
spotless in the First Circuit.  The First Circuit has neither disagreed with nor 
distinguished its 1993 decision.  Consequently, it is possible that Cook has had an effect 
on employment outcomes of the obese over the past two decades.  If the poor labor 
market outcomes of the obese result from employers’ beliefs that obesity substantially 
limits obese workers’ performance at work (regardless of whether these beliefs are 
correct), then labor market outcomes for the obese should improve in any jurisdiction that 
recognizes obesity as a disability under the ADA.   
                                                
87 E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F3d 436 (6th Cir 2006) held that “to constitute an ADA 
impairment, a person’s obesity, even morbid obesity, must be the result of a physiological condition.” 
88 Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F3d 281 (2nd Cir 1997). 
89 Greenberg v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., 498 F3d 1258 (11th Cir 2007). 
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More specifically, if lower productivity or higher costs explain the poor labor 
market outcomes of the obese, then labor market outcomes should have improved for the 
obese in the First Circuit after 1993. This effect might be exacerbated in the long run by 
First Circuit firms relocating to another circuit in order to avoid the additional burdens 
placed on employers by the Cook decision.  It takes more heroic assumptions to argue for 
a Cook effect outside the First Circuit.  Nevertheless, if national companies with a 
presence in the First Circuit set their human resources policies based on the most 
restrictive circuit, then a nationwide increase in employment of the obese might be 
possible after Cook. 
Although the coverage of Federal disability law has broadened since the Cook 
decision, testing the effect of the Cook decision is as pertinent as ever.  As noted in the 
introduction, the EEOC now takes the position that morbid obesity should be recognized 
as a disability under the ADAAA in every circuit.  In fact, the EEOC has filed suit on 
behalf of two morbidly obese plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit who claim that they were 
wrongfully terminated on the basis of their weight. The New Orleans district office has 
filed suit on behalf of Lisa Harrison.  Reminiscent of Bonnie Cook, Harrison had been 
fired from her job at a long-term care facility for weighing 527 pounds even though she 
had been 400 pounds at the time of hiring and had received “excellent” performance 
reviews.90  Similarly, the Houston district office of the EEOC has filed suit on behalf of 
                                                
90 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “EEOC Sues Resources for Human Development, 
Inc. for Disability Discrimination,” EEOC Press Releases, last modified 30 Sep. 2010, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-30-10u.cfm. 
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Ronald Kratz, whose former employer admits that they fired him because he weighed 680 
pounds, despite his “very good” performance reviews.91   
If these courts accept the EEOC’s position on morbid obesity, then the Fifth 
Circuit may soon join the First in recognizing morbid obesity as a disability for the 
purposes of the ADA.  And other circuits may soon follow suit.  Thus, looking at the 
effect of the Cook decision on labor market outcomes of the obese becomes particularly 
crucial now.  The best way to discern whether the expanded definition of disability will 
have far-reaching effects for the obese is to look at the effects in the one judicial circuit 
that has always had this expanded definition.  The Results Section will test the effects of 
the Cook decision.  Before turning to this estimation, however, the other weight 
discrimination laws in the U.S. merit further study. 
 
Obesity as a Protected Class: Local Laws Prohibiting Weight Discrimination 
 
Dissatisfied with the remedies available on the national level, one state and six 
cities across the U.S. have implemented protections on the local level over the past four 
decades. The laws in Binghamton, NY, Madison, WI, San Francisco, CA, Santa Cruz, 
CA, Urbana, IL, Washington, DC, and the state of Michigan prohibit all discrimination 
on the basis of weight or personal appearance.  Unlike the ADA, these laws leave no 
room for exceptions like undue hardship, so that weight and personal appearance are 
protected in the same manner as race and gender.  Although these seven laws have much 
                                                
91 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “EEOC Sues BAE Systems for Disability 
Discrimination,” EEOC Press Releases, last modified 27 Sep. 2011, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-30-10u.cfm; L. M. Sixel, “At 680 Pounds His World 
Crumbled: Now Weighing Less than Half as Much, Man Still Unable to Find Work,” Houston Chronicle, 
29 Sep. 2011, 1. 
 138 
in common, they were passed at very different times for very different reasons.  For this 
reason, each law merits more individualized treatment. 
Madison, Wisconsin 
The first wave of these laws emerged in the 1970s.   Even though other 
jurisdictions had considered adding these protections earlier,92 the first place in the U.S. 
to pass a law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of weight or personal appearance 
was Madison, WI.  Madison General Ordinances § 39.03(1) mandates the “practice of 
providing equal opportunities in housing, employment, public accommodations, and City 
facilities to persons without regard to…physical appearance.”93  The ordinance 
specifically defines physical appearance to include “weight.”94   
After the Madison Common Council passed the ordinance on March 13, 1975, a 
local newspaper article praised it as “one of the strongest ordinances in the country.”95  
Concern over “[e]mployers’ and landlords’ biases concerning hair length and facial hair, 
married versus unmarried persons, styles of dress and sexual orientation” led to the 
addition of physical appearance to the anti-discrimination ordinance.96   
To seek relief under the ordinance today, discrimination victims must file a 
complaint with the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission (MEOC), which 
administers and adjudicates the claim.  A Madison Equal Opportunities hearing officer 
first decides the case, and the hearing officer’s decision is appealable to the entire 
MEOC.  Once the Commission either affirms or reverses the hearing officer’s decision, 
                                                
92 For example, a provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of personal appearance was “discussed 
at length” but ultimately rejected in Urbana in 1973.  Minutes of the Committee on Legislation, Urbana, Ill. 
City Council, 24 July 1974, Champaign County Historical Archives, The Urbana Free Library, Urbana, Ill.   
93 Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances, sec. 39.03(1) (2012). 
94 Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances, sec. 39.03(2)(bb) (2012). 
95 “Equal Opportunity Report,” Capital Times, 24 Sep. 1975, 24. 
96 Ibid. 
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both the complainant and the respondent have the right of appeal to the Dane County 
Circuit Court, and afterward, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.97  Successful claimants are 
entitled to economic damages, noneconomic damages, front pay, and back pay.98  The 
procedures and remedies available under the Madison ordinance, along with the 
procedures and remedies available under the other six local laws, are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Michigan 
Only a year later came the law in the state of Michigan.  The Elliott-Larsen Civil 
Rights Act guarantees the “opportunity to obtain employment, housing and other real 
estate, and the full and equal utilization of public accommodations, public service, and 
educational facilities without discrimination because of . . . weight.”99  Weight was added 
to Michigan’s civil rights legislation through the efforts of an innovative legislator, State 
Representative Thomas Mathieu.  Mathieu, a former grassroots organizer, was somewhat 
ahead of his time in recognizing that weight could present a problem in the workplace, 
particularly for women.  According to Mathieu, he pushed for the addition of weight 
because of my personal observations while working for the Community 
Action program in Grand Rapids.  I saw with my own eyes how people 
lost out on job opportunities, just because of the way they looked.  Too 
[sic] be blunt -- too fat or too short.  In that work, before running and 
being elected to Michigan Legislature, I was deeply moved by the persons 
who had suffered such job rejections, simply because of the way they 
looked.  Mostly it was overweight females, women with superb clerical 
and secretarial skills, clearly well qualified for the position but rejected out 
of hand because they didn't fit the employer's desire of a Playboy 
                                                
97 For examples of Madison Equal Opportunities Commission cases that have been appealed, see Sam’s 
Club, Inc. v. Madison Equal Opportunities Comm’n, 668 NW2d 562 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); State ex rel. 
McDonald’s v. Madison Equal Opportunities Comm’n, 356 NW2d 495 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984); Federated 
Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. V. Madison Equal Opportunities Comm’n,, 308 NW2d 419 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981). 
98 Madison, Wis., Gen. Ordinances, sec. 39.03(1)(c)(2)(b) (2012). 
99 Mich. Comp. Laws.  Sec. 37.2102(1) (2012). 
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Centerfold body to parade around the office.100 
 
Since the law’s passage in 1976, weight-discrimination victims must file a claim 
with either the Michigan Civil Rights Department or the Federal EEOC.  At that point, 
the claimant can choose to adjudicate her claim through an administrative proceeding in 
the Michigan Civil Rights Department or through a private action.  Claimants who bring 
a private action can, of course, appeal through the court system, and claimants who 
choose the Department process can appeal the commission decision to the Ingham 
County Circuit Court and then up through the Michigan state appellate system.101  If 
successful, claimants under the Michigan law are entitled to injunctive and equitable 
relief, compensatory damages, back pay, and attorney fees.  Furthermore, the respondent 
employer is subject to a civil fine of up to $50,000.102 
Washington, District of Columbia 
The next law came in 1977 from Washington, DC, although the story began 
almost four years previously.  Since World War II, the city had unsuccessfully fought 
Congress for home rule.  At last, in the 1967 Reorganization Act, Congress granted DC 
limited home rule, with a nine-member council and a commissioner all appointed by the 
U.S. President.  Even though the council was not popularly elected, by August of 1973, it 
had passed a revolutionary law banning discrimination on the basis of personal 
appearance in employment, housing, and public accommodation.103  The council was 
concerned that groups like “single people, students, and longhairs . . . ha[d] encountered 
                                                
100 Thomas C. Mathieu, Former Michigan State Representative from Grand Rapids, e-mail message to 
author, 17 Aug. 2011. 
101 Mich. Comp. Laws.  Sec. 37.2606 (2012). 
102 Mich. Comp. Laws, secs. 37.2603-2605 (2012). 
103 Editorial, “The City’s Moves to Protect Human Rights,” Washington Post, 14 Aug. 1973, A20. 
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barriers that have no real bearing on their character, reliability, or public behavior.”104  
The council was also concerned that in this “Northern town with Southern exposure,” 
discriminating on the basis of personal appearance might serve as a clever excuse for 
Southerners in D.C. to discriminate on the basis of race.105 
The law was short-lived, however.  On December 24, 1973, Congress passed the 
District of Columbia Home Rule Act, granting DC full home rule.  An elected mayor and 
thirteen-member, “very activist” council took office for the first time on January 1, 1975, 
ready to start from scratch and “to correct the wrongs of many years.”106  Under the 
leadership of Chairman Sterling Tucker, the council passed a new Human Rights 
Ordinance in 1977.  The new ordinance was intended to be an “expansion of the 1973 
act,” protecting everything from “dashikis” to “bushes, long beards, and long hair.”107  
Like the 1973 ordinance, the 1977 ordinance barred all discrimination on the basis of 
personal appearance.   
While the DC statutory definition does not specifically include “weight,” it 
broadly includes the “outward appearance of any person, irrespective of sex, with regard 
to bodily condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress, and manner or style of 
personal grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and beards.”108  Like the 
Michigan statute, the DC law allows claimants to adjudicate their claims through either 
an administrative proceeding in the DC Office of Human Rights or through a private 
action.  Successful claimants are entitled to injunctive and equitable relief, compensatory 
                                                
104 Editorial, “Improvement of Local Human Rights Protections,” Washington Post, 28 May 1973, A26. 
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damages, back pay, and attorney fees.  Unsuccessful respondent employers may face a 
civil fine of up to $50,000.109 
Urbana, Illinois 
The final law of the 1970s came at the end of the decade from Urbana, IL.  
Urbana Code of Ordinances § 12-37 prohibits “discrimination by reason of . . . personal 
appearance . . . or any other discrimination based upon categorizing or classifying a 
person rather than evaluating a person's unique qualifications relevant to an opportunity 
in housing, employment, credit or access to public accommodations.”110  The ordinance 
specifically defines personal appearance to include “weight.”111  Urbana’s Human Rights 
Law came after almost a decade of wrangling among the mayor and city council 
members.   
The history of the provision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of personal 
appearance provision is intimately connected with the history of another provision in the 
1979 Urbana ordinance that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  
The Gay Liberation Front (GLF) was very active in the area throughout the 1970s, 
staging protests in both Urbana and its sister city, Champaign.  Perhaps its best known 
local leader was University of Illinois student, Jeff Graubart.  Graubart’s appeals to local 
politicans led to the repeal of both Champaign and Urbana’s anti-cross-dressing laws in 
1971 and 1972, respectively.   
Wanting additional civil rights protections, however, Graubart and the other 
members of the GLF continued their activism after the repeal of these laws.  On April 15, 
1972, while Graubart and other GLF members were staging a protest of an Urbana bar 
                                                
109 D.C. Code, sec. 2-1403.13 (2012). 
110 Urbana, Ill., Code of Ordinances, sec. 12-37 (2012). 
111 Urbana, Ill., Code of Ordinances, sec. 12-39 (2012). 
 143 
that was openly hostile to homosexuals, they were assaulted by individuals 
unsympathetic to their cause.  Even though the Urbana police failed to apprehend the 
assailants, a GLF member spotted one of them on campus on April 17, 1972.  Graubart 
called the police, and the police arrested the individual.  Nevertheless, when Graubart and 
another GLF member went into the police station to give a statement, the arresting officer 
accused them of lying to the police.  The police officer held the two in custody for over 
an hour, threatening them for “defaming” an “All-American Boy” and subjecting them to 
a series of homophobic slurs.112 
Graubart contacted the District Attorney’s office about the incident, but the office 
refused to launch an investigation.  Emotionally distraught, Graubart dropped out of 
school and moved to Chicago and later to California.  But Graubart continued to be 
“haunted by…the horrors of April 15th, 1972” and the subsequent denial of justice.113  
Thus, in 1976, Graubart determined to return to Urbana and seek recompense for the 
1972 events.  On March 2, 1976, Graubart began a sit-in at Urbana City Hall.  At the 
same time, he issued a press release demanding one million dollars in damages, full 
funding for him to finish his education, and reimbursement for the psychiatric and 
medical bills he had accrued as a result of the incident.114 
The protest ended unsuccessfully—police arrested Graubart after seventeen days 
of camping out in City Hall.  Even though Graubart did not receive the personal damages 
he sought, he did succeed in bringing public attention to his situation and the situation of 
the entire lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) community in Urbana.  He 
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also caught the attention of an Urbana city councilman.  In 1973, Dr. John Peterson, a 
well-known community organizer, became the first independent elected to the Urbana 
City Council.  As the “outsider” on the Council, Peterson had successfully sponsored a 
human rights ordinance in 1975 that gave limited protections to the LGBT community.115  
However, the 1975 ordinance did not provide protection against housing discrimination, 
which was an important issue in a university town.  The compromise required to avoid a 
mayoral veto in 1975 also resulted in limited investigatory powers if a complaint was 
filed and mild remedies if a complaint was successful.116 
Peterson seized the opportunity to take advantage of the public discontent after 
Graubart’s sit-in as well as the fact that, as of 1977, Democrats held a ten-to-four 
majority on the Urbana City Council, making the Council veto-proof.  Over the next 
year-and-a-half, Peterson worked with members of the Urbana Human Rights 
Commission, Graubart, and other members of the LGBT community to draft a new 
ordinance.  This ordinance would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation in all facets of life with stronger enforcement powers and stiffer penalties.  
Still, some Democrats on the Council were weary of voting for a purely gay rights bill.  
According to Graubart, 
personal appearance was added as a way to make the bill more palatable to 
the homophobes. We were against inclusion, not because we 
supported such discrimination, but because their motive was to hide the 
fact that it was an LGBT ordinance…[We were] disturbed when 
they moved to add a laundry list of people who should not be 
discriminated against.117 
 
                                                
115 Dr. John Peterson, Former Urbana City Councilman, telephone conversation with author, 26 Jan. 2012. 
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Such a laundry list was necessary, however, to get the ordinance passed.  Over two years 
after Graubart’s sit-in, the Urbana Human Rights Law was signed into law on May 10, 
1979.118 
 Today, current discrimination victims in Urbana must file a complaint with the 
local administrative authority, the Human Relations Commission.  The Urbana Human 
Relations Officer (UHRO) and one other staff member investigate all claims.  If they find 
that the claim has probable cause, the claim is slated for a public hearing in front of the 
Human Relations Commission within forty-two days (unless the claim settles first).119  
No private right of action is allowed under the Urbana Human Rights Ordinance.  
Successful claimants may obtain injunctive and equitable relief, compensatory damages, 
and back pay.  The Human Relations Commission may also order an employer 
respondent to pay up to a $500 civil fine.120  However, either party may appeal the 
Commission’s decision to the Sixth Circuit.121 
Santa Cruz, California 
After the passage of the Urbana ordinance, the passage of weight- and personal-
appearance discrimination ordinances ceased for over a decade.  Indeed, the next 
ordinance did not emerge until 1992 in Santa Cruz, CA.  Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 
9.83.010 “safeguard[s] the right and opportunity of all persons to be free from all forms 
of arbitrary discrimination, including discrimination based on . . . weight or physical 
characteristic.”122 Sponsored by Councilmember Neal Coonerty,123 the 1992 ordinance 
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had origins similar to the 1979 Urbana ordinance.  Weight and physical characteristic 
became add-ons to what began as a LGBT discrimination ordinance. 
The initial push for the ordinance came after former California Governor Pete 
Wilson vetoed a law that would have prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation throughout the state.124  Enraged by the veto, local LGBT activists knew that 
they would need a broader base of support to get an ordinance successfully passed in 
Santa Cruz.  As a result, they formed a coalition with local women’s rights and fat rights 
advocates to push for a new law “to protect more of the non-mainstream.”125  As in 
Urbana, public support for a strictly LGBT ordinance was not universal; many outraged 
citizens wrote letters to the Santa Cruz Council in opposition.126  Weight and physical 
characteristics became successful distractions from the principal issue, LGBT rights.  
These distractions rallied support from council members who initially opposed the 
ordinance, and the revised ordinance passed the council on February 11, 1992.127   
Today, discrimination victims must first file a claim with Santa Cruz Human 
Resources in order to pursue a claim under the Santa Cruz ordinance.  The Chief Human 
Resources Officer conducts a preliminary investigation of the complaint, contacts the 
accused party for a response, and requests that the accused party attend mediation with 
the complainant.  If the accused party accepts the mediation proposal, the Officer turns 
over the results of the preliminary investigation to the mediator, and the parties attempt to 
settle.  If the parties do not settle, then the complainant can file a private action.  
                                                
124 Laura Myers, “Santa Cruz Moves to Protect the Weird,” Prescott Courier, 15 Jan. 1992, 3A. 
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Similarly, if accused party refuses to go to mediation, the complainant can file a private 
action.128  Private actions under this ordinance can seek injunctive relief, equitable relief, 
compensatory damages, and attorney fees.  Employers found in violation of the ordinance 
are also subject to a maximum fine of $500.129 
San Francisco, California 
The next ordinance came from the state of California as well.  For San Francisco, 
a self-described “city of tolerance,”130 it all started in 1999 with a billboard.  A 
California-based chain of health clubs, 24 Hour Fitness, unveiled its new “sci-fi” 
advertising campaign in mid-February of 1999 with a prominent billboard South of 
Market depicting an alien and the message, “When they come, they’ll eat the fat ones 
first.”131  Within days, local fat rights activists had organized a protest.  About thirty 
protestors dressed as aliens stood outside one 24 Hour Fitness location on a Sunday 
morning doing aerobics as they held signs saying “Eat Me,” “I’m Yummy,” and “Bite 
My Fat Alien Butt.”132   
Even though the protest was small, it caught the attention of local newspapers, 
and more importantly, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.  Within a week, 
Supervisor Tom Ammiano had addressed the Board, the city attorney, and the San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission (SFHRC) about adding “weight and body size” to 
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the city’s Human Rights Ordinance.133  By the end of February, the Human Rights 
Commission had sent a letter to 24 Hour Fitness asking the health club chain to remove 
the billboard because it “target[ed] people for their appearance,” and “similar jokes about 
minorities or gays would not be tolerated” in the city of San Francisco.134 
 Although the Board’s letter was unsuccessful—24 Hour Fitness refused to remove 
the billboard—the issue of body size discrimination remained in the spotlight.  One staff 
member of the SFHRC noted that the publicity surrounding the Board’s letter drew “a lot 
of support” because “[p]eople really responded on this issue as one of fairness to all 
people.”135  Consequently, the SFHRC approved a resolution on body size discrimination 
at their meeting on June 10, 1999 that encouraged “the Board of Supervisors and the 
Mayor to enact legislation adding ‘body size’ or a comparable phrase to San Francisco’s 
anti-discrimination ordinances” and encouraged “all City contractors, and all business 
and agencies in San Francisco to eliminate body size discrimination from their programs 
and policies.”136 
After receiving the SFHRC’s resolution, the Board of Supervisors spent almost a 
year considering the possibility of adding body size language to the city’s Human Rights 
Ordinance.  On March 20, 2000, Supervisor Tom Ammiano introduced an ordinance that 
banned “the practice of discrimination on the grounds of . . . weight” in employment, city 
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contracts, public accommodations, and housing.137  The Board requested a report on the 
ordinance from the Finance and Labor Committee as well as an opinion from the city 
attorney’s office. 
On May 3, 2000—almost a year after the 24 Hour Fitness protest—local fat rights 
advocates finally got their long-awaited public hearing at the Finance and Labor 
Committee meeting. Although the ordinance sponsor, Supervisor Ammiano, was a  “rail-
thin” man, the rest of the fat-rights advocates testifying at the hearing were almost 
exclusively large women.138  The “true superstar” of the hearing, however, was Margarita 
Rossi, a sixteen-year-old student at the San Francisco School of the Arts.139  Rossi 
recounted an emotional tale of being denied care for a gynecological problem by a local 
nurse practitioner.  The nurse practitioner was so busy making “repeated remarks about 
[Rossi’s] weight” that she “never got around to conducting an exam.”140 
Rossi’s emotional testimony led to a unanimous approval of the ordinance by the 
three finance and labor committee members, and the ordinance was scheduled for a vote 
in front of the full Board on May 8, 2000.  Without any debate, all eleven supervisors 
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San Francisco Chronicle, 4 May 2000, A1. 
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voted to pass the ordinance on first reading on May 8, 2000.141  This unanimous Board 
support continued with the vote for final passage on May 15, 2000.142  Less than two 
weeks later, the ordinance became the official law of San Francisco with the signature of 
Mayor Willie L. Brown on May 26, 2000.143 
Over a year later, the SFHRC issued compliance guidelines for the ordinance, 
which carry the force of law in San Francisco.  Reinforcing the broad language of the 
ordinance, the guidelines state that weight discrimination is more than just discrimination 
on the basis of “a numerical measurement of total body weight.”  Weight discrimination 
also includes discrimination on the basis of “the ratio of a person’s weight in relation to 
height,” “an individual’s unique physical composition of weight through body size, 
shape, and proportions,” and “an impression of a person as fat or thin regardless of the 
numerical measurement.”144   
Under the ordinance, complainants today can pursue a remedy through the 
SFHRC and through a private action simultaneously.  The remedies available are among 
the most generous of all the local laws: treble special and general damages, up to $400 in 
additional damages, attorney fees, and even punitive damages.145 
Binghamton, New York 
The final and most recent addition to the weight-discrimination laws came from 
the other side of the country in Binghamton, NY.  The law was Binghamton 
                                                
141 San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Minutes, 08 May 2000, 2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder, San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission Office, San Francisco, Cal. 
142 San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Minutes, 15 May 2000, 2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder, San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission Office, San Francisco, Cal. 
143 San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Signed Ordinance 101-00, 26 May 2000, 2000 Human Rights 
Ordinance Folder, San Francisco Human Rights Commission Office, San Francisco, Cal. 
144 San Francisco Human Rights Commission, Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit Weight and Height 
Discrimination, sec. II.A (26 July 2001), 2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder, San Francisco Human 
Rights Commission Office, San Francisco, Cal. 
145 San Francisco, Cal., Police Code, secs. 3306-3307 (2012). 
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Councilmember Sean G. Massey’s “first major legislative endeavor” after his election in 
2008.146  Much like the earlier Urbana and Santa Cruz ordinances, the Binghamton 
ordinance began as one principally concerned with LGBT rights. 
In June of 2008, the Gender Equality Non-Discrimination Act, which would have 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, passed the New York State 
Assembly.  The New York State Senate, however, had a slight Republican majority that 
narrowly defeated the bill.  The defeat enraged LGBT activists statewide.  Soon 
afterwards, a group of transgendered activists approached Councilmember Massey, who 
then brought the idea to the rest of the Binghamton Council. 
Fortunately for Massey, the composition of Binghamton politicians in 2008 was 
overwhelmingly liberal.  Massey, his six fellow council members, and the mayor were all 
Democrats.  During the 2008 election, Massey and the mayor had even been endorsed by 
the Working Families Party, a New-York based, progressive grassroots organization that 
advocates equal rights for all.147  With the support of his fellow councilmembers, Massey 
began the research necessary to draft the ordinance. 
Interestingly, what distinguishes Binghamton from the two previous LGBT laws 
in Urbana and Santa Cruz is the reason for including personal appearance and weight in 
the Binghamton ordinance.  In Urbana and Santa Cruz, weight and personal appearance 
were added to distract council members who were wary to pass a law that exclusively 
concerned LGBT rights.  In Binghamton, however, weight and personal appearance 
protections were actually suggested by LGBT groups.  According to Massey, 
                                                
146 Sean G. Massey, Former Binghamton, N.Y. City Councilmember, e-mail message to author, 25 Jan. 
2011. 
147 Ibid. 
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Research on the legislation put me in contact with Lisa Mottet at the 
National Lesbian and Gay Task Force.  She helped me find model 
legislation that included protections based on gender expression and 
identity.  But we both agreed, however, that since we were creating a new 
law, we might as well create as comprehensive [a] law as possible.148 
 
 As a result, Massey contacted two San Francisco fat rights activists, Sondra 
Solovay and Marilyn Wann, who had helped draft that city’s ordinance and compliance 
guidelines.  With their help, Massey drafted an ordinance that “protect[s] and 
safeguard[s] the right and opportunity of all persons to be free from discrimination based 
on . . . weight.”149  Like the San Francisco ordinance, the definition of weight is 
extremely broad, including “an impression of a person as fat or thin regardless of the 
numerical measurement” and “[a]n individual's body size, shape, proportions, and 
composition . . . [that] make[s] them appear fat or thin regardless of numerical weight.”150   
The ordinance passed the Council successfully on December 15, 2008.  Unlike the 
other six jurisdictions, Binghamton does not have a commission that oversees the 
administration of its Human Rights Law.  Consequently, complainants under the 
Binghamton law must file a private action directly.  Complainants can seek injunctive 
relief, equitable relief, compensatory damages, and attorney fees.151 
Taken together, the seven Title VII-esque laws in Madison, Michigan, 
Washington, Urbana, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, and Binghamton differ substantially in 
their motivations for passage, remedies, and methods of administration.  But they are 
remarkably similar in the broad level of coverage they provide against discrimination on 
                                                
148 Ibid. 
149 Binghamton, N.Y., Municipal Code, sec. 45-2 (2012). 
150 Binghamton, N.Y., Municipal Code, sec. 45-3 (2012). 
151 Binghamton, N.Y., Municipal Code, sec. 45-9 (2012). 
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the basis of weight and personal appearance.  With a solid understanding of these seven 
laws, the FRA, and the ADA, it is now time to test their effectiveness. 
 
Data 
 
To test the effectiveness of the ADA, FRA, and the seven local Title VII-esque 
laws, this paper uses data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). 
The BRFSS is a nationally representative health survey dataset conducted annually by 
telephone and administered by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Although only 
fifteen states participated during the first year of collection in 1984, most states 
participated by 1990.  Indeed, by 1994, all fifty states, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Virgin Islands participated in the data collection.   
As described in Chapter I, very few datasets collect both labor market information 
and information on weight and height from their participants.  Yet the BRFSS has 
collected data annually on the health and risk characteristics, including weight and height, 
of its participants on a statewide basis.152  In addition to providing health and risk 
behavior information, the BRFSS collects data on participants’ employment status, 
education, state and county of residence, and other demographic information. 
Besides the detailed information provided by each participant, another advantage 
of the BRFSS dataset is its large size.  Each year of the BRFSS contains over 50,000 
                                                
152 Note that the BRFSS collects self-reported weight and height data, just as the EHM did in the last 
chapter.  I do not correct for self-reported weight and height in this chapter because as the previous chapter 
and many other previous papers have shown, this correction does not change the results. 
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observations, so that when all of the BRFSS data from 1985153 to 2010 are appended 
together, the result is over three million observations.  The large size of the BRFSS is 
critical for this analysis because testing the effectiveness of each law requires enough 
observations from each jurisdiction.  In smaller datasets like the NLSY, used for many 
previous obesity studies, or the CPS-ATUS-EHM, used in the previous chapter, there 
would never be enough observations from small cities like Binghamton, NY or Santa 
Cruz, CA to get statistically meaningful results.  Moreover, like the CPS-ATUS-EHM, 
the BRFSS contains observations on people of all ages, from as young as eighteen to 
retirement-age.  The BRFSS contains all of the information needed—in sufficiently large 
quantities—for the purposes of the study, so the next section explores the methodology 
necessary to test the effectiveness of the obesity laws using the BRFSS. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
 
Ideally, I could test the effectiveness of the ADA, FRA, and seven Title VII-esque 
laws for obese individuals over a broad range of labor market outcomes, including wages, 
industry and occupation distribution, and hours worked.  But as the previous section 
described, the BRFSS collects data on only one labor market outcome: employment 
status.  Using this outcome, a good way to test how these laws have affected employment 
of the obese is by comparing employment of the obese before and after each law’s 
implementation. Comparing the raw employment levels is a good place to start, but since 
                                                
153 Although BRFSS data collection began in 1984, the observations from 1984 are not geographically 
identifiable on the county-level, which is necessary for this study.  As a result, this paper uses the BRFSS 
data only from 1985 to 2010 (except for the Carpenter replication in Table 2, which only uses the BRFSS 
data from 1988 to 1999). 
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other things might have changed over time, a better analysis will control for these other 
factors.   
To implement this controlled comparison of the before and after-effects, this 
paper uses a basic differences model.  As in the previous chapter, I simplify the 
differences model here by assuming that only two BMI groups, obese and normal weight, 
exist.  Nevertheless, in the actual empirical analysis, I consider all five medical 
classifications of BMI: underweight, normal weight, overweight, obese, and morbidly 
obese.  In this first regression, I compare observations before the law’s passage to 
observations after the law’s passage within the affected jurisdiction: 
! 
E = X"+ #O+$L + %(O & L) +' . (1) 
In this model, the dependent variable E is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
individual is employed.  X is a vector of individual characteristics that commonly play a 
role in occupational choice, such as education, age, race, and geographical region. O is an 
indicator variable equal to one when the individual is obese; normal weight is the omitted 
category.  L is an indicator variable equal to one for all observations that occurred in 
years after the relevant law came into effect.  For example, when testing the effect of the 
1993 Cook decision, L will be equal to one for all observations from years after 1993.  In 
each regression, L will pick up all trends and changes that occurred after the passage of 
the relevant law, including changes due to general economic conditions.  As a result, year 
fixed effects will also be included in an attempt to control for other changes in economic 
conditions besides the law being tested.   
The variable of interest will be the interaction term, OxL, which will indicate the 
after-effect of each law specifically for the obese.  If its coefficient ! is greater than zero, 
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then the results suggest that relevant law has improved employment outcomes for the 
obese.  On the other hand, if ! is less than or equal to zero, then the law has not changed 
(or actually worsened) employment outcomes for the obese. 
 Comparing employment rates of the obese before and after a law’s passage is 
certainly informative, but with the BRFSS, will not be possible for every law.  The 
complete BRFSS data begins in 1985, but four of the local Title VII-esque laws were 
passed before 1980.  Consequently, for laws without any before-observations, a different 
type of differences model must be implemented: 
! 
E = X"+ #O+ $J +%(O & J) +' . (2) 
In this model, the dependent variable E is again an indicator variable equal to one 
if the individual is employed.  X is the same vector of individual characteristics, and O is 
an indicator variable equal to one when the individual is obese.  The new variable, J, is an 
indicator variable equal to one for observations that come from within the affected 
jurisdiction.  Unlike the first differences model, which only considered observations 
within the affected jurisdiction, this differences model compares employment of the 
obese in jurisdictions with protective laws to employment of the obese in jurisdictions 
without such protections. 
The variable of interest in this model will be the interaction term, OxJ, which will 
indicate the advantage (if any) of being an obese person in a jurisdiction with a protective 
law.  As with the previous model, if its coefficient " is greater than zero, then the results 
suggest that the relevant law has improved employment outcomes for the obese.  On the 
other hand, if " is less than or equal to zero, then the law has not improved employment 
outcomes. 
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In addition to these two tests of effectiveness, a third type of test is possible.  For 
the jurisdictions eligible for the first effectiveness test—that is, the jurisdictions that have 
a sufficient number of BRFSS observations before passing an obesity law—an even more 
robust test is possible.  This third test combines the differences tests in models one and 
two to perform a difference-in-differences analysis: 
! 
E = X"+ #O+$L + %J + &(O ' L) +((O ' J) + )(L ' J) + µ(O ' L ' J) +* . (3) 
 In this third and final model, E is the same indicator variable equal to one if the 
individual is employed.  X is the same vector of individual characteristics, and O is the 
same indicator variable equal to one when the individual is obese.  As in the previous two 
models, L is an indicator variable equal to one for all observations that occurred in years 
after the relevant law came into effect, and J is an indicator variable equal to observations 
that come from within the affected jurisdiction.  Thus, the difference-in-differences 
model, like the second differences model, requires using observations from both within 
and outside the affected jurisdiction. 
 The variable of interest in this model is the interaction term OxLxJ, which will 
indicate the effect of being an obese person in a jurisdiction with an obesity protection 
law after the law was passed.  If its coefficient µ is greater than zero, then the results 
suggest that the relevant law has improved employment outcomes for the obese.  On the 
other hand, if µ is less than or equal to zero, then the law has not improved employment 
outcomes. Using this methodology and the BRFSS data, the next section tests the effect 
of the Cook decision on employment outcomes for the obese. 
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Results 
 
 In this section, I will first present the results from testing the effect of the Cook 
decision on employment outcomes of the obese.  I will then present the results from 
testing the effect of the seven local Title VII-esque laws on employment outcomes of the 
obese.  Before turning to these results, however, a further exploration of the BRFSS data 
is merited.  Table 2 presents the summary statistics for men by BMI classification 
(underweight, normal weight, overweight, obese, and morbidly obese), and Table 3 
presents the summary statistics for women by BMI classification. 
 The first notable feature of both tables is the number of observations.  The BRFSS 
data contains over 1.5 million observations for men and over two million observations for 
women.  Primarily because of this large size, the differences in means by BMI 
classification are almost all statistically significant (see the Bonferroni test columns).  For 
both genders, average age increases as BMI classification increases.  Underweight and 
normal weight men are the least likely to be married, but underweight and morbidly 
obese women are the least likely to be married. 
 For men, only a slight correlation between race and weight appears, with the 
lightest and the heaviest men more likely to be black or Hispanic.  For women, however, 
the correlation between race and weight is striking.  Even though less than 10 percent of 
the full women’s sample are black, 15.5 percent of the obese sample and 20.2 percent of 
the morbidly obese women’s sample are black. 
 Overweight men have the highest education levels, while normal weight women 
have the highest education levels compared to the other BMI groups.  Similarly, 
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overweight men are most likely to be employed for wages, but normal weight women are 
most likely to be employed for wages.   
Note that here, and throughout the paper, employed for wages will serve as the 
dependent variable (E in the model above).  The BRFSS gives respondents seven options 
when responding to the employment status question: employed for wages, self-employed, 
out of work, homemaker, student, retired, and unable to work.  The employed for wages 
variable that I use throughout the paper defines employed for wages as employed, counts 
all respondents who are out of work, self-employed, a homemaker, a student, retired, or 
unable to work as not employed, and drops all respondents who refused to respond to the 
employment question.  The rationale for defining employed in this manner is that 
counting the self-employed as employed may not account for individuals who are forced 
into self-employment because they cannot find another job in the labor market.  The 
rationale for defining not employed in this manner is that it drops the fewest respondents 
possible from the analysis.   
Nevertheless, two other definitions of employed/not employed have been tested 
on all regressions presented in this paper.  I have tried defining all respondents who are 
employed for wages or self-employed as employed, counting all respondents who are out 
of work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who are a homemaker, a student, 
retired, unable to work, or refused to respond to the employment question.  I have also 
tried defining all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counting all 
respondents who are out of work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who are 
self-employed, a homemaker, a student, retired, unable to work, or refused to respond to 
the employment question.  The results of these robustness checks are not generally 
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reported because the definition of employed/not employed does not affect the main 
results. 
With these definitions and summary statistics in mind, I now turn to the main 
results of the paper.  The first part will present the effects of the 1993 Cook decision on 
employment outcomes of the obese, both in the First Circuit (where Cook is the law) and 
nationwide.  The second part will present the effects of the seven local laws on local 
employment outcomes of the obese. 
The Effect of the Cook Decision on Employment Outcomes for the Obese 
The First Circuit was the first and only circuit to hold that obesity is a disability 
for the purposes of the ADA and FRA in their 1993 case Cook v. Dept. of Mental Health, 
Retardation, & Hosps.154  Even though Cook has received negative treatment in the 
Second, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, it remains the law in the First Circuit.  As 
previously explained, Cook requires employers to overlook at least some of the costs 
associated with obese workers (whether real or perceived) by making reasonable 
accommodation.  Thus, Cook could have increased employment of obese in the First 
Circuit over the past two decades if the poor labor market outcomes of the obese result 
from employers’ beliefs that obesity substantially limits obese workers’ performance at 
work.  Furthermore, Cook could have increased employment of the obese nationwide if 
national companies with a presence in the First Circuit set their human resources policies 
based on the most restrictive circuit, which for the purposes of Federal obesity law, is the 
First Circuit.  This section will test both of these hypotheses by looking at the effects of 
the Cook decision on employment of the obese both in the First Circuit and nationwide. 
                                                
154 Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, 10 F3d 17 (1st Cir 1993).  Note that the analysis in 
this section that follows is pertinent to both the ADA and the FRA since that the evaluation standards are 
the same for both statutes, but this paper will refer to the ADA only in this section for simplicity. 
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This paper is not the first to examine the effect of Cook on employment of the 
obese.  Carpenter (2006) reported that the 1993 First Circuit decision in Cook v. Dept. of 
Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps. had enormous effects on employment of obese 
workers—even outside the First Circuit.  With the 1988-1999 BRFSS, Carpenter 
estimated using OLS that the decision increased nationwide employment of obese women 
by four percentage points and of obese men by two percentage points.155 Carpenter did 
not report any estimates of Cook’s effect on employment of the obese in the First Circuit 
only, even though the effects in the First Circuit should have been stronger than any 
nationwide effects.  Still, Carpenter argued that his nationwide estimates were plausible 
because the Cook case “effectively sent a nationwide signal to employers due to the 
widespread media attention” that obesity would be henceforth protected under the 
ADA.156 
Because Carpenter’s estimates are very large, this section revisits them and tests 
the robustness of his results.  I begin with an exact replication.  Carpenter uses the first 
differences model discussed in the Empirical Methodology Section to test the effect of 
the 1993 Cook decision on employment outcomes of the obese.  Thus, the variables of 
interest in this replication will be the obese*post-1993 and the morbidly obese*post-1993 
terms.   
Instead of using the entire range of available BRFSS data, Carpenter restricts his 
data to the years between 1988 and 1999.  Carpenter also limits his analysis to individuals 
between eighteen and forty-four.  Carpenter dropped a large portion of his older 
                                                
155 Christopher S. Carpenter, “The Effects of Employment Protection for Obese People,” Industrial 
Relations 45 (July 2006): 393. 
156 Ibid., 412. Although Carpenter argues that these employment effects were driven by the media, 
Carpenter does not cite other media events that have had effects on employment even remotely this large. 
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respondents because he wanted to drop all pregnant women from the sample, and the 
BRFSS does not ask women over forty-four whether they are pregnant.157  Three attempts 
at exact replication are reported in Table 4.  As the number of observations indicates, all 
three attempts at replication are unsuccessful.  Because Carpenter does not specify how 
he defined his dependent variable, employed, the three plausible ways of defining this 
variable (discussed above) are all tested.  
With all three definitions, the estimates of the coefficients on the variables of 
interest look quite similar for obese men.  As Carpenter indicated in his paper, these 
regressions suggest that the 1993 Cook decision increased employment of obese men by 
about two percentage points for obese men nationwide.  The results for women, however, 
are about half as large as Carpenter’s estimates.  In all three specifications, the coefficient 
on obese*post-1993 indicates that the 1993 Cook decision increased employment of 
obese women between two and three percentage points.   
Interestingly, the results for morbidly obese men and women are somewhat 
different from Carpenter’s estimates.  Carpenter found that the Cook decision had no 
statistically significant effect on the employment of morbidly obese men or women, even 
though Cook herself was a morbidly obese woman.  My estimates in specification two 
agree with Carpenter’s result for morbidly obese men (although the sign of the coefficient 
is negative, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero), but my estimates in 
specifications three and four find that the years after 1993 did have a positive, statistically 
significant impact on employment of morbidly obese men.  Similarly, my estimates for 
                                                
157 Carpenter does not consider that “by 44 the fertility window is definitely closing” through either natural 
conception or medically-induced conception such as in-vitro fertilization.  Salynn Boyles, “After Age 44, 
Fertility Successes are Few,” 25 Aug. 2005, WebMD Health News, last modified 2012, 
http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/news/20050825/after-age-44-fertility-successes-are-
few.  
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women in specifications, six, seven, and eight find that the years after 1993 had a 
positive, statistically significant effect on the employment outcomes of morbidly obese 
women. 
I am unable to replicate Carpenter’s results exactly in Table 4, yet I still find 
evidence that the years after 1993 had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
employment outcomes for the obese and morbidly obese nationwide.  So the question 
becomes: Are these post-1993 effects the result of Cook?  Or are they result of some 
other 1993 event?  Carpenter’s estimates—and my attempts to replicate him—assume 
that the Cook decision was capable of having a nationwide effect on employment of the 
obese.  Yet even if Cook did have a nationwide effect, the effect should have been 
strongest in the First Circuit since Cook is only mandatory precedent in the First Circuit.  
Tables 5 and 6 test how the strength of the post-1993 effect in the First Circuit compares 
to the strength of the post-1993 effect in all other circuits. 
In Table 5, I present the results of a difference-in-differences regression using the 
third regression model presented in the Empirical Methodology Section.  This difference-
in-differences regression compares pre-1993 and post-1993 observations within the First 
Circuit to those outside the First Circuit.  Because I am no longer trying to replicate 
Carpenter, I use the full range of available BRFSS data from 1985 to 2010 as well as the 
full range of working-age respondents from eighteen to sixty-five.  The variables of 
interest in this regression are the obese*post-1993*first circuit and the morbidly 
obese*post-1993*first circuit interaction terms.  Neither of these interaction terms is 
statistically significant for men or for women.  Consequently, Table 5 indicates that the 
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nationwide post-1993 effects picked up in Table 4 are the result of something besides 
Cook. 
Table 6 first presents the nationwide differences estimates using the full range of 
1985 to 2010 BRFSS data.  Table 6 then divides this data between the First Circuit and 
all other circuits; it presents differences estimates for each division in order to determine 
what region of the country is driving the post-1993 nationwide employment effects seen 
in Table 4 and in Carpenter’s paper.  After comparing specifications five and six for 
women, it is clear that something outside the First Circuit is driving any post-1993 
employment effects for the obese nationwide.  The coefficient on obese*post-1993 is 
statistically significant for women in the First Circuit, but it is smaller in magnitude than 
the coefficient on this variable in all other circuits.158  Moreover, the coefficient on 
morbidly obese*post-1993 is not even statistically significant for women in the First 
Circuit. If the Cook decision helped anyone, it should have been morbidly obese women 
in the First Circuit since Cook herself was a morbidly obese woman in the First Circuit. 
But it had no effect on these women, suggesting that the positive, significant coefficients 
on obese*post-1993 and morbidly obese*post-1993 seen nationwide in specification four 
is being driven by some other event in 1993, and not Cook. 
The results for women in Table 6 as well as the previous results for both genders 
in Table 5 cast doubt on the premise that men saw benefits from the decision either.  The 
fact that the morbidly obese*post-1993 coefficient is not statistically significant for men 
in specifications one, two, or three of Table 6 further casts doubt on the premise that 
Cook is responsible for any positive employment effects after 1993.  Nevertheless, 
specification two in Table 6 does show that the coefficient on obese*post-1993 is 
                                                
158 These differences are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
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strongly positive and statistically significant for men in the First Circuit.  These 
coefficients are larger than the same coefficients in specification three, which uses data 
for men outside the First Circuit. The magnitude of the obese*post-1993 coefficient for 
men in the First Circuit is consistent with Carpenter’s hypothesis that Cook improved 
employment outcomes for obese men.   
Still, even if Carpenter’s hypothesis is correct for men, it is not clear why his 
hypothesis would only be correct for obese men and not morbidly obese men—especially 
given that the plaintiff in Cook was morbidly obese.  The anomaly of this one result, 
which is not robust to a change in specification (as seen in the difference-in-differences 
results for men in Table 5), must be driven by some other factor.   
One potential candidate for this “other factor” is the economy.  Despite three 
recessions during the 1980s and early 1990s, the economy grew for 120 consecutive 
months from April 1991 to March 2001.159  The regression results may be picking up this 
economic growth, although the year fixed effects included in every regression should 
control for economic trends.  I tested additional specifications, not reported here, in order 
to determine the origin of this one result, including controls for various macroeconomic 
indicators such as national unemployment rate, First Circuit unemployment rate, 
employment in blue collar industries, employment in utilities (since there were several 
energy crises during this period), poverty rate, and gross domestic product.  This one 
result for obese men in this specification is robust to all of these additional controls.  Still, 
given all of the other evidence, the fact that Cook is behind this one result is questionable. 
                                                
159 National Bureau of Economic Research, “U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Online, last modified 20 Sep. 2010, http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
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For those convinced that this one result is driven by Cook, however, I present one 
final piece of evidence that Cook had nothing to do with any positive employment effects 
for the obese seen after 1993.  This evidence is introduced in Table 7, which presents the 
results of a falsification test.  If it is true that the 1993 Cook decision, which recognized 
obesity as an disability under the ADA, improved employment outcomes for the obese, 
then it should also be true that a contrary decision had either a negative effect or no effect 
at all on employment of the obese.  In other words, if Carpenter is correct that Cook “sent 
a nationwide signal”160 to employers that not hiring the obese could have legal 
consequences, then a contrary decision should have damaged this signal, particularly in 
the circuit where the decision was rendered.   
Two such contrary decisions to Cook occurred in the Sixth Circuit over this time 
period.  The first decision came in 1997.  As discussed in the Obesity as a Disability 
Section, the Sixth Circuit refused to grant relief to Ohio State Highway Patrol officers 
who had failed to meet the force’s weight requirements in Andrews v. State of Ohio.161   
The second decision, E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, came in 2006.  Here, Watkins 
Motor Lines prevented a dock worker from returning to work after an injury because of 
his weight, so the worker brought suit against his employer.  Because the worker’s weight 
did not arise from an underlying physiological issue, the Sixth Circuit denied him relief, 
reaffirming the 1997 Andrews decision.162   
Andrews and Cook are only mandatory precedent in the Sixth Circuit, so any 
negative effects on the employment of the obese resulting from these decisions should be 
                                                
160 Christopher S. Carpenter, “The Effects of Employment Protection for Obese People,” Industrial 
Relations 45 (July 2006): 412. 
161 Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F3d 803 (6th Cir 1997). 
162 E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F3d 436 (6th Cir 2006). 
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strongest in the Sixth Circuit.  As Table 7 demonstrates, neither the 1997 Andrews case 
nor the 2006 Watkins case had a negative impact on employment of the obese.  In fact, 
these years actually had a positive effect on employment of the obese in the Sixth Circuit.   
The obese*post and morbidly obese*post coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant for women in both 1997 and 2006, and the obese*post coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant for men in 2006.  These results are exactly the opposite of 
what Carpenter’s hypothesis would predict. 
Taken together, Tables 5 through 7 indicate that ADA protections have not 
improved employment outcomes for the obese, either in the First Circuit or nationwide.  
Therefore, even if the ADAAA does convince other circuits to recognize obesity as a 
disability in the future, these expanded protections are unlikely to improve employment 
outcomes for the obese. Although the Cook decision has not helped the obese, the seven 
local laws that specifically prohibit weight and personal appearance discrimination may 
have been more successful.  The estimations in the next section test just how successful 
these other laws have been. 
The Effect of Local Laws on Employment Outcomes for the Obese 
 Ideally, the BRFSS would contain observations before and after each local Title 
VII-esque law was passed, just as the BRFSS contained observations before and after the 
Cook decision.  But as the Data and Empirical Methodology Sections described, the 
BRFSS did not begin until 1984, and not all states participated until the early 1990s.  
Therefore, the BRFSS does not contain any before-observations for Madison, WI, 
Michigan, Washington, DC, or Urbana, IL.  Because California did not participate in the 
BRFSS from the beginning and Santa Cruz is a small city, there are no before-
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observations for Santa Cruz either.  As a result, for five of the seven cities, only a 
comparison between employment rates of the obese within the jurisdiction to 
employment rates outside the jurisdiction is possible. 
 Table 8 presents summary statistics that compare the raw employment rates by 
BMI classification for jurisdictions with Title VII-esque protections to surrounding 
jurisdictions without such protections.  Because the number of observations are 
drastically reduced when a single jurisdiction is considered, the trends in the data are 
most visible when some of the BMI classifications are pooled.  Therefore, for better 
readability and ease of comparison, the five weight classes are pooled into three groups: 
underweight and normal weight, overweight, and obese and morbidly obese. The weight 
group with the highest employment rate is highlighted in this table for each jurisdiction. 
Nationwide, underweight/normal weight women and overweight men have the 
highest rates of employment.  But in four of the jurisdictions with weight or personal 
appearance-discrimination laws, heavier residents have higher employment rates.  
Heavier men and women in Urbana, IL, women in Madison, WI, women in Binghamton, 
NY, and men in Santa Cruz, CA all appear to have more success in the labor market than 
heavier men and women in the rest of these states.  None of these differences in means 
are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, but very few of the city differences in 
means are statistically significant given that cities have fewer observations. 
Because this method of analysis is crude, the Santa Cruz, CA (N=207 men, 301 
women) results may be at least partially driven by the fact that it is has the smallest 
number of observations of any jurisdiction in the sample.  The obese/morbidly obese 
group of Santa Cruz men only has thirty-five observations.  Binghamton, NY (N=359 
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men, 582 women) has a larger overall sample, but very few observations from after 2008 
when its weight-discrimination law passed (N=51 men, 78 women).  Nevertheless, for 
Urbana, IL (N=391 men, 562 women) and Madison, WI (N=1,608 men, 2,021 women), 
the sample sizes are large, and all of the observations come after their laws passed in the 
1970s.  Thus, even if the results for Santa Cruz and Binghamton are not totally 
convincing, there still appears to be something real occurring in Madison and Urbana.   
Table 9 confirms that Madison and Urbana’s laws are the only two that show 
strong signs of effectiveness.  Table 9 shows the results of differences regressions for the 
five jurisdictions without before-observations.  These regressions follow the second 
model presented in the Empirical Methodology Section; thus, the variable of interest in 
these regressions is obese/morbidly obese*jurisdiction.  As in the previous table, weight 
groups are pooled here because of the small number of observations available in some of 
the affected jurisdictions. These regression results show that employment outcomes are 
better for obese men in Urbana and for obese women in Madison than in surrounding 
jurisdictions.  In contrast, employment outcomes for the obese are worse in Michigan and 
Washington. 
For the remaining two jurisdictions, San Francisco and Binghamton, the BRFSS 
contains observations for each city and its surrounding areas before and after each law’s 
passage.  The summary statistics for San Francisco and Binghamton before and after 
passage are presented in Table 10. These summary statistics indicate that employment 
rates for obese and morbidly obese men increased after the passage of San Francisco’s 
law, while the employment rates for obese and morbidly obese women increased after the 
passage of Binghamton’s law.  Because this method of analysis is crude, however, I can 
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further exploit the broader availability of data for San Francisco and Binghamton.  For 
these two cities, I run difference-in-differences regressions that follow the third model 
presented in the Empirical Methodology Section. 
Table 11 presents the results of these difference-in-differences regressions.  The 
variable of interest in these regressions is obese/morbidly obese*post*jurisdiction. The 
effect seen for obese and morbidly obese women in the Binghamton summary statistics 
disappears.  This disappearance may indicate that Binghamton’s law—like so many 
others—has not improved employment outcomes for the obese.  On the other hand, this 
disappearance may simply be the result of having very few post-2008 observations for 
Binghamton men (N=51) and women (N=71).  For Binghamton, it may be too soon to tell 
the effects of its law.  
For San Francisco, however, the obese/morbidly obese*post*jurisdiction 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant for men, but neither of the coefficients 
of interest are statistically significant for women.  These results could indicate that the 
San Francisco law has improved employment outcomes for obese men, but several 
factors cast doubt on this conclusion.  First, the sample only contains thirty-five 
observations of obese and morbidly obese men in San Francisco after 2000.  Second, the 
obese/morbidly obese*post*jurisdiction coefficient is enormous—if true, this estimate 
would suggest that the San Francisco law increased employment of obese men there by 
almost twenty percentage points.  Not only is this estimate implausibly large to be 
attributed solely to the weight-discrimination law, but it is also difficult to reconcile with 
specification two, which suggests that the San Francisco law has not helped women at all.   
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In fact, if the San Francisco law were going to help one gender only, it should 
have been women.  Although a male supervisor sponsored the ordinance, the participants 
in the protest that incited the law, the speakers at the Board of Supervisors hearing that 
considered the law, and the drafters of the San Francisco ordinance and compliance 
guidelines were almost exclusively women.163  In addition, the two most famous and 
publicized complaints filed under this law were brought by women.  Filed shortly after 
the law’s passage, the two complaints came from Krissy Keefer, a dancer whose eight-
year-old daughter was rejected by the San Francisco Ballet School for “not having the 
right body type,”164 and Jennifer Portnick, an aerobics instructor who was rejected from 
teaching Jazzercise because of her weight.165  Both cases resulted in settlement through 
the San Francisco Human Rights Commission mediation program.166 
In sum, the seven local Title VII-esque laws that prohibit weight and personal 
appearance discrimination have performed better than the ADA in improving 
employment outcomes for the obese, but they still have not been entirely successful.  
With so many seeming failures, then the question naturally arises: Why have so few laws 
improved employment outcomes of the obese?  The last section discusses this question at 
length. 
 
 
 
                                                
163 Telephone interview with Sondra Solovay, San Francisco Weight Discrimination Attorney, in San 
Francisco, CA (Aug. 17, 2011). 
164 Jon Carroll, “Just Like a Ballerina,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8 Dec. 2000, C24. 
165 Elizabeth Fernadez, “Teacher Says Fat, Fitness Can Mix: SF Mediates Complaint Jazzercise Showed 
Bias,” San Francisco Chronicle, 24 Feb. 2002, A21. 
166 Sondra Solovay, San Francisco Weight Discrimination Attorney, telephone conversation with author, 17 
Aug. 2011. 
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Administration: Why Some Laws Work and Some Laws Do Not 
 
 For advocates of obesity discrimination laws, the results of this chapter may be 
quite discouraging.  Fat rights organizations like the National Association to Advance Fat 
Acceptance (NAAFA) tout the Cook decision and the seven local laws as archetypes for 
the rest of the nation, advocating legislation and policy as “the solution . . . to ensure size 
equality” and to improve labor market outcomes of the obese.167  Yet only two laws 
appear to have made any progress toward achieving these goals. 
 On the bright side for fat rights advocates, it is not just the obesity laws that are 
falling short.  No one seems to be doing very well under our current Federal system of 
employment discrimination protections.  Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) found that overall 
employment of all disabled individuals actually declined after the ADA went into effect.  
Even after controlling for increased social security and disability insurance participation 
rates, the disabled were still worse off after the ADA.  The ADA requires employers to 
make reasonable accommodation for disabled employees, but employers cannot dock 
disabled workers’ wages to pay for this accommodation.  Thus, Acemoglu and Angrist 
concluded that “the costs of reasonable accommodation are probably larger than the costs 
of litigation for wrongful termination” for most employers.168 
 Indeed, all potential victims of employment discrimination—even members of 
Title VII protected classes—face a difficult journey to enforce their rights under the 
current Federal system.  Clermont and Schwab (2004) studied the Federal court outcomes 
                                                
167 National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance, “Facts on Size Discrimination,” NAAFA Online, last 
viewed 03 Mar. 2012, 
http://www.naafaonline.com/dev2/assets/documents/naafa_FactSheet_v17_screen.pdf. 
168 Daron Acemoglu and Joshua D. Angrist, “Consequences of Employment Protection?  The Case of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,” Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001): 915-57. 
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of a broad range of employment discrimination cases, including cases filed under Title 
VII, the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,169 42 U.S.C. § 1983,170 the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA),171 and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).172  
Compared to all other litigants in Federal court, employment discrimination plaintiffs fare 
worse at every step of the adjudication process.  Plaintiffs under these statutes are more 
likely to lose pretrial, often succumbing to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  
Even if they make it past the summary judgment phase, they are less likely to settle their 
claims, and thus, are more likely to go to trial.  At trial, employment discrimination 
plaintiffs lose “disproportionately often.”173  And even though employment 
discrimination plaintiffs are more likely to appeal an adverse trial outcome, defendants do 
“far better on those appeals than the plaintiffs.”174 
 Five years later, Clermont and Schwab (2009) updated their results and found that 
the situation for employment discrimination plaintiffs had gotten worse, not better.  
Employment discrimination plaintiffs still fared worse at every step of the adjudication 
process than other plaintiffs in Federal court.  But now, another, more discouraging trend 
was present.  Employment discrimination suits, which once constituted the largest 
fraction of the Federal docket, were now on the decline.  Clermont and Schwab found 
that the absolute number of employment discrimination suits had been declining since 
                                                
169 This section prohibits intentional discrimination against members of protected classes engaged in 
protected activities.  Thus, this section can be used to bring claims outside of employment as well. 
170 This section is primarily used to sue municipalities for discrimination a member of a protected class. 
171 The ADEA protects individuals who are at least forty years old from workplace discrimination.  Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, U.S. Code, vol. 29, sec. 621 (2012). 
172 The FMLA “entitles eligible employees of covered employers to take unpaid, job-protected leave for 
specified family and medical reasons with continuation of group health insurance coverage under the same 
terms and conditions as if the employee had not taken leave.”  U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour 
Division, “Family and Medical Leave Act,” U.S. Department of Labor Online, last modified 15 Feb. 2012, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla; Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. Code, vol. 29, sec. 2601 (2012). 
173 Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, “How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 1 (July 2004): 429-58. 
174 Ibid., 429. 
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1999, and the relative number of employment discrimination suits (compared to the rest 
of the Federal docket) had been declining since 2001.175  The authors credited this decline 
to the frustration of employment discrimination plaintiffs and attorneys, leading to their 
“foreswearing use of the courts.”176 
 Taken together, these papers all suggest the same conclusion: employers are not 
afraid of employment discrimination lawsuits brought under Federal law.  Acemoglu and 
Angrist indicate that employers would rather take the chance of being sued than 
undertake the additional expenses associated with reasonable accommodation.  Clermont 
and Schwab suggest that employers take this chance because even if they are sued, they 
generally win.   
 So why are potential victims of employment discrimination faring so poorly under 
Federal law?  Congress intended that Federal employment discrimination laws would 
improve labor market outcomes for protected individuals.  Yet the labor market outcomes 
of protected individuals show few signs of improvement—and have even declined in 
some cases.  Consequently, the answer to this puzzle must lie in the administration of 
Federal employment discrimination statutes.    Studying how these statutes are enforced 
may illuminate why many employment discrimination plaintiffs are not faring well under 
Federal law.  More importantly, studying enforcement under the Federal system may 
illuminate why many employment discrimination plaintiffs are not faring well under local 
obesity discrimination laws either. 
 
 
                                                
175 Kevin M. Clermont and Stewart J. Schwab, “Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: 
From Bad to Worse?” Harvard Law & Policy Review 3 (2009): 103-32. 
176 Ibid., 104. 
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Enforcement of Federal Employment Discrimination Law 
Individuals with a complaint under a Federal employment discrimination law, 
whether the ADA or something else, have no more than 300 days to file a charge with the 
EEOC or an authorized state agency.  In fact, in states without their own employment 
discrimination laws and agencies, individuals have only 180 days to file.  Once an 
individual has filed a valid employment discrimination charge under a current Federal 
law, the EEOC sends a letter to the employer with two options.  The first option invites 
the employer to participate in a free mediation program.177  If the employer refuses to 
participate in mediation, then the employer must choose the second option, which is to 
provide a written position statement and written answers to a list of questions based on 
the charge.178 
If the employer chooses to mediate, the EEOC brings in a mediator from either 
inside or outside the EEOC.  The parties may bring an attorney to mediation, but they are 
not required to bring one.  Mediation remedies vary from offers to hire and monetary 
settlements to employer recommendation letters and apologies.  According to the latest 
EEOC statistic from 2008, the mediation program has a 72.1 percent settlement rate.179  
Of course, this statistic does not account for selection into the program; employers with 
bad cases may be the only ones who choose to mediate. 
                                                
177 The employee must also agree to mediation.  If the employee refuses to mediate, then the EEOC 
automatically requires the employer to provide a written position statement and written answers to 
questions based on the charge. 
178 The information in this section comes almost entirely from an interview with an EEOC District Director. 
Katharine Kores, District Director of Memphis Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
telephone conversation with author, 09 Jan. 2012. 
179 U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, “Questions and Answers About Mediation,” Equal 
Opportunity Employment Commission Online, last viewed 20 Feb. 2012, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/qanda.cfm. 
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Regardless, if EEOC mediation fails (or if either party refuses to mediate), the 
EEOC begins its investigation process.  During its investigation, the EEOC can rely on 
the information provided by both parties, but it can also gather its own information 
independently.  The information gathering process may include onsite visits to the 
employer and interviews with other employees.  The EEOC strives to complete this 
investigation within 180 days.  Unfortunately, according to one EEOC District Director, 
the “workload increases every year,” and most investigations “probably go more towards 
a year.”180 
At the end of the investigation, the EEOC determines whether the investigation 
has given the agency “reasonable cause” to believe that discrimination has occurred.181  If 
it has not, then the EEOC will issue a right to sue letter to the charging party, which will, 
as the name implies, give the charging party the right to bring a lawsuit against her 
employer.  If the investigation has given the agency reasonable cause to believe that 
discrimination has occurred, however, then the parties are invited to participate in 
conciliation.  During conciliation, the EEOC uses "informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion" to encourage the parties to reach a settlement agreement.182  
In practice, the EEOC seeks full relief for the charging party during the conciliation 
process.  For charges that involve an entire class of individuals, the EEOC will ask the 
employer to change its discriminatory policy and to compensate all victims (not just the 
charging party).  Still, conciliation is voluntary, and the employer can refuse the EEOC’s 
proposals. 
                                                
180 Katharine Kores, District Director of Memphis Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
telephone conversation with author, 09 Jan. 2012. 
181 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 2000e-5 (2012). 
182 Ibid. 
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If the employer does refuse the EEOC proposals (or refuses to participate in 
conciliation at all), then the EEOC sends the case to the agency legal unit.  The legal unit 
determines whether to file the lawsuit itself or to issue a right to sue letter to the charging 
party.  If the EEOC files the lawsuit itself, then the agency brings the case on its own 
accord; the charging party is not the agency’s client.  Still, having the EEOC bring the 
case is always preferable because the charging party does not have to hire an attorney or 
pay any of the fees associated with litigation.  Furthermore, the charging party and any 
class members are still entitled to relief obtained from the litigation. 
On the other hand, if the agency issues a right to sue letter, the charging party is 
on her own to bring a lawsuit against her employer.  Because employment discrimination 
cases are legally complicated and take years to litigate, most individuals cannot afford to 
pay an attorney out-of-pocket.  Therefore, most lawyers working in the employment 
discrimination area work on a contingent-fee basis: they do not receive payment unless 
their client wins.183  Even though many discrimination statutes—both Federal and local—
contain fee-shifting provisions, which allow plaintiffs who are successful at trial to seek 
an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the contingent fee amount often controls.  In 
Venegas v. Mitchell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that employment discrimination 
attorneys were allowed to collect the contingent fee agreed to by their client, even if the 
amount of the contingent fee exceeded the court’s determination of a reasonable attorney 
fee.184  Since this case, Federal courts agree that a successful plaintiffs’ attorney is at least 
                                                
183 Joel Wm. Friedman, The Law of Employment Discrimination, 7th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 
2009), 698. 
184 Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 US 82 (1990).  
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entitled to the higher of the two fees (either the contingency fee or the statutory award).185  
However, the Fifth Circuit has held in Gobert v. Williams that a plaintiffs’ attorney can 
collect both the contingency fee and the statutory award.186  The generous fee awards for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who are successful at trial may seem almost excessive, but courts 
realize that “the attorney is being compensated for the risk that the suit would be 
unsuccessful” (and in employment discrimination suits, plaintiffs’ attorneys are often 
unsuccessful).187   
Contingent-fee attorneys, as a result, are “reluctant to bring questionable claims,” 
and they are also reluctant to bring valid claims that will not result in a high level of 
damages.188  With questionable claims, plaintiffs’ attorneys have a higher probability of 
losing and, consequently, a lower possibility of ever being compensated for their time.  
With low damage claims, the contingency fee may not fully compensate plaintiffs’ 
attorneys for their time, even if they are successful.  Of course, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
bringing low-damage claims who are successful at trial can eventually seek a reasonable 
fee award from the defendant.  But plaintiffs’ attorneys who settle low-damage claims 
before or during trial are only entitled to the small contingency fee.  Thus, even a plaintiff 
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with a valid claim and a right to sue letter may have a difficult time finding an attorney—
and may be forced to choose between bringing a case pro se or not bringing a case at all.   
Supposing a plaintiff with a right to sue letter does decide to bring her lawsuit, 
Clermont and Schwab (2004, 2009) demonstrated that she will face another uphill battle 
surviving summary judgment, trial, and appeal.189  Supporting Clermont and Schwab’s 
findings, Nielsen et al. (2010) found that over 40 percent of all employment 
discrimination plaintiffs have their cases dismissed or lose on summary judgment.  
Plaintiffs who proceed pro se are three times as likely to have their cases dismissed or 
lose on summary judgment.  And only 33 percent of plaintiffs who survive summary 
judgment win at trial.190 
Furthermore, even successful plaintiffs endure years of litigation.  The enormous 
time it takes to litigate employment discrimination cases is evident from the legal 
community’s remaining uncertainty about the ADAAA.  The ADAAA took effect in 
2008, and yet no one knows for certain whether courts will consider obesity a disability 
for the purposes of the ADA.  The two cases brought by the EEOC in the Fifth Circuit 
still have not gone to trial.   Moreover, Lisa Harrison, the plaintiff from the first case filed 
in 2010, has now died, and the EEOC is proceeding on behalf of her estate.191 
All things considered, the lengthy EEOC process, the even lengthier litigation 
process, and all of the roadblocks set up for plaintiffs along the way can explain why 
employers feel little pressure from Federal employment discrimination statutes.  Thus, it 
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is not surprising that plaintiffs in jurisdictions following the Federal model suffer the 
same fate. 
Enforcement of Local Laws 
 Looking back at Table 1, the resemblance of the seven state and local 
employment discrimination enforcement processes to the Federal process is striking.  
Every jurisdiction except Binghamton, NY has its own enforcement agency.  All six 
jurisdictions with enforcement agencies have mediation programs.  Moreover, four of 
these jurisdictions, including Michigan, Madison, WI, Urbana, IL, and Santa Cruz, CA, 
require employees to file a charge with the local enforcement agency so that the agency 
can make a reasonable cause determination.     
 Beyond the similarities in enforcement agencies, the state and local processes also 
resemble the Federal process in method of adjudication.  In five of the seven 
jurisdictions, complainants have a private right of action.  Michigan, Washington, DC, 
and San Francisco, CA also allow complainants to pursue a remedy through the local 
enforcement agency instead, but submitting to the enforcement agency’s process is 
optional.  In fact, the only two jurisdictions that do not allow discrimination complainants 
to file a private right of action happen to be the same two jurisdictions that showed any 
promise of helping the obese in the labor market: Madison, WI and Urbana, IL.  
Complainants in these jurisdictions must go through the local enforcement agency 
processes in order to obtain relief.   
 One of the fundamental assumptions of economic theory is that more choice is 
better.192  Thus, at first glance, it would appear that Michigan, Washington, DC, and San 
Francisco, CA were the most plaintiff-friendly environments since plaintiffs there have a 
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choice between pursuing a remedy through the local enforcement agency or through the 
courts.  Nevertheless, the higher employment rates of the obese in Madison and Urbana 
are not an accident.  Even though complainants in these cities cannot file a private 
lawsuit, the commission adjudication processes are quick, rigorous, and sufficiently 
threatening for employers to take them seriously. 
Madison, Wisconsin 
 Although the Madison commission process as a whole is quite different from the 
EEOC process, the Madison process begins in the same manner.  After a complaint is 
filed with the MEOC, the complaint is assigned to an investigator.  The investigator uses 
the information provided by the parties as well as information from her own independent 
research to make a determination of probable cause.  During the investigatory process, 
the parties are given an opportunity to mediate.  If one party declines, or mediation fails, 
the investigator proceeds to make a probable cause determination.193   
If the investigator determines that no probable cause exists, then the complainant 
has fifteen days to appeal this decision to a hearing examiner and fifteen days to make a 
second appeal to the entire MEOC; otherwise, the case is closed.  If the investigator 
determines that there is probable cause, the parties have the opportunity for conciliation, 
just as they do in the EEOC process. 
The similarities between the MEOC and EEOC processes end after conciliation.  
In the EEOC process, complainants with probable cause begin the long process of 
Federal court litigation.  In the MEOC process, once conciliation fails, a hearing officer is 
                                                
193 The information presented in this section is based on three sources: City of Madison Department of 
Civil Rights, City of Madison Department of Civil Rights Online, last modified 2012, 
http://www.cityofmadison.com/dcr/index.cfm; Lucia Nunez, Director of the Madison Department of Civil 
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immediately appointed, and the complaint is scheduled for a prehearing conference and 
final hearing.  At the prehearing conference, the parties determine issues commonly 
decided at a pretrial conference, such as deadlines for each party’s list of witnesses.  By 
law, the final hearing must be scheduled within thirty days of the probable cause 
determination.194 
At the hearing, the parties must present all of the evidence that they wish the 
hearing examiner to consider.  The hearing examiner will not consider the investigator’s 
report on her own, but the parties are free to introduce content from the investigator’s 
report.  The hearing begins with each party making an opening statement.  The 
complainant presents witnesses, and the employer is allowed to cross-examine the 
complainant’s witnesses.  At any point during the witness testimony, the hearing officer 
is allowed to ask her own independent questions of the witnesses. 
After the presentation of witnesses, each party is allowed to introduce exhibits, 
including previous decisions of a Madison Equal Opportunities hearing officer, the 
Commission itself, or Wisconsin state appellate courts.  Every decision on the Madison 
law is indexed by subject and party name on the MEOC website, so relevant cases are 
easy to find, even for a novice legal researcher.  Finally, each party makes a closing 
statement, and the hearing officer makes a decision, and if applicable, awards damages.  
As mentioned previously, the hearing officer’s decision is appealable first to the entire 
Commission for review, then the Dane County Circuit Court, and finally the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals. 
Although the MEOC process has some similarities to the Federal process, two key 
differences make it more effective.  First, the Madison process is much faster.  
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Complainants who file with the Federal EEOC are generally still waiting for a probable 
cause determination a year after filing their charge; complainants who file with the 
MEOC have generally already had their hearing in that time.  As a result, even decisions 
that are appealed all the way up to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals are generally resolved 
within three years.195  In contrast, litigants who take their cases up through the Federal 
court system can expect double that amount of time.196 
Second, and more importantly, the MEOC tries to make the commission process 
as accessible for complainants as possible.  The MEOC does not require complainants to 
have a lawyer; in fact, the MEOC does everything possible to help complainants 
represent themselves effectively.  As mentioned before, the MEOC maintains an 
extensive and easily searchable decision digest so that complainants can look up previous 
cases similar to their own.  The MEOC also provides complainants with extensive 
instructions on every step of the commission process, including how to gather evidence, 
prepare witnesses, and present their cases at the hearing. 
If a complainant decides that she wants assistance in the pre-hearing negotiations 
and the actual hearing, the MEOC allows the complainant to bring anyone to help 
represent her, including a non-lawyer.  Moreover, if the complainant prefers to have an 
actual lawyer, the MEOC provides a list of attorneys who have litigation experience with 
the Madison law. 
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Because the MEOC makes the process so accessible for complainants, the MEOC 
receives between seventy and eighty employment complaints each year.197  Although the 
majority of complaints are not related to physical appearance, some are.  In the twenty-
seven years since the ordinance’s passage, six physical appearance cases have made it to 
the final hearing.  Of these cases, two have resulted in decisions for the complainant.198  
In the past fourteen years, seven other complaints based on physical appearance have 
been filed but have not made it to final hearing.  Three of these seven lawsuits have 
resulted in settlements.   
The number of physical appearance complaints brought under the Madison 
ordinance is small, but the results of this chapter show that the Madison ordinance is 
working in another way.  The filing and adjudication process is faster, easier, and cheaper 
for complainants than the EEOC process; therefore, the potential threat posed by an 
MEOC complaint is greater for employers.  Together, the uniqueness of the Madison 
process and the empirical results indicate that employers respond to this threat by hiring 
workers whom they would not normally hire: the obese. 
Urbana, Illinois 
Urbana’s filing and adjudication process differs even more from the EEOC 
process than does Madison’s.  The Urbana Human Relations Commission process is 
administered solely by one primary staff member, the UHRO, and one part-time 
employee.  Individuals who wish to file a complaint under the Urbana ordinance make an 
                                                
197 Madison received seventy-six employment complaints in 2011 and seventy complaints in 2010. Rachel 
Campbell, Administrative Clerk for the Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, e-mail message to 
author, 4 Jan. 2012. 
198 Madison Equal Opportunities Commission, “Decision Digest,” City of Madison Department of Civil 
Rights Online, last updated 2012, http://www.cityofmadison.com/dcr/DecisionDigest/index.cfm.  Cases 
such as Cronk v. Reynolds Transfer & Storage, Regan v. Lyons Mortgage Co., and Maxwell v. Union Cab 
Cooperative have all found that the complainant was discriminated against because of personal appearance. 
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appointment with the UHRO, who assists them in filing a formal complaint.  Once the 
complaint has been filed, the UHRO begins an investigation into the complaint.  With the 
assistance of the part-time employee, the UHRO conducts a completely independent 
investigation, collecting documents from employers, conducting interviews, and 
scheduling onsite factfinding meetings with the employers.199   
By law, within forty-two days of the complainant’s filing, the UHRO must make 
a probable cause determination.  If the UHRO determines that no probable cause for 
discrimination exists, then the complainant can appeal the decision to the Commission.  
The Commission chair appoints one Commission member and two outside individuals to 
hear the appeal.  After considering the evidence proffered by the UHRO as well as any 
additional evidence proffered by the complainant, the three-member panel determines 
whether to affirm the UHRO’s decision or to reverse the decision and issue its own 
probable cause decision. 
If the UHRO or the three-member panel find probable cause, the UHRO’s role in 
the case transforms into that of a “law enforcement officer.”200  Technically, the UHRO 
always acts as an advocate for the people of Urbana, but after a probable cause 
determination, he begins to act as an inadvertent advocate for the complainant, much like 
the EEOC acts as an inadvertent advocate for complainants whose cases the agency 
decides to file itself.  At this point, the UHRO begins a process of “conference, 
conciliation and persuasion,” much like the EEOC conciliation process.201  The UHRO 
                                                
199 The information presented in this section is based on three sources: Urbana, Ill., Code of Ordinances, 
secs. 12-82 – 12-84 (2012); Todd Rent, Urbana Human Relations Officer, e-mail message to author, 14 
Nov. 2011; Todd Rent, Urbana Human Relations Officer, telephone conversation with author, 03 Jan. 
2012. 
200 Todd Rent, Urbana Human Relations Officer, telephone conversation with author, 03 Jan. 2012. 
201 Urbana, Ill., Code of Ordinances, secs. 12-83(a) (2012); 
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acts as the complainant’s advocate during conciliation, seeking full relief.  The principle 
difference between the Urbana conciliation process and the EEOC process, however, is 
that there is a strict time limit on this process in Urbana: forty-two days.  If conciliation is 
unsuccessful within this time limit, then a public hearing before the commission is 
scheduled for no more than 105 days later. 
At the public hearing, the UHRO serves as the inadvertent advocate for the 
complainant, so there is no need for the complainant to have an attorney.  Traditionally, 
the Commission has made all determinations of fact and law, resulting in very lengthy, 
and often complicated hearings.  For this reason, the Commission is currently considering 
bringing an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the next hearing.  The ALJ would hear 
the case and make factfinding recommendations, which the Commission would later 
review and approve.  Even if Urbana does incorporate an ALJ into its hearing process, 
Urbana will still maintain the swiftest, cheapest, and easiest adjudication process for 
employment discrimination complainants. 
Despite the accessibility of the Urbana process for plaintiffs, Urbana, like 
Madison, does not see an overwhelming number of complaints under its ordinance.  The 
UHRO receives approximately five to six new complaints every month.  Almost all of 
these complaints are based on other types of discrimination; in fact, only one personal 
appearance complaint has been filed since 1990.  Even more interestingly, the complaints 
in Urbana almost never make it to public hearing—the last public hearing was five years 
ago. 
Nevertheless, Todd Rent, the current UHRO, believes that the lack of public 
hearings is an indicator of success, not failure.  According to Rent, the office has “a very 
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active enforcement mechanism and a reputation of being thorough.”202  This reputation 
combines with a “level of awareness [that is] greater than in most communities” about the 
city’s strong human rights law, resulting in employers who take the Urbana ordinance 
very seriously.203 
As a result, employers try to avoid receiving complaints in the first place, but 
when they do, they are more likely to settle—especially if the UHRO finds probable 
cause.  Still, Rent believes that the most important advantage of the Urbana system is that 
it allows individuals who would be shut out of the traditional EEOC process to receive 
compensation for real discriminatory acts.   Rent notes that most employment 
discrimination attorneys will not even consider bringing a lawsuit unless substantial sums 
of money are involved due to the great expense required to litigate these cases.  In 
practice, Rent sees a lot of individuals with strong complaints but low damages.  Thus, 
Rent compares his office to a “small claims court,” regularly making settlements of 
$1,000 to $5,000.204  The large number of small settlements negotiated by Rent’s office 
suggest that, as in Madison, employers see the Urbana Human Relations Commission as 
a valid threat, and as a result, hire workers who might otherwise be ignored—including 
the obese. 
San Francisco, California, Michigan, and Washington, District of Columbia: Why the 
Other Three Commissions Do Not Work 
 
 The details of the Madison, WI and Urbana, IL enforcement commissions help to 
explain why their processes work.  But they do not explain why the processes in other 
jurisdictions do not.  Particularly in the three other jurisdictions with commission 
                                                
202 Todd Rent, Urbana Human Relations Officer, telephone conversation with author, 03 Jan. 2012. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
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enforcement processes—Michigan, San Francisco, CA, and Washington, DC—it seems 
that outcomes for classes of workers who experience greater difficulty in the labor 
market, including the obese, should be better, not worse.  After all, in these jurisdictions, 
complainants have the option to seek enforcement through the local commission or 
through litigation.   
 But all enforcement commission processes are not created equal.  Indeed, key 
differences in the commission processes in these three cities make it more difficult for 
complainants to seek redress for their claims.  As a result, individuals with legitimate 
employment discrimination claims appear to succeed less frequently, and employers 
appear to feel less threatened by the local laws. 
 At the outset, San Francisco’s law probably seemed the best candidate to improve 
employment outcomes of the obese.  Recall that San Francisco was the only jurisdiction 
to pass a law with the principal intent of eliminating obesity discrimination.  The sponsor 
of Michigan’s bill was more broadly interested in protecting individuals who were “too 
fat or too short” and whose bodies did not conform with “Playboy Centerfold” ideals.205  
And in all other jurisdictions, weight and personal appearance were simply add-ons to 
make the legislation more comprehensive or more passable.  San Francisco’s law was the 
only one initiated by fat rights advocates. 
 Yet strong legislative intent is not enough to overcome severe weaknesses in the 
enforcement process.  In spite of being a self-proclaimed city of tolerance, San 
Francisco’s commission process has three weaknesses that undermine enforcement of its 
                                                
205 Thomas C. Mathieu, Former Michigan State Representative from Grand Rapids, e-mail message to 
author, 17 Aug. 2011. 
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human rights ordinance: lack of timeliness, lack of ability to proceed without a lawyer, 
and lack of awareness.206 
 Perhaps the greatest strength of the Madison and Urbana commission processes is 
their swiftness.  Both Madison and Urbana’s adjudicatory swiftness is driven by statutory 
time limits.  San Francisco’s ordinance only places strict time limits on housing 
complaints; employment and all other complaints under the ordinance are not subject to 
any time limits.  Thus, as with litigation, commission adjudication can drag on for an 
indefinite period of time. 
 The San Francisco process is also unfriendly to complainants not represented by 
an attorney.  The San Francisco commission does not require that complainants are 
represented by an attorney.  But the San Francisco commission provides neither the 
extensive guidance nor the easily accessible decision digest that MEOC does.  Moreover, 
commission investigators do not act as de facto advocates for complainants in 
commission hearings.  The greater need for advocacy in the San Francisco commission 
process is apparent from the fact that complainants are actually retaining counsel.  In the 
two most notable settlements to come out of the San Francisco weight discrimination 
ordinance, the complainants were represented by the same local civil rights attorney, 
Sondra Solovay.207 
                                                
206 The information in this section this section comes from four sources: San Francisco, Cal., 
Administrative Code, sec. 12A.1 (2012); San Francisco, Cal., Police Code, secs. 3306-3307 (2012); San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission, San Francisco Human Rights Commission Online, last modified 
2012, http://www.sf-hrc.org/index.aspx?page=1; Sondra Solovay, San Francisco Weight Discrimination 
Attorney, telephone conversation with author, 17 Aug. 2011. 
207 In fact, the San Francisco Contract Compliance Officer only knows of one other case that has settled 
under this ordinance.  This case was not highly publicized like the other two cases, and the complainant did 
not retain counsel.  Mullane Ahern, Contract Compliance Officer, San Francisco Human Rights 
Commission, e-mail message to author, 12 Jan. 2012. 
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 The final barrier to effective commission enforcement in San Francisco is lack of 
awareness of the law by local employers.  A 2006 study commissioned by the San 
Francisco Human Rights Commission agreed with this chapter that “San Francisco’s 
public policy to prohibit weight discrimination is not effective in preventing weight based 
discrimination.”208  The study placed much of the blame for this ineffectiveness on the 
local enforcement agency, the Human Rights Commission.   After conducting a survey of 
San Francisco residents, the study concluded that the failure of the Human Rights 
Commission to promote public awareness of the ordinance combined with the failure of 
the Human Rights Commission to actively enforce the ordinance was responsible for this 
ineffectiveness.209 
 Awareness is less of a problem in Michigan than in San Francisco.  According to 
a 1994 article, 190 individuals had filed weight discrimination complaints since the law’s 
passage in 1976.210  The Michigan Department of Civil Rights has not been able to 
determine how many complaints have been filed since 1994, but 190 complaints still 
overwhelm the small number of weight- and personal appearance-based complaints seen 
in other jurisdictions.211   
Some of these complainants, of course, pursued litigation instead of the Michigan 
Department of Civil Rights Commission process.  Weight discrimination litigants in 
                                                
208 Catherine M. Wippel, “San Francisco Administrative Code Chapters 12A, 12B and 12C and San 
Francisco Municipal/Police Code Article 33: An Evaluation of San Francisco’s Public Policy to Prohibit 
Weight Discrimination,” 21 Dec. 2006, 4, 2000 Human Rights Ordinance Folder, San Francisco Human 
Rights Commission Office, San Francisco, Cal. 
209 Ibid., 16-17. 
210 Aaron Epstein, “Fighting Bias Against the Obese,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 Jan. 1994, A1. 
211 Sylvia J. Elliott, Director, Office of Legal Affairs, Michigan Department of Civil Rights, e-mail message 
to author, 10 Jan. 2012.  According to Elliott, “The number of complaints based on weight or a 
combination of weight and another protected basis is very small.  Of that very small number most settle or 
are NPC [no probable cause].  A very small amount may have a legitimate business reason (BFOQ) [bona 
fide occupational qualification] for the weight discrimination.  A recent case involved Hooters Restaurant 
which settled.”  
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Michigan have achieved mixed results.  Part of the difficulty faced by these litigants is 
the fact that proving an employment discrimination claim under Michigan law is difficult 
for all Michigan plaintiffs—not just ones claiming weight discrimination.   
In any employment discrimination case, under state or federal law, the plaintiff 
must prove her prima facie case, then employer can rebut the plaintiff by offering a 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason (LNDR) for the adverse employment action, and 
finally the plaintiff can rebut the employer’s LNDR by claiming that it is pretext.  For the 
third and final pretext step, three pretext rules have developed across U.S. states.  In 
“pretext only” states, the employee will always prevail as long as she can demonstrate 
that the employer’s LNDR is false.  In “pretext may” states, the employee may prevail if 
she can demonstrate that the employer’s LNDR is false.  In “pretext plus” states, the 
employee must prove something beyond the fact that the employer’s LNDR is false in 
order to prevail, making recovery most difficult for employees in these jurisdictions. 
Indeed, employees in pretext plus jurisdictions must not only prove that the employer’s 
LNDR is false, but they must also prove that discrimination is the real reason for the 
adverse employment action.212 
Since the 2000 U.S. Supreme Court case Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Inc., employment discrimination plaintiffs bringing claims under Federal anti-
discrimination laws have been held to the pretext may standard.  But plaintiffs bringing 
claims under state discrimination laws may still be held to the pretext only or the pretext 
plus standards, depending on the state’s case law.  Unfortunately for Michigan plaintiffs, 
                                                
212 For an overview of the pretext rules, see Joel Wm. Friedman, The Law of Employment Discrimination, 
7th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2009), 891-93 and George Rutherglen, Employment Discrimination 
Law: Visions of Equality in Theory and Doctrine, 2d ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2007), 61-106. 
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the state still follows the pretext plus standard.213  Consequently, successful weight 
discrimination plaintiffs there have generally produced direct evidence (not just 
circumstantial evidence) that, if believed, “requires the conclusion that unlawful 
discrimination was at least a motivating factor” in the employer's actions.”214  In fact, of 
the five published decisions involving Michigan’s weight-discrimination law, three of the 
five plaintiffs prevailed.  All three of these plaintiffs presented “credible, direct evidence 
of wrongful discrimination” in the form of comments about their weight made by 
supervisors; the two unsuccessful plaintiffs did not have such evidence.215 
Although litigation under the Michigan law is particularly difficult for 
discrimination plaintiffs, the alternative commission process has its own problems.  One 
benefit of the Michigan commission process is that complainants need not retain counsel; 
in fact, according to the current Director of the Michigan Department of Civil Right’s 
Office of Legal affairs, “the majority of people using the Department process do not 
retain counsel due to financial concerns.”216  Nevertheless, the office does not provide the 
same guidance for complainants proceeding without representation that the MEOC does. 
Yet the biggest problem faced by discrimination complainants using the Michigan 
commission process is the time delay.  Unlike Madison and Urbana, Michigan’s statute 
                                                
213 Lee Hornberger, “Employment Discrimination Law in Michigan,” Michigan Bar Journal, Sep. 2003, 
13-16, http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article612.pdf. 
214 Figgins v. Advance America Cash Advance Centers of Mich., Inc., 476 FSupp 675, 686 (E.D. Mich. 
2007); Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 584 NW2d 589, 593 (Mich. App. 1998). 
215 Hein v. All America Plywood Company, Inc., 232 F3d 482, 488 (6th Cir 2000).  To see this distinction, 
compare Figgins v. Advance America Cash Advance Centers of Mich., Inc., 476 FSupp 675 (E.D. Mich. 
2007) (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s weight 
discrimination claim); Lamoria v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 593 NW2d 699 (Mich. App. 1999) 
(reinstating plaintiff’s weight-based discrimination claim); and Ross v. Beaumont Hospital, 687 FSupp 
1115 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (ordering a new trial for plaintiff on her claim of weight discrimination); with Hein 
(affirming employer’s motion for summary judgment) and Byrnes v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 811 FSupp 286 (E.D. 
Mich. 1993) (granting employer’s motion for summary judgment). 
216 Sylvia J. Elliott, Director, Office of Legal Affairs, Michigan Department of Civil Rights, e-mail message 
to author, 10 Jan. 2012. 
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does not place any time limits on administration of discrimination complaints.217  As a 
result, complainants pursuing the Michigan commission process face waiting times that 
rival the Federal process.  Interestingly, the delays in Michigan’s commission 
adjudication are not the result of most complaints going through the entire process to full 
commission hearing.  Since 2000, the Michigan Department of Civil Rights has 
maintained an online decision digest of all cases decided by the full Michigan Civil 
Rights Commission.218  The commission has decided only sixteen cases in that time.219 
Furthermore, looking through the commission cases, complainants who go 
through the Michigan commission process must wait a very long time just to be heard by 
the commission.  The last four complaints heard by the commission had been filed two to 
four years earlier.  And of course, if either the complainant or the respondent chooses to 
appeal the commission decision, then adjudication time gets even longer.  Moreover, it is 
not the case that all strong cases settle before being heard by the commission.  Two of the 
last four complaints heard by the commission resulted in judgments for the 
complainant.220  One of these complaints involved a disabled individual who had been 
evicted from her apartment because she required a service dog.  The complainant had 
been evicted four years prior.221  The result of these long complaint resolution times and 
difficult proof standards in Michigan is likely to discourage employees from bringing 
claims.  More importantly, it is likely to encourage employers to take the law less 
                                                
217 Mich. Comp. Laws, sec. 37.2605 (2012). 
218 Sylvia J. Elliott, Director, Office of Legal Affairs, Michigan Department of Civil Rights, e-mail message 
to author, 10 Jan. 2012. 
219 Michigan Department of Civil Rights, “Commission Decisions,” Michigan Department of Civil Rights 
Online, last modified 2011, http://www.michigan.gov/mdcr/0,1607,7-138-47782_47828_48067---,00.html. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Emmick v. Royalwood Cooperative Apartments, Inc. (Mich. Civil Rights Commission 2004), 
“Commission Decisions,” Michigan Department of Civil Rights Online, last modified 2011, 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdcr/268485-emmick_212978_7.pdf. 
 194 
seriously.  Hence, it is not surprising that Michigan’s law has had no effect on 
employment outcomes of the obese.   
The final jurisdiction with a commission process, Washington, DC, does not make 
complainants endure the same time delays as the Michigan commission.  In fact, the DC 
Office of Human Rights (OHR), which administers the complaints of individuals who 
choose to pursue a remedy through the commission process instead of a private action, 
has instituted strict time limits for itself to investigate and adjudicate complaints.  The 
timeline for housing discrimination complaints is stricter than the employment timeline 
because of eviction concerns, but the DC OHR still moves remarkably fast on 
employment complaints.  The office schedules mediation (mandatory for both parties in 
the commission process) within one month of an individual completing a pre-complaint 
questionnaire.  If mediation fails, then OHR investigators must complete their 
investigation within four months, and the OHR director must make a final decision on 
whether the complaint has probable cause within five weeks after completion of the 
investigation.222 
If the OHR director finds probable cause, the case is then certified for a hearing in 
front of three members of the DC Human Rights Commission.  Complainants can also 
appeal a finding of no probable cause to the full commission.  All in all, the timeline for 
the DC process appears to mirror the Madison process, with most adjudications occurring 
within a year of filing a complaint.223 
                                                
222 District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, “Timeline – What to Expect After Submitting an Intake 
Questionnaire,” Office of Human Rights Online, last viewed 22 Feb. 2012, 
http://ohr.dc.gov/service/timeline-what-expect-after-submit-intake-questionnaire. 
223 District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, “DC Commission on Human Rights,” Office of Human 
Rights Online, last viewed 22 Feb. 2012, http://ohr.dc.gov/page/dc-commission-human-rights. 
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Like Madison and Urbana, the DC OHR does not require—or even expect—that 
complainants be represented by an attorney.  DC, like Madison, also provides extensive 
instructions for complainants on the hearing process, although it does not provide 
complainants with an easily searchable decision digest.  Moreover, upon request, the 
OHR will provide complainants who reach a full commission hearing with 
representation.224  
 With swift adjudication and no expectation of outside representation, the question 
remains: why has the DC law not improved employment outcomes of the obese?  DC 
appears to have a similar problem to San Francisco: lack of awareness.  In San Francisco, 
the lack of awareness is just among the residents.  But in DC, the lack of awareness about 
its law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of personal appearance seems to extend to 
the OHR itself.  When contacted, the General Counsel of the OHR knew almost nothing 
about the law, including when or why the law was passed.  The General Counsel also did 
not know of any complaints under the law.225  Thus, while the DC commission process is 
likely very effective for some forms of discrimination, personal appearance 
discrimination appears to have been forgotten by the staff of the DC OHR.226 
                                                
224 District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, “A Guide to the Adjudication Process,” September 
2003, Office of Human Rights Online, last viewed 22 Feb. 2012, 
http://ohr.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/publication/attachments/HRCommiss-HearingGuideBook-
English.pdf. 
225 Alexis P. Taylor, General Counsel for the Office of Human Rights for the District of Columbia, 
telephone conversation with author, 4 Aug. 2011. 
226 After I contacted the General Counsel last year, the General Counsel assigned a staff member to 
research the law because she knew so little about it.  The staff member was unable to find anything about 
the law in the OHR records.  The legislative history presented here is solely the result of my own 
independent research from newspaper articles and from an interview with Sterling Tucker, the Chairman of 
the DC Council that passed the 1977 Human Rights Ordinance. Alexis P. Taylor, General Counsel for the 
Office of Human Rights for the District of Columbia, e-mail message to author, 14 Aug. 2011; Jewell 
Little, Staff Attorney, Office of Human Rights for the District of Columbia, e-mail message to author, 7 
Sep. 2011; Jewell Little, Staff Attorney, Office of Human Rights for the District of Columbia, e-mail 
message to author, 3 Jan. 2012. 
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 As this exploration of the commission processes in San Francisco, Michigan, and 
DC has shown, the Madison and Urbana discrimination laws are not necessarily more 
effective because they take away choice and force complainants to pursue relief through 
commissions.  They are more effective because their commission processes are more 
accessible for complainants seeking relief for discrimination on the basis of weight or 
personal appearance.  Before drawing too many conclusions about the most effective way 
to enforce these discrimination laws, however, a brief exploration of the procedures in the 
two jurisdictions without commission processes is warranted. 
Santa Cruz, California and Binghamton, New York 
 Recall from the Results Section that obese and morbidly obese men in Santa Cruz 
and obese and morbidly obese women in Binghamton have the highest employment rates 
of all weight groups.  These trends were only visible in the summary statistics and did not 
hold up in the regression analyses.  Thus, the Results Section concluded that any trends in 
the summary statistics were likely the result of the small number of observations, 
although it could not completely rule out the possibility that these laws had improved 
employment outcomes for the obese. 
 An investigation into the actual enforcement of these laws reinforces the 
conclusion that any trends visible in the summary statistics probably result from a small 
number of observations.  Santa Cruz does not have a formal commission process, but it 
does require that individuals file a complaint with Santa Cruz Human Resources before 
pursuing a private action.  An interview with Joe McMullen, the Chief Human Resources 
Officer of Santa Cruz, revealed that only two such complaints have been filed since the 
Human Rights Ordinance was passed in 1992.  Neither complaint involved either weight 
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or personal appearance discrimination.  One of the complaints was immediately dropped; 
the other complaint involved a homosexual couple who were refused a room at a local 
motel.  Once Santa Cruz Human Resources notified the motel owner of the complaint, the 
motel owner agreed to attend sensitivity training, and the couple dropped their complaint. 
 If any other complaints are filed in the future—whether based on weight 
discrimination or any other form of discrimination prohibited by the Santa Cruz 
ordinance—the Santa Cruz Chief Human Resources Officer will immediately contact the 
accused party for a response.  At no point will Santa Cruz Human Resources conduct its 
own investigation or make a probable cause determination.  Because there is “not a lot of 
guidance in the ordinance,” McMullen has in the past tried to assist in settlement 
negotiations based on his assessment of the situation.227  In the case of the motel owner, 
his efforts worked.  If they do not work in the future, however, McMullen (or his 
successor) will set up the mediation required by statute.  Only if mediation fails will the 
complainant will have the right to sue.  All in all, McMullen seems ready to enforce any 
complaints brought to him, but the ordinance appears to have been completely forgotten 
by the residents of Santa Cruz. 
 In Binghamton, the ordinance also appears to be forgotten despite being passed 
only four years ago. In Binghamton, of course, there is neither an oversight commission 
nor any requirement to file a complaint before pursuing litigation.  Still, neither the 
Binghamton Court Clerk nor local employment discrimination lawyers know of a single 
lawsuit filed in Binghamton under any part of the broad human rights ordinance (recall 
                                                
227 Joe McMullen, Chief Human Resources Officer, Santa Cruz, Cal, telephone conversation with author, 
09 Jan. 2012. 
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that the ordinance also prohibits other types of discrimination, including sexual 
orientation discrimination).228 
 In sum, I cannot completely rule out that Santa Cruz and Binghamton’s 
ordinances have had a prophylactic effect on employer’s hiring decisions, especially 
since remedies under the ordinances appear fairly easy to pursue in both cities.  But the 
evidence certainly suggests a general lack of awareness of these ordinances.  Perhaps this 
lack of awareness results from the lack of enforcement guidance in both ordinances or 
from the cities’ failure to publicize the laws.  Whatever the reason, it appears that these 
ordinances have not improved employment outcomes for the obese. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has presented a broad overview of the laws that currently protect 
obese individuals in the U.S. labor market.  Throughout the chapter, I have taken the 
position that in order to truly understand the effectiveness of these laws, a multi-
dimensional analysis is required.  Understanding the legislative history and the 
enforcement mechanisms of a law can be just as important as conducting a rigorous 
empirical analysis of it.  After researching the legislative history, enforcement 
mechanisms, and empirical realities of the one Federal, one state, and six cities’ laws that 
currently protect the obese in the United States, I have concluded that only two 
                                                
228 Sean G. Massey, Former Binghamton, N.Y. City Councilmember, e-mail message to author, 24 Feb. 
2012.  Massey, the sponsor of the ordinance, made several phone calls on my behalf to the Binghamton 
Court Clerk and to local employment discrimination attorneys.  No one knew of any cases filed under the 
ordinance. 
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jurisdictions, Urbana, IL and Madison, WI, appear to have succeeded in improving 
employment outcomes for the obese. 
 Thus, perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from this chapter is that when 
studying the effectiveness of laws, empirical analysis is not enough.  It is not usually 
possible to control for every subtlety of a law, and so empirical researchers studying laws 
make a mistake by not supplementing their results with additional qualitative research.  
Carpenter (2006), for example, concluded that the nationwide improvement in 
employment outcomes for the obese that he saw in the data after 1993 must have been 
due to Cook because the case received some publicity, and there was no other obvious 
alternative explanation.  But had he done more research into the negative treatment of 
Cook in the other ten Federal circuits, he would have realized that a Cook effect outside 
the First Circuit was highly unlikely. 
 With regards to the seven local laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
weight or personal appearance, the empirical results would not have had much meaning 
without additional qualitative research.  The fact that only the Madison and Urbana laws 
showed any real signs of effectiveness would have seemed almost random if this chapter 
had ended after presenting the empirical results.  Until comparing the qualitative details 
of each jurisdiction’s enforcement process, it seemed almost counter-intuitive that the 
two laws that restricted the enforcement choices of discrimination victims would also be 
the most effective.  Future empirical research on the effectiveness of laws—whether 
discrimination laws or other types of laws—would be wise to remember this lesson. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1.  Comparison of Local Laws Prohibiting Weight and Personal Appearance Discrimination 
Jurisdiction Year 
Passed 
Type of 
Discrimination 
Prohibited 
Oversight 
Commission 
 
Does 
Employee 
Have a 
Private 
Right of 
Action? 
 
Must 
Employee 
File 
Complaint 
with 
Oversight 
Commission 
Before 
Private 
Action? 
Mediation Remedies 
Available to 
Complainant 
 
Maximum 
Civil Fine 
for 
Violation 
Attorney 
Fees 
 
Madison, WI 1975 Physical 
appearance 
Equal 
Opportunities 
Commission 
No, 
administered 
by 
Commission 
Yes, with 
Equal 
Opportunities 
Commission 
Required Economic 
damages, 
noneconomic 
damages, 
front and 
back pay 
(limited to 
two years) 
None No 
Michigan 1976 Weight Civil Rights 
Department 
Yes, but 
may choose 
to go 
through 
Department 
instead 
Yes, with 
either the 
EEOC or the 
Civil Rights 
Department 
Optional 
Through 
Department 
Injunctive 
and equitable 
relief, 
compensatory 
damages, 
back pay 
First 
Infraction: 
$10,000 
Second in 
Five Years: 
$25,000 
Third in 
Seven 
Years: 
$50,000 
Yes 
 201 
Washington, DC 1977 Personal 
appearance 
Office of 
Human 
Rights 
Yes, but 
may choose 
to go 
through 
Commission 
instead 
No Required in 
Commission 
Process 
Injunctive 
and equitable 
relief, 
compensatory 
damages, 
back pay 
First 
Infraction: 
$10,000 
Second in 
Five Years: 
$25,000 
Third in 
Seven 
Years: 
$50,000 
Yes 
Urbana, IL 1979 Personal 
appearance 
Human 
Relations 
Commission 
No, 
administered 
by 
Commission 
Yes, with 
Human 
Relations 
Commission 
Required Injunctive 
and equitable 
relief, 
compensatory 
damages, 
back pay 
$500 No 
Santa Cruz, CA 1992 Weight Santa Cruz 
Human 
Resources 
Yes Yes, with 
Santa Cruz 
Human 
Resources 
Required 
(Both parties 
share costs) 
Injunctive 
and equitable 
relief, 
compensatory 
damages 
First 
Infraction in 
One Year: 
$100 
Second: 
$200 
Third: $500 
Yes 
San Francisco, CA 2000 Weight Human 
Rights 
Commission 
Yes, but 
may choose 
to go 
through 
Commission 
in addition 
No Required in 
Commission 
Process 
Treble special 
and general 
damages, 
$200-$400 
additional 
damages, 
punitive 
damages 
None Yes 
Binghamton, NY 2008 Weight None Yes No No Injunctive 
and equitable 
relief, 
compensatory 
damages 
None Yes 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics of BRFSS Data for Men by BMI Classification, 1985-2010 
Variables Underweight Normal Weight Overweight Obese Morbidly Obese Full Sample Bonferroni Test 
        
Age 37.270 40.111 44.398 45.898 46.311 43.370 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
Married 0.352 0.510 0.647 0.657 0.564 0.602 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
Black 0.094 0.067 0.066 0.083 0.100 0.071 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 
9, 10 
Hispanic 0.087 0.059 0.066 0.070 0.071 0.065 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10 
        
No High School Diploma 0.206 0.098 0.082 0.099 0.127 0.093 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 
8, 9, 10 
High School Diploma 0.358 0.297 0.298 0.328 0.352 0.305 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 
9, 10 
Some College 0.234 0.246 0.257 0.276 0.285 0.258 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
College Graduate 0.202 0.359 0.363 0.297 0.235 0.343 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
Employed for Wages 0.506 0.645 0.663 0.634 0.543 0.647 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
Total Observations 11,401 481,883 687,029 330,820 33,362 1,544,495 --- 
Notes: Sample includes men between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five from the 1985-2010 BRFSS data.  The employed for wages variable counts all 
respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counts all respondents who are out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to 
work as not employed, and drops all respondents who refused to respond to the employment question.  The Bonferroni test column reports significant differences 
in means of weight group at the 10-percent level based on Bonferroni multiple comparison test, where “1” compares morbidly obese to obese, “2” compares 
morbidly obese to overweight, “3” compares morbidly obese to normal weight, “4” compares morbidly obese to underweight, “5” compares obese to overweight, 
“6” compares obese to normal weight, “7” compares obese to underweight, “8” compares overweight to normal weight, “9” compares overweight to 
underweight, and “10” compares normal weight to underweight. 
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics of BRFSS Data for Women by BMI Classification, 1985-2010 
Variables Underweight Normal Weight Overweight Obese Morbidly Obese Full Sample Bonferroni Test 
        
Age 37.865 41.791 45.889 46.585 46.523 43.958 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10 
Married 0.474 0.586 0.589 0.536 0.432 0.568 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
Black 0.057 0.060 0.110 0.155 0.202 0.098 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
Hispanic 0.055 0.060 0.082 0.084 0.071 0.071 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
No High School Diploma 0.104 0.067 0.096 0.121 0.145 0.090 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
High School Diploma 0.307 0.277 0.319 0.336 0.339 0.303 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10 
Some College 0.277 0.279 0.319 0.299 0.310 0.287 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9 
College Graduate 0.312 0.377 0.296 0.244 0.206 0.320 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
Employed for Wages 0.521 0.595 0.583 0.562 0.486 0.579 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10 
        
Total Observations 56,040 961,594 589,910 409,004 82,682 2,099,230 --- 
Notes: Sample includes 2,099,230 observations of women between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five from the 1985-2010 BRFSS data.  The employed for 
wages variable counts all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counts all respondents who are out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a 
student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and drops all respondents who refused to respond to the employment question.  The Bonferroni test column 
reports significant differences in means of weight group at the 10-percent level based on Bonferroni multiple comparison test, where “1” compares morbidly 
obese to obese, “2” compares morbidly obese to overweight, “3” compares morbidly obese to normal weight, “4” compares morbidly obese to underweight, “5” 
compares obese to overweight, “6” compares obese to normal weight, “7” compares obese to underweight, “8” compares overweight to normal weight, “9” 
compares overweight to underweight, and “10” compares normal weight to underweight.  Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 4.  Regression Estimates for Probability of Employment, 1988-1999 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Carpenter 
(2006) 
Estimate 
Replication:  
Employed = 
Employed for 
Wages; 
Dropped = 
Refused 
Replication:  
Employed = 
Employed for 
Wages and 
Self Employed 
Replication:  
Employed = 
Employed for 
Wages; 
Dropped = 
Self-
Employed 
Carpenter 
(2006) 
Estimate 
Replication:  
Employed = 
Employed for 
Wages; 
Dropped = 
Refused 
Replication:  
Employed = 
Employed for 
Wages and 
Self Employed 
Replication:  
Employed = 
Employed for 
Wages; 
Dropped = 
Self-
Employed 
Post-1993 0.013*** 0.001 -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.007 -0.061*** -0.044*** -0.039*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Underweight -0.037*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.022*** -0.038*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Overweight 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Obese -0.008 -0.007 -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.034*** -0.044*** -0.047*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Morbidly Obese -0.09*** -0.049*** -0.061*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.114*** -0.101*** -0.106*** 
 (0.028) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
Underweight*Post -0.008 0.008 0.031** 0.035** -0.006 -0.018** -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) 
Overweight*Post -0.001 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.021** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Obese*Post 0.021** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.048*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.024 -0.017 0.032** 0.040** 0.013 0.032** 0.052*** 0.054*** Morbidly 
Obese*Post (0.037) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) 
         
N 292,469 283,471 261,578 228,542 314,914 337,735 261,065 238,911 
R2 0.062 0.045 0.037 0.040 0.054 0.044 0.044 0.045 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Reported estimates are from a linear probability model.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses.  Specifications one and five 
are the estimates reported in Carpenter (2006).  Specifications two and six count all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, count all respondents 
who are out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and drop all respondents who refused to respond to the 
employment question.   Specifications three and seven count all respondents who are employed for wages or self-employed as employed, count all respondents 
who are out of work as not employed, and drop all respondents who are out of work, a homemaker, a student, retired, unable to work, or refused to respond to 
the employment question.  Specifications four and eight count all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, count all respondents who are out of 
work as not employed, and drop all respondents who are self-employed, a homemaker, a student, retired, unable to work, or refused to respond to the 
employment question.  All regressions include controls for age, age-squared, marital status, race, education level, state of residence, and year fixed effects.  All 
regressions are restricted to BRFSS respondents between the ages of 18 and 44, as in Carpenter (2006).  DC and Wyoming were dropped from the sample as in 
Carpenter (2006). Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 5.  Difference-in-Differences Regression Estimates for the Probability of Employment in the First Circuit, 1985-2010 
 Men Women 
Variable   
Post-1993 -0.041*** 
(0.006) 
-0.067*** 
(0.005) 
First Circuit -0.152*** 
(0.011) 
-0.059*** 
(0.008) 
Underweight -0.084*** 
(0.013) 
-0.036*** 
(0.005) 
Overweight 0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Obese -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.037*** 
(0.003) 
Morbidly Obese -0.075*** 
(0.015) 
-0.126*** 
(0.009) 
Underweight*Post -0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.041*** 
(0.006) 
Overweight*Post 0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.037*** 
(0.003) 
Obese*Post 0.028*** 
(0.004) 
0.050*** 
(0.004) 
Morbidly Obese*Post 0.015 
(0.014) 
0.049*** 
(0.009) 
Underweight*First 0.002 
(0.043) 
-0.006 
(0.019) 
Overweight*First -0.010 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
Obese*First -0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
Morbidly Obese*First -0.030 
(0.057) 
-0.019 
(0.038) 
Post*First -0.019*** 
(0.007) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Underweight*Post*First -0.017 
(0.048) 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
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Overweight*Post*First 0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
Obese*Post*First 0.023 
(0.014) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
Morbidly Obese*Post*First 0.024 
(0.055) 
-0.018 
(0.039) 
   
N 1,544,495 2,099,230 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.067 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates are the marginal effects from a probit model.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses. The specifications 
are restricted to BRFSS respondents between 18 and 65, counting all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counting all respondents who are 
out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who refused to respond to the 
employment question. All estimates use BRFSS data from 1985-2010.  All regressions include controls for age, age-squared, marital status, race, education level, 
state of residence, and year fixed effects. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 6.  Differences Regression Estimates for the Probability of Employment by Circuit, 1985-2010 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Nationwide BRFSS 
Data, 1985-2010 
First Circuit Only, 
1985-2010 
All Circuits But the 
First, 1985-2010 
Nationwide BRFSS 
Data, 1985-2010 
First Circuit Only, 
1985-2010 
All Circuits But the 
First, 1985-2010 
Post-1993 -0.043*** -0.098*** -0.036*** -0.066*** -0.097*** -0.062*** 
 (0.006) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.005) 
Underweight -0.084*** -0.080** -0.084*** -0.036*** -0.037** -0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.045) (0.013) (0.005) (0.019) (0.005) 
Overweight 0.018*** 0.009 0.019*** -0.009*** 0.003 -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) 
Obese -0.009*** -0.029** -0.008** -0.037*** -0.033** -0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) 
Morbidly Obese -0.077*** -0.100* -0.076*** -0.127*** -0.136*** -0.127*** 
 (0.015) (0.058) (0.015) (0.009) (0.038) (0.009) 
Underweight*Post 0.010 -0.023 -0.009 -0.042*** -0.047** -0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.047) (0.013) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) 
Overweight*Post 0.012** 0.028*** 0.010*** 0.036*** 0.023** 0.037*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) 
Obese*Post 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.028*** 0.048*** 0.028** 0.050*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004) 
0.017 0.005 0.016 0.048*** 0.030 0.050*** Morbidly 
Obese*Post (0.014) (0.055) (0.014) (0.009) (0.037) (0.009) 
       
N 1,544,495 124,285 1,420,210 2,099,230 171,676 1,927,554 
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.097 0.096 0.067 0.085 0.066 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates are the marginal effects from a probit model.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses. The specifications 
are restricted to BRFSS respondents between 18 and 65, counting all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counting all respondents who are 
out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who refused to respond to the 
employment question. All estimates use BRFSS data from 1985-2010.  All regressions include controls for age, age-squared, marital status, race, education level, 
state of residence, and year fixed effects. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 7.  Falsification Test: The Effect of the Negative Treatment of Cook on Employment in the Sixth Circuit 
 1997 Decision: Andrews 2006 Decision: Watkins 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Men Women Men Women 
Variable     
Post (1997 or 2006) -0.037** -0.041*** -0.098*** -0.134 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.014) 
Underweight -0.188*** -0.044*** -0.122*** -0.059*** 
 (0.031) (0.013) (0.021) (0.009) 
Overweight 0.021*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.014*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Obese -0.003 -0.034*** -0.002 -0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
Morbidly Obese -0.092*** -0.159*** -0.090*** -0.126*** 
 (0.031) (0.017) (0.013) (0.008) 
Underweight*Post 0.070** -0.036** -0.071* -0.036* 
 (0.033) (0.016) (0.043) (0.021) 
Overweight*Post 0.011 0.016** 0.026*** 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Obese*Post 0.010 0.029*** 0.022** 0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
Morbidly Obese*Post 0.008 0.053*** 0.019 0.034*** 
 (0.031) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) 
     
N 109,801 161,283 109,801 161,283 
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.080 0.126 0.080 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Reported estimates are the marginal effects from a probit model.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses. The specifications 
are restricted to BRFSS respondents between 18 and 65, counting all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counting all respondents who are 
out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who refused to respond to the 
employment question. All estimates use BRFSS data from 1985-2010 from the Sixth Circuit only.  All regressions include controls for age, age-squared, marital 
status, race, education level, state of residence, and year fixed effects. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 8.  Employment Rates by Sex and Weight in Jurisdictions with Obesity Discrimination Laws 
 Men Women 
Location Underweight/ 
Normal 
Overweight Obese/ 
Morbidly 
Obese 
Bonferroni 
Test 
Underweight/ 
Normal 
Overweight Obese/ 
Morbidly 
Obese 
Bonferroni 
Test 
         
Nationwide 0.519 0.540 0.532 1, 2, 3 0.465 0.436 0.441 1, 2, 3 
         
Michigan 0.523 0.541 0.503 1, 2, 3 0.464 0.420 0.423 1, 2, 3 
Indiana  0.574 0.596 0.580 1, 2, 3 0.492 0.463 0.469 1, 2 
Ohio 0.530 0.550 0.535 1, 2, 3 0.471 0.426 0.430 1, 2, 3 
Wisconsin 0.567 0.579 0.561 1, 3 0.537 0.493 0.501 1, 2 
         
Binghamton, 
NY 
0.517 0.532 0.457 1 0.451 0.403 0.471  
New York 0.535 0.557 0.542 1, 3 0.496 0.460 0.452 1, 2 
         
Madison, WI 0.591 0.622 0.602 3 0.605 0.577 0.617  
Wisconsin 0.567 0.579 0.561 1, 3 0.537 0.493 0.501 1, 2 
         
Santa Cruz, 
CA 
0.452 0.474 0.629  0.417 0.333 0.370  
California 0.525 0.555 0.543 1, 3 0.443 0.410 0.413 1, 2, 3 
         
San Francisco, 
CA 
0.517 0.516 0.485  0.463 0.407 0.399  
California 0.525 0.555 0.543 1, 3 0.443 0.410 0.413 1, 2, 3 
         
Urbana, IL 0.574 0.591 0.671  0.455 0.496 0.486  
Illinois 0.593 0.602 0.598 1, 3 0.511 0.473 0.481 1, 2 
         
Washington, 
DC 
0.590 0.595 0.541 1, 2 0.553 0.511 0.481 1, 2, 3 
Maryland 0.594 0.607 0.593 1, 2 0.532 0.501 0.505 1, 2 
Virginia 0.588 0.613 0.599 1, 2, 3 0.512 0.483 0.497 1, 2 
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Notes: All estimates use BRFSS data from 1985-2010. The Bonferroni test column reports significant differences in means of weight group at the 10-percent 
level based on Bonferroni multiple comparison test, where “1” compares obese/morbidly obese to overweight, “2” compares obese/morbidly obese to 
underweight/normal weight, and “3” compares overweight to underweight/normal weight. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 9.  Differences Regressions: Employment Rates by Weight Group in Protected Jurisdictions 
Compared to Surrounding Jurisdictions 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction* 
Overweight 
Jurisdiction* 
Obese/Morbidly 
Obese 
Jurisdiction* 
Overweight 
Jurisdiction* 
Obese/Morbidly 
Obese 
Madison, WI 0.046 0.047 0.023 0.065* 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.032) (0.035) 
Michigan -0.001 -0.068*** 0.011* -0.065*** 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.006) (0.011) 
Washington, DC 0.012 -0.004 -0.015* -0.043*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) 
Urbana, IL 0.033 0.136* 0.045 0.057 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.058) (0.064) 
Santa Cruz, CA -0.032 0.176 -0.046 -0.069 
(Post-1992) (0.084) (0.157) (0.074) (0.071) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Notes: Reported estimates are the marginal effects from a probit model.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are below in parentheses. The specifications are restricted to BRFSS respondents between 18 and 65, counting all 
respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counting all respondents who are out of work, self-
employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who 
refused to respond to the employment question. All estimates use BRFSS data from 1985-2010.  The Madison 
regressions use data from the state of Wisconsin; the Michigan regressions use data from bordering states (Indiana, 
Ohio, and Wisconsin); the DC regressions use data from DC, Maryland, and Virginia; the Urbana regressions use 
data from Illinois; and the Santa Cruz regressions use data from California (excluding San Francisco).  All 
regressions include controls for age, age-squared, marital status, race, education level, and s year fixed effects.   
Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 10.  Employment Rates in San Francisco and Binghamton Before and After Passage of Obesity Discrimination Laws 
 San Francisco Binghamton 
 Men Women Men Women 
 Pre-2000 Law Post-2000 
Law 
Pre-2008 Law Post-2008 
Law 
Pre-2000 
Law 
Post-2000 
Law 
Pre-2008 Law Post-2008 
Law 
Underweight/Normal 0.591 0.464 0.521 0.437 0.571 0.188 0.468 0.286 
 (0.493) (0.500) (0.501) (0.496) (0.497) (0.403) (0.500) (0.463) 
Overweight 0.571 0.492 0.452 0.380 0.542 0.474 0.422 0.296 
 (0.497) (0.501) (0.500) (0.487) (0.500) (0.513) (0.496) (0.465) 
0.457 0.495 0.489 0.360 0.472 0.375 0.462 0.522 Obese/Morbidly Obese 
(0.505) (0.503) (0.505) (0.482) (0.502) (0.500) (0.501) (0.511) 
         
Overall 0.570 0.484 0.500 0.415 0.531 0.353 0.451 0.366 
 (0.496) (0.500) (0.501) (0.493) (0.500) (0.483) (0.498) (0.485) 
N 328 665 378 792 307 51 474 71 
         
Notes: Sample means use data from the 1985-2010 BRFSS.  Standard deviation of the mean in parentheses.   Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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Table 11.  Difference-in-Differences Regression: Before-and-After Employment Rates by Weight Group in Protected Jurisdictions Compared to 
Surrounding Jurisdictions 
 San Francisco Binghamton 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Men Women Men Women 
Variable     
Post (2000 or 2008) -0.013 -0.036*** -0.078*** -0.032** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.023) (0.014) 
Overweight 0.029*** -0.008 0.026*** 0.019*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Obese/Morbidly Obese 0.006 -0.022** -0.002 -0.016** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Overweight*Post 0.006 0.031*** 0.016 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.029) (0.022) 
0.007 0.026** 0.065 0.021 Obese/Morbidly Obese*Post 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.206) (0.024) 
-0.0007 -0.029 0.065 0.045 Jurisdiction (San Francisco or 
Binghamton) (0.041) (0.032) (0.054) (0.044) 
Post*Jurisdiction -0.042 0.030 -0.179 -0.075 
 (0.051) (0.041) (0.151) (0.115) 
Overweight*Jurisdiction -0.009 0.025 0.001 -0.062 
 (0.066) (0.062) (0.072) (0.059) 
-0.148 0.013 -0.089 -0.025 Obese/Morbidly 
Obese*Jurisdiction (0.091) (0.089) (0.078) (0.064) 
0.039 -0.058 0.065 -0.011 Overweight*Post* 
Jurisdiction (0.082) (0.076) (0.206) (0.170) 
0.199* -0.041 0.140 0.152 Obese/Morbidly 
Obese*Post*Jurisdiction (0.102) (0.101) (0.207) (0.181) 
     
N 46,854 62,537 34,442 49,106 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.173 0.210 0.197 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes: Reported estimates are the marginal effects from a probit model.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are below in parentheses. The specifications 
are restricted to BRFSS respondents between 18 and 65, counting all respondents who are employed for wages as employed, counting all respondents who are 
out of work, self-employed, homemaker, a student, retired, or unable to work as not employed, and dropping all respondents who refused to respond to the 
employment question. All estimates use BRFSS data from 1985-2010.  The San Francisco regressions use data from the state of California (excluding Santa 
Cruz), and the Binghamton regressions use data from the state of New York.  All regressions include controls for age, age-squared, marital status, race, education 
level, and year fixed effects. Sample excludes pregnant women. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE LAST LEGALLY ALLOWED FORM OF DISCRIMINATION: WHY WEIGHT 
SHOULD BE THE NEXT PROTECTED CLASS UNDER TITLE VII 
 
 
Introduction 
 It has been called  “one of the last legally allowed forms of discrimination,”229 
“the most socially acceptable prejudice left,”230 “the last area of safe bigotry,”231 and 
even “a socially acceptable injustice.”232  Fat rights advocates, newspaper reporters, and 
even some researchers have expressed their beliefs that obesity discrimination is real.  
Yet proving empirically that obesity discrimination is real is impossible since 
discrimination is always the residual hypothesis. 
 Nonetheless, Chapter I presented empirical evidence that was consistent with the 
discrimination hypothesis.  The evidence in Chapter I was particularly supportive of 
discrimination since the sorting and wage discrepancies associated with certain 
occupational characteristics were only present for morbidly obese women, and not men.  
Chapter II explored the legal remedies enacted by the Federal government and seven 
other jurisdictions across the United States to prevent any such discrimination and 
examined whether these legal remedies had worked. 
 This chapter builds on the findings of Chapters I and II.  The findings of Chapter I 
add to a growing body of evidence that is consistent with the existence of discrimination 
                                                
229 International Size Acceptance Association, “Nationwide Contact Campaign Petition,” International Size 
Acceptance Association Online, last modified 7 Dec. 2011, http://www.size-acceptance.org/nationwide. 
230 Aaron Epstein, “Fighting Bias Against the Obese,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 10 Jan. 1994, A1. 
231 Janet Cawley, “Last Target of Legal Bigotry: Obesity,” Chicago Tribune, 12 May 1993, 1. 
232 Rebecca M. Puhl, “Obesity Discrimination: A Socially Acceptable Injustice,” Obesity Action Coalition 
News 3 (July 2008): 6-7. 
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against the obese—particularly obese women—in the labor market.  Therefore, this 
chapter proposes passing a new Federal law to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
weight using the lessons learned from the existing laws discussed in Chapter II.  I 
propose making weight the sixth protected class for the purposes of employment under 
Title VII.   
Some may be concerned with adding a characteristic that is at least somewhat 
under a person’s control—in formal terms, mutable—to the list of Title VII protected 
classes.  To address these concerns, I propose protecting weight in the same manner as 
religion.  Anyone familiar with Title VII practice knows that religion is not quite as 
strongly protected as race or even sex.  In litigation, once an employee has proven her 
prima facie case of Title VII religious discrimination, the employer can assert an undue 
hardship defense, similar to the undue burden defense under ADA law described in 
Chapter II.  Allowing employers to assert an undue burden defense would also address 
any concerns that weight may interfere with certain types of jobs. 
Others may fear that adding another protected class under Title VII may be 
somewhat of a slippery slope.  If Congress adds weight to the list of protected classes, 
then what is to stop them from also protecting individuals who are unattractive, who have 
substance abuse problems, and who have bad personalities?  Two characteristics 
distinguish weight from these other potential protected classes.  First, as Chapter I and II 
have shown, there is currently no evidence that weight lowers an individual’s 
productivity at work.  In contrast, having a substance abuse problem or a bad personality 
could arguably make an individual less productive on the job.  Second, and more 
importantly, weight is objectively measureable using BMI.  Using BMI, courts could 
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easily draw a line between individuals whose BMI was high enough to merit legal 
protection and individuals whose BMI was not high enough.  Yet it would be very 
difficult to decide who was unattractive enough, addicted enough, and unfriendly enough 
to merit legal protection. 
Still others may be concerned about the costs of this proposal—more particularly, 
that the costs of enacting a new Federal law to prohibit weight-based discrimination 
might outweigh the benefits.  Although it is impossible to predict the precise costs and 
benefits of my proposal, I deliberately advocate for policies that should minimize its costs 
and maximize its benefits.  For example, I advocate that weight should be protected under 
Title VII and not the ADA because Title VII can address the full range of issues faced by 
the obese in the labor market, while the ADA cannot.  Therefore, Title VII protections 
will provide the most benefits for the obese in the labor market.  At the same time, 
making weight a protected class under Title VII is less likely to result in unintended 
consequences than protecting weight under the ADA.  Later on in this chapter, I will 
present evidence that employment outcomes for the disabled have actually declined since 
the passage of the ADA, further suggesting that protecting weight under the ADA would 
be less beneficial.   
Looking more closely at costs, recall from Chapter II that only a handful of 
weight-based complaints have been filed under the Madison and Urbana ordinances.  
These two ordinances work because employers know that the Madison and Urbana 
commissions take violations of the local anti-discrimination laws seriously; consequently, 
employers fear the costs of non-compliance.  Indeed, Chapter II revealed that none of the 
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weight to the list of protected classes will add only a small additional burden to the 
EEOC caseload.  Moreover, advocating for protecting weight under Title VII instead of 
the ADA does not generate any additional costs: both laws require claimants to go 
through the same EEOC charge filing and litigation process.  In fact, the only 
considerable costs associated with my proposal arise from the changes that I recommend 
for Federal administration of employment discrimination claims.  Yet I propose these 
changes for all discrimination claims, not just ones based on weight, and regardless of 
whether the discrimination claims arise under Title VII, the ADA, or another Federal 
statute. 
 With all of these concerns in mind, my proposal for a new law (and the rationale 
behind it) will proceed as follows.  First, I will discuss recent evidence from the field of 
psychology that weight stigma, a term adopted by researchers in that field to describe a 
bias against heavier people, exists.  This growing evidence of weight stigma indicates 
that my results in Chapter I are being driven by discrimination and not some other 
demand-side effect.  Second, I will explore more thoroughly why Title VII, and not the 
ADA, is the most appropriate model under which to prohibit weight discrimination in the 
workplace.  Third, I will address three of the strongest arguments against making weight 
a protected class.  Fourth, I will present the details of my proposal for making weight a 
protected class.  Fifth, and finally, I will suggest some changes to the current Federal 
administration process of employment discrimination claims based on the evidence 
presented in Chapter II.  Not only would these changes in administration make Title VII a 
more effective remedy for future protected classes, but they would also make Title VII a 
more effective remedy for the five currently protected classes. 
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Evidence of Weight Stigma and Weight Discrimination 
 
 
 Chapter I concludes with a call for further research on how obese individuals 
view themselves and how obese individuals are viewed by others.  While this research is 
still very much ongoing, many psychology studies already support the notion that people 
associate obesity with a wide range of negative characteristics.  These negative 
associations are particularly strong for obese women.  Psychology researchers have 
classified these negative associations as weight stigma. 
 Although research on weight stigma and its implications for the workplace has 
grown in popularity as obesity rates have increased, the earliest papers on weight stigma 
actually emerged over two decades ago.  In one of the first experiments, Larkin and Pines 
(1979) showed participants videos of normal-weight and overweight individuals applying 
for a job.  Participants were less likely to describe the overweight applicants as neat, 
productive, ambitious, disciplined, or determined, and they were less likely to 
recommend overweight applicants for the job.233   Decker (1987) provided subjects in his 
experiments with written descriptions of hypothetical managers.  Subjects rated normal-
weight managers as more likely to be good supervisors than overweight managers.234  
Similarly, Rothblum et al. (1988) provided participants in their experiment with written 
descriptions of obese and non-obese female job applicants.  Participants believed the 
                                                
233 J. C. Larkin and H. A. Pines, “No Fat Persons Need Apply: Experimental Studies of the Overweight 
Stereotypw and Hiring Preference,” Social Work Occupations 6 (1979): 312-27. 
234 W. H. Decker, “Attributions Based on Managers’ Self-Presentation, Sex, and Weight,” Psychological 
Reports 71 (1987): 175-81.  
 226 
obese job applicants were more likely to lack self-discipline, supervisory potential, 
professional appearance, and even personal hygiene.235   
Jasper and Klassen (1990) also used written descriptions of hypothetical job 
applicants; their experiment showed different subjects the same resume for a sales 
position.  Some scenarios described the applicant as obese; other scenarios described the 
applicant as not obese.  Participants reviewing the resumes of obese applicants rated them 
as less desirable.236  Pingitoire et al. (1994) went back to live performance in their 
experiment.  Using a male and a female professional actor, they created videos of fake 
job interviews for computer and sales positions. In some videos, the normal-weight actors 
wore a padded costume to make themselves look fat, but in other videos, they dressed as 
themselves.  Subjects viewing the overweight videos were less likely to recommend the 
applicant to be hired for either position, although the effect was more pronounced for the 
sales position.237  Moreover, the negative effect of the padded costume was more severe 
for the female applicant.  
As a result, literature reviews of these early papers concluded that the outlook for 
obese applicants and employees in the labor market were grim.  A comprehensive review 
by Roehling (1999) found psychology studies documenting stereotypes of obese 
individuals as lacking self-discipline, lazy, less conscientious, less competent, sloppy, 
and more likely to have a personal problem.238  A later review by Puhl and Brownell 
                                                
235 Esther D. Rothblum et al., “Stereotypes of Obese Female Job Applicants,” International Journal of 
Eating Disorders 7 (1988): 277-83.  
236 C. R. Jasper and M. L. Klassen, “Perceptions of Salespersons’ Appearance and Evaluation of Job 
Performance,” Perceptual & Motor Skills 71 (1990): 563-66. 
237 R. Pingitoire et al., “Bias Against Overweight Job Applicants in a Simulated Employment Interview,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology 79 (1994): 909-17. 
238 Mark V. Roehling, “Weight-Based Discrimination in Employment: Psychological and Legal Aspects,” 
Personnel Psychology 52 (Dec. 1999): 969-1016. 
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(2001) concluded that “discrimination against obese individuals is real.  It occurs in key 
areas affecting health and well-being.”239 
More recent psychology research has concurred with these earlier findings.  Berry 
and Spence (2009) conducted a weight stigma experiment in which they showed subjects 
pictures of normal-weight individuals and overweight individuals.  Subjects associated 
words such as “unmotivated, lethargic, unfit, lazy, inactive, sluggish, idle, weak, sickly, 
[and] loaf” with the pictures of the overweight individuals more frequently than with the 
normal-weight individuals.240  Berry and Spence credited media portrayals of overweight 
and obese individuals with this “automatic stereotype activation.”241 
 Besides Berry and Spence’s paper, much of the other recent research in this area 
has come out of one particular research institute, the Yale Rudd Center for Food Policy 
and Obesity.  Interestingly, the Rudd Center is primarily associated with research to 
combat obesity: researchers there have produced much of the seminal research on U.S. 
food sources, food addiction, food marketing, school nutrition policies, and soda taxes.  
Nevertheless, the Rudd Center also supports research on weight stigma. 
 Two of the researchers from the Rudd Center, Puhl and Brownell (2006), 
surveyed over 3,000 adult members of a weight loss support group on their experience 
with weight stigmatization and their psychological health.  Puhl and Brownell found that 
as BMI increased, so did reported instances of weight stigma and weight discrimination.  
Approximately 70 percent of this mostly obese sample reported having others make 
negative assumptions about them based on their weight.  Over half of the sample also 
                                                
239 Rebecca M. Puhl and Kelly D. Brownell, “Bias, Discrimination, and Obesity,” Obesity Research 9 (Dec. 
2001): 801. 
240 Tanya Berry and John C. Spence, “Automatic Activation of Exercise and Sedentary Stereotypes,” 
Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 80 (Sep. 2009): 633-40. 
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reported experiencing nasty comments from children, inappropriate comments from 
doctors, and hurtful comments from family members.  Finally, about one-quarter of the 
sample reported experiencing job discrimination.  Despite all of this negative treatment, 
however, the authors did not find any evidence that higher BMI had any psychological 
effects; there was no statistical relationship between BMI and level of self-esteem or 
likelihood of being depressed.242  
Interestingly, the weight stigma documented by Puhl and Brownell appears to be 
increasing over time—even though an increasing percentage of the U.S. population is 
overweight or obese.  A later paper produced by Rudd Center researchers Andreyeva et 
al. (2008) found that weight and height discrimination increased nationwide from 7 
percent to 12 percent over an eleven-year period.  These researchers used data from the 
National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States (MIDUS), which asks 
participants questions related to their behavioral, psychological, and social well-being.  
The MIDUS data asked participants several questions about whether they had 
experienced discrimination, and if so, what type.  In the 1995 to 1996 MIDUS sample. 
4.1 percent of men and 10.0 percent of women reported experiencing weight and height 
discrimination.  In the 2004 to 2006 MIDUS sample, however, 8.1 percent of men and 
15.5 percent of women reported experiencing weight and height discrimination.  Even 
more surprisingly, the authors found that in the 2004 to 2006 sample, reports of 
discrimination based on weight and height were just as common as discrimination based 
on race or age.243 
                                                
242 Rebecca M. Puhl and Kelly D. Brownell, “Confronting and Coping with Weight Stigma: An 
Investigation of Overweight and Obese Adults,” Obesity 14 (Oct. 2006): 1802-15. 
243 Tatiana Andreyeva et al., “Changes in Perceived Weight Discrimination Among Americans, 1995-1996 
Through 2004-2006,” Obesity 16 (2008): 1129-34. 
 229 
Because the psychology research over the past three decades has almost 
universally supported the existence of weight stigma, the latest papers to come out of the 
Rudd Center have explored the negative consequences of weight stigma and have 
advocated finding ways to combat it.  Puhl and Heuer (2010) expressed concern over 
studies documenting that obese patients receive less thorough care from their health care 
providers and concluded that “weight stigma is not a beneficial public health tool for 
reducing obesity.”244  Instead, the Puhl and Heuer suggested that weight stigma would 
only lead to further health disparities between the obese and non-obese.  Another 
literature review by Puhl (2011) found that weight stigma started early: overweight and 
obese children were more likely to experience bullying and victimization from other 
children, teachers, and even parents.  Puhl expressed concern that this victimization could 
create somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy: overweight and obese children would grow 
up to be less emotionally healthy than their normal-weight counterparts because they had 
been bullied their entire life.245 
In sum, while economic evidence can only suggest the existence of weight 
discrimination, the psychology evidence is clear: weight stigma is real, and weight 
discrimination is its natural consequence.  Over thirty years of psychology research have 
documented that being obese is associated with a wide range of negative characteristics 
about an individual’s ability, personality, and work ethic.  Although economists are 
reluctant to attribute the labor market disparities experienced by the obese to 
discrimination, psychologists see these disparities as the natural outgrowth of the 
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“pervasive bias against overweight [and obese] people.”246  Because of this pervasive 
bias, the United States needs a strong Federal law to counteract its negative effects in the 
workplace.  This new Federal protection should take the form of making weight the next 
protected class under Title VII.  
 
Why Title VII—and Not the ADA 
 
 A new Federal law to counteract the poor labor market outcomes of the obese 
could conceivably take one of two forms: protection under the ADA or protection under 
Title VII.  This section will argue that Title VII is the more appropriate model for 
protecting the obese in the labor market for three reasons.  First, protection under the 
ADA will fail to address the full range of issues encountered by obese individuals in the 
labor market.  Second, with the right administration, Title VII-esque laws are capable of 
improving employment outcomes.  Third, and most practically, previous research 
demonstrates that making weight a protected class will garner more public support than 
recognizing obesity as a disability. 
 As Chapter II detailed, the ADA protects workers who have, previously had, or 
are regarded as having an actual disability that “substantially limits one or more major 
life activities.”247  Because the 2008 ADAAA instructed courts to begin construing the 
term disability “in favor of broad coverage,” the EEOC now takes the position that at 
least morbid obesity is a disability under the statute.  Future court decisions will 
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determine whether obesity of any severity is actually a disability for the purposes of the 
amended ADA. 
 Yet even if courts uniformly decide that obesity is a disability under the amended 
ADA, the ADA may not address all problems encountered by obese individuals in the 
labor market.  Recall that the ADA protects workers who have, previously had, or are 
regarded as having a disability.  Thus, if the disadvantages encountered by the obese in 
the labor market are driven by employers viewing them as disabled workers who are less 
capable of doing their jobs without reasonable accommodation, then ADA protections 
should absolutely improve employment outcomes of the obese. 
 But what if the disadvantages encountered by the obese in the labor market are 
driven by something else?  What if employers recognize that obese workers are just as 
capable and productive as non-obese workers?  Employers’ preferences for the non-obese 
may not be based on a belief that obese workers are somehow disabled.  Instead, 
employers’ preferences may be strictly based on taste for the appearance of non-obese 
individuals.  In such a case, the ADA would not offer any protections.  An obese worker 
who was turned down for a job or paid lower wages strictly because of an employer’s 
tastes would not have an ADA claim: she would be unable to prove that she had a 
disability or was perceived as having a disability. 
 Discrimination based on pure employer taste might not be such a concern if the 
poor labor market outcomes of the obese were concentrated in occupations where 
employers might reasonably believe that weight interfered with an individual’s ability to 
do the job—such as occupations requiring physical activity.  But recall the results of 
Chapter I: morbidly obese women are more likely to work in occupations requiring 
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physical activity and less likely to work in occupations requiring communication with 
others.   
The results in Chapter I suggest that if society wants to improve employment 
outcomes for the obese, then the ADA is not the right model.  The disadvantages 
encountered by the obese in the labor market are not being driven by a perceived inability 
to do the job.  They are being driven by employers’ tastes for who does the job.  The fact 
that sorting on the basis of occupational characteristic only occurs with women, and not 
with men, further strengthens the argument that the poor labor market outcomes of the 
obese are driven by employer taste, and not by perceived disability. 
On a more practical level, Title VII-esque protections may always be a more 
effective method to improve a disadvantaged group’s labor market outcomes than ADA-
esque protections.  The results of Chapter II indicated that with the right administration, 
Title VII-esque laws could improve employment outcomes of the obese.  The ADA, on 
the other hand, has done nothing for the obese, even in the one circuit that recognized 
obesity as a disability before the ADAAA. 
More generally, Chapter II pointed out that the ADA may not have improved 
employment outcomes for anyone with a disability. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) found 
that overall employment of all disabled individuals declined after the ADA went into 
effect.  The authors attributed the decline to the fact that employers who hired a disabled 
individual would be forced to incur the costs associated with reasonable accommodation 
without being able to pass these costs onto the employee.  As a result, the authors 
hypothesized that it was cheaper for employers not to hire disabled employees and take 
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the chance that they might file a lawsuit under the ADA.248 Acemoglu and Angrist’s 
work suggests that the ADA model may never succeed in improving employment 
outcomes. 
Of course, Chapter II also discussed papers such as Clermont and Schwab (2004, 
2009) and Nielsen et al. (2010) that indicated Title VII might not be performing much 
better right now than the ADA.249  But any current failure of Title VII to improve 
employment outcomes for its protected classes is due to a flaw in Federal administration, 
not a flaw in the overall model of Title VII.  Leonard (1984) demonstrated that Title VII 
did improve employment outcomes for protected classes in the past: between 1966 and 
1978, Leonard found that Title VII increased black employment across a wide range of 
occupations.250   
Despite these early successes with Title VII, Federal enforcement of employment 
discrimination laws under the EEOC has been fraught with administrative problems from 
almost the very beginning.  As early as 1976, the EEOC faced calls to “speed up its 
individual charge resolution process,” to fund an “investigative staff upgraded by 
effective training,” and to “function as a collegial decision-making body.”251  These calls 
for EEOC reform have continued in papers such as Monroe (1995), Selmi (1996), Green 
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(2000), and Moss et al. (2005).252  The evidence that Title VII initially worked but has 
subsequently been the victim of administrative backlog strengthens Chapter II’s 
conclusion that Title VII (and Title VII-esque laws) can improve employment outcomes 
if administered effectively.   
Besides the argument that Title VII is a better model for improving the 
employment outcomes of disadvantaged groups in the labor market, a third and final 
argument for protecting obesity under Title VII is that this type of protection will garner 
more public support than protecting obesity under the ADA.  Puhl and Heuer (2010) 
conducted a survey with a nationwide sample of 1,001 adults.  They proposed six 
different laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of weight.  Proposal one asked 
respondents if obesity should be a disability for the purposes of the ADA; only 27 percent 
of men and 32 percent of women believed it should.  Proposal four asked respondents if 
their state should have a Title VII-esque law like the state of Michigan.  Almost twice as 
many respondents agreed: 47 percent of men and 61 percent of women.  Finally, proposal 
six, which garnered the most support (65 percent of men and 81 percent of women), 
asked individuals if they agreed that 
It should be illegal (unlawful) for an employer to do all of the following: 
(i) Refuse to hire a qualified person because of his/her body weight.  
(ii) Fire a qualified employee because of his/her body weight.   
(iii) Deny a promotion or appropriate compensation to a qualified 
employee because of his/her body weight.253 
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Although these are precisely the same protections offered by the Michigan law and all 
Title VII-esque laws, the authors noted that all proposals stated with greater “specificity” 
(thus eliminating the problem of unfamiliarity) consistently garnered more support from 
respondents.254 
Puhl and Heuer’s research indicates that Title VII-esque protections for the obese 
are not only the most effective: they are also the most passable.  The legislative histories 
of the ordinances in Urbana, IL and Santa Cruz, CA, related in Chapter II, match Puhl 
and Heuer’s findings.  Recall that in these two cities, the prohibitions against weight and 
personal appearance discrimination were added to make these ordinances more passable.   
All in all, this section has demonstrated that making weight a protected class 
under Title VII is preferable to recognizing it as a disability for the purposes of the ADA.  
Title VII is the more appropriate measure to remedy all issues faced by the obese in the 
labor market, the more effective measure in actually improving employment outcomes, 
and the more passable measure by a legislature.  With Title VII established as the more 
preferable remedy to the ADA, I turn now to addressing additional arguments against 
making weight a protected class. 
 
Arguments Against Including Weight as a Protected Class 
 
 Even though Title VII protection is preferable to ADA protection, many people 
may still be uncomfortable with elevating weight to the same level as the five currently 
protected classes under Title VII, race, sex, color, religion, and national origin.  This 
section will address three of the strongest arguments against making weight a protected 
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class: the fact that weight is at least somewhat mutable, the fact that discrimination 
against the obese may be a good thing for society, and the fact that new protections for 
the obese may be redundant with existing laws.  In turn, I will consider each of these 
arguments and demonstrate why the evidence behind them actually strengthens the case 
for including weight in the list of protected classes. 
Obesity is Not as Mutable as Popular Opinion Would Suggest 
 Perhaps the most obvious concern with including weight in the list of Title VII 
protected classes is the fact that people believe their weight to be at least somewhat under 
their control. A 2005 survey, for example, found that 65 percent of Americans believed 
that obese people lacked personal willpower, and 63 percent of Americans thought that 
obesity was solely the result of consuming unhealthy food.255  In contrast, courts have 
traditionally viewed the five Title VII protected classes as immutable traits that are 
beyond people’s control.256  Yet it is increasingly easy to dispute how immutable these 
five classes are.  With the development of sex-change operations and skin bleaching, sex 
and color are now alterable.  Even without going to these extreme measures, religion has 
always been alterable.  Although people cannot change the religion into which they were 
born, they are certainly free to change it later.  
 Moreover, a careful study of the scientific evidence reveals that weight may be no 
more mutable than religion, sex, or color.  Ever since the publication of an influential 
article by Nisbett (1972), psychologists and many medical researchers have prescribed to 
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his “set point” theory of weight determination.257  According to this theory, every 
individual has a natural weight, or set point, toward which they gravitate.  Over the past 
four decades, the set point theory has been supported in laboratory experiments such as 
Sims et al. (1973),258 Leibel et al. (1995),259 and Levine et al. (2006).260 
Opponents of the theory question why the weight of Americans has increased so 
much over the past three decades since this amount of time seems too small for any kind 
of evolutionary change in people’s set points.  Biologists have responded with a 
modification to the set-point theory.  Instead of natural weight being completely pre-
determined, many biologists now believe that natural weight is determined by the 
interaction between genes and environment.  Genes determine people’s predisposition 
towards being heavy; environment determines just how heavy they become.261  As one 
literature review noted, “Genes do not necessarily make people fat but they do make 
certain people more predisposed to being heavy if environmental conditions are 
correct.”262  This widely accepted modification in the set-point theory indicates that 
weight may not be quite as mutable as popularly believed. 
 Furthermore, like sex and color, the most effective way for obese people to 
change their weight is through extreme measures: bariatric surgery.  Surgical treatment is 
now widely accepted in the medical community as the best way for obese, and 
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particularly morbidly obese, patients to achieve sustained weight loss.  Some of the most 
prominent papers comparing the effectiveness of surgical and non-surgical weight loss 
techniques have emerged from the Swedish Obese Subjects Study Scientific Group 
(SOS).  Sjöström (2000), for example, found that ten years after bariatric surgery, 
patients had sustained a 16 percent average loss of their initial weight.  These findings 
left Sjöström to conclude, “No non-surgical treatment available today can achieve such 
results, not even over 2 years. Surgical treatment for obesity needs to become much more 
common.”263  Using the same SOS subject pool, Sjöström et al. (2004) found that 
bariatric surgery was also the most effective treatment for ameliorating the health 
conditions associated with obesity, such as diabetes and hypertension.264  More recent 
research by Farias et al. (2011) has suggested that bariatric surgery works because it is 
the only way that individuals can change their natural set point.265 
 Reviewing the scientific literature on obesity indicates that weight is no more 
mutable than religion, and perhaps no more mutable than sex or color.  The widespread 
public belief that obesity is solely determined by personal choice is wrong; everyone is 
born with a tendency toward being heavy, medium-sized, or thin—just as everyone is 
born with a tendency toward being tall, medium-height, or short.  The fact that genes play 
a significant role in determining body size make weight just as much of an immutable 
trait as the five immutable traits currently recognized by Title VII. 
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Obesity Discrimination is Not Reducing Obesity Rates 
 A second argument against protecting weight under Title VII is that 
discriminating against the obese may actually be beneficial for society.  Obesity is 
associated with higher risks of hypertension, high cholesterol, type two diabetes, 
respiratory problems, and osteoarthritis.266  As obesity rates increase, society’s health 
declines.  Consequently, proponents of this second argument argue that discrimination is 
society’s way of using the market to correct this social ill.  As Patrick Basham of the Cato 
Institute has argued, “employer-driven discrimination [is] the correct approach…First, 
this policy would place the costs for being overweight squarely on individuals, giving 
them stronger incentives to slim down. Second, since most employers want a healthy 
workforce, it would give them an incentive to help employees control their weight.”267 
 Proponents of this argument might also point to the fact that in the past, society 
has successfully used the market to correct another public health problem: smoking. 
Smokers face disadvantages in the labor market very similar to the obese.268  Viscusi and 
Hersch (2001), for instance, demonstrated empirically that smokers worked in riskier jobs 
but earned less wage compensation for their risk.  The authors concluded that smokers 
faced a different market offer curve than non-smokers: smokers not only had greater risk-
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seeking preferences but also had lesser market opportunities than non-smokers.269  Auld 
(2005) found that smokers faced between an 8 percent and a 24 percent wage penalty in 
the labor market.270   
Using the evidence above, proponents of the market correction of social ills 
argument would quickly point out that as smokers have been subjected to increasing 
scrutiny—both in the labor market and in society—smoking rates have declined 
dramatically. While almost half of the country smoked in 1965, only a fifth of the country 
smoked in 2007.271  Thus, proponents of the market correction argument would argue that 
legally protecting the obese under Title VII is the last thing we should do from a public 
health standpoint.  Discrimination, so the argument goes, helped to reduce smoking and 
improve public health; in turn, discrimination will help to reduce obesity and improve 
public health.272 
The market correction of social ills argument and the related analogy of smoking 
to obesity have three flaws.  First, although smoking may be the closest analogy to being 
obese from a labor market standpoint, there is a fundamental difference between smoking 
and obesity.  Smoking is a pure personal choice.  At least initially (before the onset of 
addiction), people make a choice to start smoking.  But as the review of the scientific 
literature on obesity demonstrated, being obese is not necessarily a pure personal choice.  
Genes play a role in determining a person’s size. 
                                                
269 W. Kip Viscusi and Joni Hersch, “Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 83 (May 2001): 269-80. 
270 M. Christopher Auld, “Smoking, Drinking, and Income,” Journal of Human Resources 40 (Spring 
2005): 505-18. 
271 Marc Kaufman, “Decades-Long U.S. Decrease in Smoking Rates Levels Off,” Washington Post, 9 Nov. 
2007, A7. 
272 For an overview of the debate on smoking discrimination, see “Banning Smoking at Work—Is It 
Discrimination?” 11 Feb. 2009, CBS News Online, last modified 28 Feb. 2012, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/31/health/main327245.shtml and A. G. Sulzberger, “Hospitals 
Shift Smoking Bans to Smoker Ban,” New York Times, 10 Feb. 2011, A1. 
 241 
Even if being obese were a pure personal choice, a second flaw exists in the 
argument that discrimination is the market’s way of decreasing obesity rates: it is not 
clear that the labor market is even capable of curing social ills such as rising obesity 
rates.  Indeed, the Evidence of Weight Stigma and Weight Discrimination Section 
discussed research by Puhl and Heuer (2010), which found that weight discrimination 
actually worsens obesity outcomes.  According to these authors, instead of encouraging 
the obese to lose weight, weight discrimination “threatens the psychological and physical 
health of obese individuals, impedes the implementation of effective efforts to prevent 
obesity, and exacerbates health disparities.” 273 
Yet even for those who do not believe Puhl and Heuer’s research, there is a third, 
more fundamental problem with the argument that discrimination is the market’s way of 
reducing obesity rates.  The economic studies discussed in Chapter I illustrate that even if 
the labor market is capable of reducing obesity rates, only one-half of the market is 
working.  If it is true that discrimination is the market’s way of reducing obesity rates, 
then obese individuals should experience the same level of discrimination, regardless of 
their gender.  But in fact, both Chapter I and earlier economics research have 
demonstrated that women see a much greater discrepancy in their wages for being obese 
than do men.  At best, under this argument, the labor market is still failing along gender 
lines.  One way to remedy market failure is, of course, to pass a law—such as making 
weight a protected class under Title VII. 
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Title VII Protections for Weight Would Not Be Redundant 
The third argument against making weight a protected class under Title VII is that 
these protections are unnecessary given the other Federal employment discrimination 
laws currently on the books.  I have already discussed in detail above why the ADA does 
not offer sufficient protection for the obese in the labor market, even assuming that 
obesity is recognized as a disability in every circuit for the purposes of the amended 
ADA.  The ADA would never protect obese employees who experienced an adverse 
employment action because of pure taste-based preferences (and not a perception of 
inferior ability).  Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the ADA has not improved 
employment outcomes for any disabled individuals because it is too costly for employers 
to follow strictly. 
An argument that requires greater consideration, however, is that making weight a 
protected class under Title VII would be redundant with the sex-based protections that 
already exist under Title VII.  Chapter I demonstrated that labor market disparities for the 
obese are really only a problem for obese women.  The previous economics literature 
discussed in Chapter I found that the obesity wage discrepancy is only robust for women; 
the discrepancy can be eliminated for men once enough controls are introduced.  This 
evidence suggests that obesity discrimination may actually be gender discrimination in 
disguise. 
In more formal legal terms, opponents of making weight a protected class may 
argue that obese women could already file a claim under the theory of Title VII “sex-
plus” discrimination.  A sex-plus claim alleges that an employer is discriminating not just 
on the basis of sex, “but on the basis of sex plus some other, facially neutral 
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qualification.”274  Since the advent of the sex-plus theory in Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., female plaintiffs have successfully challenged employer’s discriminatory hiring 
policies against women with preschool-aged children,275 women who were married,276 
and women who were unwed mothers.277  Successful sex-plus claimants must 
demonstrate that the employer does not care about the facially neutral qualification on its 
own; the employer only cares because of the claimant’s sex.  Consequently, in the 
previously mentioned cases, claimants had to show that the employers in question were 
still willing to hire men with preschool-aged children, men who were married, and men 
who were unwed fathers.  Because the economic evidence strongly indicates that 
employers care about women’s weight but not men’s weight, it seems logical that women 
who are obese might also be able to make a successful sex-plus claim. 
 Unfortunately for obese women, a sex-plus-obesity discrimination claim is almost 
certain to fail under Federal courts’ current interpretation of the sex-plus doctrine.  
Federal courts will only recognize sex-plus claims when the facially neutral characteristic 
is either a fundamental right, such as the right to marry and have children, or an 
immutable trait.278  Kotkin (2009) attributes courts’ reluctance to recognize sex-plus 
claims to a concern that at the extreme, “protected subgroups would exist for every 
possible combination of race, color, sex,” and the “benefits of Title VII…[will] be 
splintered beyond use and recognition.”279 
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As a result, courts have been very reluctant to recognize aspects of a claimant’s 
personal appearance as an immutable trait.  The cases testing whether personal 
appearance constitutes an immutable trait have largely focused on one element: hairstyle.  
Most famously, in 1975, the Fifth Circuit rejected Alan Willingham’s sex-plus 
discrimination claim that the Macon Telegraph Publishing Co. had refused to hire him 
because he had long hair.  Even though Willingham demonstrated that Macon allowed its 
female employees to have long hair, the court rejected Willingham’s claim because 
hairstyle was not a fundamental right or an “immutable trait[], such as race and national 
origin.”280  Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit’s definition of immutable trait was apparently 
limited to characteristics already protected by Title VII like race and national origin.  
Sex-plus-hairstyle discrimination claims have all failed.  Moreover, two lower 
courts have suggested in dicta that closely related race-plus-hairstyle discrimination 
claims may succeed if the plaintiff alleged that an employer did not allow her to wear her 
race’s natural hairstyle.  Still, the claimants in both of these race-plus-hairstyle cases 
ultimately lost: in Carswell v. Peachford Hospital and Rogers v. American Airlines Inc., 
black plaintiffs challenged their employers’ prohibitions against wearing their hair in 
braids or cornrows.  Although both courts suggested that the employers could not prohibit 
them from wearing their hair in a natural “afro,” the courts found that employers could 
prohibit employees from wearing any other hairstyle.281  
Notably, in 2006, the Ninth Circuit developed a different approach to sex-plus 
discrimination claims in an en banc decision.  In Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating 
Company, Inc., the court considered Harrah’s formal policy requiring female employees 
                                                
280 Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir 1975). 
281 Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carswell v. Peachford Hospital, 
1981 WL 224 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
 245 
to wear makeup and forbidding male employees from wearing makeup.  Instead of trying 
to determine whether this aspect of personal appearance constituted an immutable trait or 
a fundamental right, the Ninth Circuit asked whether this policy imposed equal burdens 
on both sexes.  Even though this equal burdens test sounds broader than the immutable 
trait/fundamental right test in all other circuits, the Ninth Circuit has not applied it 
broadly.  The en banc panel in Jesperson held that the makeup policy did impose equal 
burdens on men, pointing to Harrah’s other grooming policies, such as hair length 
requirements for men, as support.282 
Despite its different test, the Ninth Circuit has not proven to be any more 
accepting of sex-plus-personal appearance discrimination claims than the other ten 
circuits.  Federal courts’ rejection of previous sex-plus-personal appearance 
discrimination claims has led scholars such as Kotkin (2009) to be pessimistic that courts 
would treat previously untested elements of personal appearance, such as weight or 
beauty, any differently.283   
As a result, even though the scientific evidence suggests that weight ought to be 
considered an immutable trait, it is highly unlikely that courts would consider it an 
immutable trait under current law.  The Willingham court seemed unwilling to include 
anything but characteristics already protected by Title VII in its list of immutable traits.  
Other courts have been unwilling to recognize sex-plus claims based on facially neutral 
characteristics that involve even the slightest element of personal choice. 
In sum, making weight a protected class under Title VII would not be redundant 
with currently existing laws.  Even if obesity is a disability under the amended ADA, the 
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ADA will only provide protection when an employer believes that an individual’s obesity 
substantially limits one or more of her life activities.  The ADA will never protect obese 
individuals who experience adverse employment action because the employer has a taste 
for thinner people.  Moreover, sex-plus-weight discrimination claims under Title VII 
cannot fill this gap in ADA coverage.  Under courts’ current interpretation of sex-plus 
doctrine, courts are unlikely to recognize weight as an immutable trait.  In order for 
weight discrimination claims to succeed and to have a meaningful impact on employment 
outcomes for the obese, weight must be a separate protected class. 
 
Proposal for Making Weight a Title VII Protected Class 
 
 
 Keeping all of these arguments against making weight a Title VII protected class 
in mind, I turn now to the details of my proposal.  The goal of my proposed law is to 
provide the narrowest protection possible that will still help the obese overcome the real 
disadvantages that they face in the labor market.  I keep my proposal narrow because as 
seen in the previous section, there are strong concerns against equating weight 
discrimination with race, color, sex, religion, and national origin discrimination.  
Moreover, viewing weight as immutable, while supported by scientific research, goes 
against the grain of public opinion. 
 Under my proposal, weight discrimination plaintiffs, like other Title VII 
plaintiffs, could bring cases using one of two theories.  The first theory, disparate 
treatment, alleges that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee 
because the employee was a member of a protected class.  Proving these cases usually 
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requires presenting direct and circumstantial evidence that the employer treated the 
plaintiff differently because she was a member of a protected class.  The second theory, 
disparate impact, alleges that the employer had a facially neutral policy that 
disproportionately impacted members of a protected class.  In contrast to disparate 
treatment cases, proving disparate impact cases generally requires statistical evidence that 
the employer’s policy negatively affected a large group of protected class members (not 
just the plaintiff) either working for or seeking a job with the employer.284 
 Thus, my basic proposal is that Congress should add weight to the list of 
protected classes under Title VII, which would entitle weight-based discrimination 
plaintiffs to seek relief in the same manner as any other Title VII plaintiff.  Beyond this 
basic proposal, however, I must work out additional details.  I will begin outlining these 
details with a brief discussion of why I propose a Federal law instead of additional state 
and local laws.  Next, I will explain why I propose adding weight, instead of a broader 
protection like personal appearance, to the list of Title VII protected classes.  I will then 
discuss two important defenses to my proposed Title VII protection of weight that I 
believe will address any cost concerns about making weight a protected class.  Finally, I 
will address why I propose making weight a protected class just for the purposes of Title 
VII and not for the purposes of all Federal anti-discrimination laws. 
The Advantage of a Federal Law 
 As Chapter II demonstrated, six cities and one state have successfully passed a 
law making weight a protected class for the purposes of employment.  Consequently, 
passing weight-based discrimination laws at the state and local levels may seem more 
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feasible than passing a Federal law.  Moreover, Chapter II presents evidence that the 
Federal system is not doing a good job administering its anti-discrimination laws already 
in place, while at least two of the local jurisdictions, Madison, WI and Urbana, IL, are 
doing a good job.  For this reason, many people may argue that making weight a 
protected class under state and local laws may be a better solution than making weight a 
protected class under Federal law.  
 Nonetheless, a Federal law has one enormous advantage: the ability to confer 
national uniformity.  The fundamental problem with these state and local laws is that they 
are all different.  The legislative histories and administrative procedures described in 
Chapter II demonstrate just how varying these laws are.  Some of these laws protect 
weight; some of them protect all personal appearance.  Some jurisdictions have 
enforcement commissions; some do not have one.  Some have statutory time limits; some 
do not.  The differences are endless, and the differences would multiply if additional state 
and local laws passed.   
Moreover, as difficult as it may be for plaintiffs to keep track of all these 
differences, it may be even more difficult for employers.  Particularly for employers 
located in multiple jurisdictions, setting a uniform human resources policy could become 
very tricky given all the differences in local anti-discrimination laws.  The existence of 
weight discrimination laws in some jurisdictions and not others also raises fairness 
concerns, particularly in large metropolitan areas.  It hardly seems fair that an employee 
who happens to work in one part of a metropolitan area can seek legal recourse for 
weight-based discrimination, but an employee who works in another part of a 
metropolitan area cannot.  Employees in the greater San Francisco metropolitan area, for 
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example, enjoy weight-based discrimination protections if they happen to work in the city 
of San Francisco or in nearby Santa Cruz.  But employees working in other areas of this 
large metropolitan area do not enjoy such protections.  Federalism, which recognizes the 
right of different jurisdictions to have different laws, may trump these fairness concerns.  
But the fact remains that non-uniformity of workplace laws presents a particular 
challenge for employers and employees in metropolitan areas that span multiple cities 
and even multiple states.285 
For all of these reasons, making weight a protected class under Federal law is 
preferable to continuing the current trend of making weight a protected class in select 
cities and states.  State and local protections against weight-based discrimination in 
employment are certainly preferable to no protections at all.  But if Congress were able to 
pass a law adding weight to the list of Title VII protected classes, it would create a 
national, uniform standard by which both employers and employees could abide.  The 
superiority of a Federal anti-discrimination law, of course, depends on the Federal anti-
discrimination law being administered effectively.  Since Chapter II questioned the 
effectiveness of current Federal administration, the final section of this chapter will 
propose Federal administrative reforms.  Instituting these reforms will make a Federal 
weight-based discrimination law unequivocally preferable to a state or local one. 
 
 
                                                
285 Indeed, both Congress and the courts have already recognized the need for uniform laws in the 
employment context, particularly for multi-jurisdictional employers.  For example, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 was designed to preempt local laws in the employee benefit 
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Weight Versus Personal Appearance 
 Now that I have established that a Federal law would be preferable to a state or 
local law, I turn now to the details of my proposal.  As mentioned in the previous section, 
many of the existing state and local laws discussed in Chapter II protect weight under the 
broader category of protecting personal appearance.  In fact, the two cities whose laws 
appeared effective, Madison and Urbana, prohibited all personal appearance 
discrimination, not just discrimination on the basis of weight.  Yet I do not propose that 
personal appearance be added to the list of protected classes under Title VII; I only 
propose that weight be added.   
In fact, others have made the more expansive proposal that discrimination on the 
basis of all personal appearance characteristics should be prohibited under Title VII.  
Prohibiting discrimination on the basis of all personal appearance characteristics, not just 
weight, certainly seems reasonable.  As Chapter I highlighted, the economic literature on 
beauty certainly suggests that the poorer labor market outcomes of the unattractive are 
the result of discrimination.  Using this literature as justification for her proposal, 
Adamitis (2000) was one of the first authors to recommend that personal appearance be 
added to the list of protected categories.286  More recently, Rhode (2010) has also argued 
that laws should prohibit discrimination on the basis of personal appearance.  Rhode 
pointed to the small number of claims filed in the seven jurisdictions with these laws to 
convince her readers that these laws would add little additional burden to the already 
overburdened EEOC.287  Finally, Hamermesh (2011), the pioneer of the beauty 
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economics literature, has also argued that the U.S. should offer “legal protections to the 
ugly.”288 
While these proposals are certainly reasonable given the strong evidence that 
discrimination on the basis of personal appearance exists, the fundamental problem with 
personal appearance laws is that they lack any kind of objective standard.  Hamermesh 
(2011) anticipates this argument and spends a sizeable portion of his book arguing that 
objective beauty standards do exist.  While we may not always agree on the exact level of 
attractiveness or judgments of relative attractiveness, Hamermesh argues that we can all 
agree on who is “truly ugly.”289 
Hamermesh may be right—there may be a general consensus on who is truly 
ugly—but he is unable to draw a clear line between the people who are ugly enough to 
merit legal protection and the people who are not quite ugly enough.  Even just protecting 
the bottom 1 to 2 percent of ugly people as Hamermesh suggests seems unwieldy from an 
administrative standpoint.290  After all, who would decide who fell into this bottom 1 to 2 
percent category?  An appointed individual?  A new beauty-rating agency?  The EEOC?  
Considering that the EEOC has already a difficult time administering statutes like Title 
VII with fairly clear standards about who is a member of each protected class, 
Hamermesh’s proposal would be a nightmare for the agency. 
In contrast to personal appearance and beauty, where no true, measurable, and 
objective standards exist, weight does have an objective, measureable standard: BMI.  
While BMI may not be a perfect measure of obesity, it is the measure upon which the 
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healthcare industry relies.  The BMI objective standard could allow the EEOC and courts 
to set a BMI cutoff point, such as thirty-five or forty, below which no claims of weight-
based discrimination would be received.  From a fairness perspective, a cutoff point 
would ensure that the heaviest claimants were given priority and treated uniformly.  From 
a practical perspective, a cutoff point would limit the amount of additional cases that the 
EEOC would have to process under a new Federal law. 
Arguably, a hard cutoff point might lead to arbitrary distinctions between 
individuals right below and individuals right above the cutoff.  For that reason, a soft 
cutoff point might be more advisable.  A soft cutoff point would not automatically bar 
individuals below the point from filing a claim, but it might require these lighter 
individuals to produce additional evidence that their adverse employment action was due 
to weight discrimination.  Regardless of whether the EEOC and courts institute a hard or 
soft cutoff point—or any cutoff point at all—the fact that obesity can be measured by an 
objective scale means that the EEOC and courts have a tool through which they can 
compare plaintiffs and evaluate the relative strength of their claims. 
All in all, grounds for making personal appearance a protected class certainly 
exist, and many scholars have previously advocated for such protection.  But personal 
appearance is inherently a subjective term that is difficult to define.  Federal courts and 
the EEOC are already having a difficult time enforcing discrimination against protected 
classes that are objectively well defined.  Thus, including a subjective term like personal 
appearance (or even personality, as suggested in the introduction) in the list of protected 
classes could wreak enforcement havoc.  Including weight, instead of broader personal 
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appearance, protections in Title VII would lessen these enforcement concerns since 
objective weight standards like BMI do exist. 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
 Because obesity is associated with so many negative health outcomes, many 
people may be concerned about adding weight to the list of Title VII protected classes 
because obesity could interfere with a person’s physical ability to perform her job.  The 
results in Chapter I should have allayed these fears since its results demonstrated that 
morbidly obese women were actually more likely to work in occupations requiring 
physical activity than normal-weight women (and morbidly obese men were no less 
likely to work in these occupations).  Thus, obesity does not appear to be interfering with 
workers’ abilities to perform physical activities systematically enough to show up in the 
data.  Nonetheless, it is still possible to imagine an occasional situation where a job was 
so strenuous and a worker was so obese that it rendered her incapable of performing the 
job. 
 For an easy remedy to this occasional situation, I propose allowing employers to 
assert a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e) if weight becomes a protected class under Title VII.  Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e) allows employers to assert the BFOQ affirmative defense “in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”291  
Consequently, BFOQ is never a valid defense to employment discrimination claims based 
on race or color.   
                                                
291 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012). 
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The first U.S. Supreme Court case applying the BFOQ defense, coincidentally, 
came in a sexual discrimination case involving weight and height restrictions.  In 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, Dianne Rawlinson brought an employment discrimination claim 
after her application to be an Alabama state prison guard was turned down because of 
two Alabama regulations.  The first regulation required that all prison guards meet 
minimum height and weight requirements; Rawlinson argued that these height and 
weight requirements had a disparate impact on women because very few women could 
meet these standards.  The second regulation required that only males be employed in 
“contact positions” in all-male maximum-security prisons.  Rawlinson brought a 
disparate treatment claim against the second regulation, arguing that treating men and 
women differently was unnecessary for these positions.  Alabama asserted a BFOQ 
defense against both claims.  The court rejected Alabama’s BFOQ defense based on the 
weight and height requirements but accepted Alabama’s BFOQ defense based on the bar 
on women in contact positions.  The court reasoned that because of the “rampant 
violence” and “jungle atmosphere” in maximum security prisons, “[t]he likelihood that 
inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman would pose a real threat not 
only to the victim of the assault but also to the basic control of the penitentiary and 
protection of its inmates and the other security personnel.”292  Since Dothard, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that the “BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and 
this Court has read it narrowly.”293  Nonetheless, BFOQ remains a viable defense for 
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employers who can demonstrate that changing their policy would interfere with the 
“essence” or the “central mission of the employer’s business.”294 
As a result, if weight is added to the list of protected classes under Title VII, it 
should also be added to the list of protected classes in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) against 
which employers can assert a BFOQ defense.  A BFOQ defense against weight 
discrimination claims would provide an exception for occupations in which being obese 
could endanger the safety of the claimant, other workers, or both.  Moreover, allowing for 
a BFOQ exception would not erode the strong protections otherwise provided by making 
weight a protected class.  Because courts have admittedly read the BFOQ exception for 
sex, national origin, and religion narrowly, courts should read a BFOQ exception for 
weight just as narrowly (unless, of course, Congress indicated that it wanted courts to 
read the BFOQ exception more broadly for weight).  Thus, including a BFOQ defense 
does not weaken my proposal to make weight a protected class; an employer could only 
assert the defense successfully in rare cases.  But including a BFOQ defense in my 
proposal does address legitimate concerns that obesity may occasionally create a safety 
issue in certain occupations.295 
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Undue Hardship 
 In order to allay additional concerns about the costliness of accommodating obese 
employees in the workplace, I propose allowing employers to assert a second defense 
against future Title VII claims based on weight: undue hardship.  Unlike the BFOQ 
defense, an undue hardship defense does not appear anywhere in the text of Title VII.  
Yet in a Title VII claim based on religious discrimination, Federal courts all allow 
employers to assert a defense of undue hardship.  After the claimant proves her prima 
facie case (which requires her to prove that an employment requirement conflicted with 
her religious beliefs, that she notified her employer of the conflict, and that she suffered 
an adverse employment action because she refused to comply with the requirement), the 
burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that he made a good faith effort to 
accommodate the claimant’s religious belief.  In the alternative, the employer can prove 
that a reasonable accommodation to the employee’s religious beliefs would have created 
an undue hardship.296  The court-created undue hardship defense in religious 
discrimination claims is reminiscent of the undue burden exception in ADA claims. 
 Importing the undue hardship defense from religious discrimination claims into 
my proposal for making weight a Title VII protected class may seem strange.  Weight 
seems to be most closely associated with sex: certainly there is more apparent overlap 
between weight and sex than between weight and religion.  But recall the discussion in 
the Obesity is Not as Mutable as Popular Opinion Would Suggest Section; religious 
discrimination is the most mutable of the five currently protected classes under Title VII.  
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Therefore, it makes sense that courts do not protect against religious discrimination quite 
as strongly: religion is something that people can (and do) change. 
 The scientific literature reviewed earlier demonstrates that obesity is not as 
mutable as popular belief would suggest; genes play a large role in determining an 
individual’s propensity toward obesity.  Still, environment affects obesity too, making 
weight at least somewhat mutable.  Weight is at least more mutable than the already 
protected categories of race and national origin.  Consequently, it makes sense that courts 
would not protect against weight discrimination quite as strongly: weight is something 
that people can (and do) change. 
 More practically, allowing employers to assert an undue hardship defense can 
address any real cost considerations that arise from making weight a protected class.  The 
results in Chapter I suggested that the disadvantages experienced by the obese in the 
labor market were not by and large the result of cost considerations.  Still, it is easy to 
imagine the occasional situation where hiring an obese worker may create real costs for 
employers.   
Suppose an obese worker is perfectly capable of performing a job, and her weight 
does not create a safety issue (if it did, it would already be covered by the BFOQ 
defense).  But suppose the job requires an obese worker to use a piece of equipment that 
has a weight limit less than her current weight.  Buying a new piece of equipment with a 
higher weight limit may be very costly for the employer, especially if the employer is a 
small business.  The employer in this case could turn to the undue hardship exception.  
The only area in which the undue burden defense would probably not help 
employers avoid the costs associated with hiring an obese worker is insurance.  The 
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undue burden defense would not help small employers whose health insurance premiums 
would drastically increase by employing an obese worker because allowing such a 
defense would conflict with other laws.  For other Federal anti-discrimination laws such 
as the ADA, increased health insurance costs arising from the employee’s protected 
status do not constitute a legitimate undue burden for the employer.297   Consequently, 
allowing such a defense under Title VII would conflict with the ADA, especially if 
morbid obesity becomes more broadly recognized as a disability under the ADAAA.  
Still, for most other situations, the undue hardship exception would help an employer 
avoid a cost from complying with Title VII that might otherwise put him out of business. 
Even though the results in Chapter I suggest that these cost considerations are not 
driving the disadvantages experienced by the obese in the labor market, including an 
undue hardship exception would help remedy the few situations in which costs do matter.  
For that reason, allowing employers to assert an undue hardship defense will not erode 
the benefits of making weight a protected class.  Instead, the inclusion of an undue 
hardship defense in my proposal addresses legitimate concerns that employing an obese 
worker may occasionally be cost-prohibitive, particularly for small employers. 
Weight as a Protected Class Under Title VII Only 
A final notable feature of my proposal is that I only propose making weight a 
protected class for the purposes of employment.  I am not proposing making weight a 
protected class under any Federal anti-discrimination laws other than Title VII.  This 
employment-only proposal runs somewhat contrary to other scholars such as Puhl and 
Heuer (2009), who advocate broader legal protections for the obese besides just 
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employment,298 and Rhode (2010), who advocates “expand[ing] prohibitions on 
discrimination based on appearance…[by] enact[ing] or amend[ing] federal, state, or 
local antidiscrimination rights statutes covering employment, housing, public 
accommodations, and related contexts.”299 
Unlike these scholars, I do not propose making weight a protected class in other 
contexts such as housing and public accommodations.  My proposal is limited to 
employment simply because the role of weight in employment is the more thoroughly 
researched than the role of weight in other contexts.  Moreover, virtually all of the 
previous research on weight and employment is consistent with the existence of 
discrimination.   
The psychology research discussed in the Evidence of Weight Stigma and Weight 
Discrimination Section suggests that weight discrimination may occur in other areas like 
housing and public accommodations.  But there is very little research on whether weight 
discrimination actually does occur in these areas, and what little research exists is quite 
outdated.  For example, the one often cited psychology study of obesity discrimination in 
housing by Karris (1977) is almost four decades old.  Moreover, Karris’s study, while 
unique and supportive of the existence of obesity discrimination in the housing market, 
involved only six renters and eleven landlords.300  Even Puhl and Heuer (2009), who have 
advocated legal protections beyond employment, admit that the research on “public 
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accommodations, jury selection, housing and adoption” remain “understudied domains in 
which obese persons may be vulnerable to weight discrimination.”301 
A final concern with proposing broader weight protections is the cost.  The results 
in Chapter I indicated that obese workers are not more costly to employ than non-obese 
workers; thus, adding protections for the obese in the workplace should not generate too 
many additional costs for employers.  But the costs of protecting the obese may be much 
greater outside of employment.  For example, protecting the obese in public 
accommodations may require governments to purchase larger, more costly seats that 
reduce the number of other people who are able to use the public accommodation.  The 
benefits of protecting weight in other areas like public accommodations may still 
outweigh the costs, but further research is needed to address this issue. 
In sum, there is not as much research on obesity discrimination outside of 
employment as there is within employment.  Additional research on whether obesity 
discrimination exists outside of employment as well as on the costs of protecting weight 
outside of employment is necessary.  Until this research exists, it would be unwise to 
propose laws that make weight a protected class outside of employment. 
 
Reforming Title VII Administration: Critical for All Protected Classes 
 
 As Chapter II demonstrated, passing new laws does not help anyone if the laws 
are not well administered.  Chapter II pointed out that many of the local laws prohibiting 
weight or personal appearance discrimination have been ineffective because they have 
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been poorly administered, and in some cases, almost forgotten.  Even worse, as the last 
chapter pointed out, the administration and adjudication of Federal employment 
discrimination claims for current Title VII protected classes leave much to be desired.  
For this reason, proposing a new Title VII protected class does not make much sense 
without also proposing changes in the EEOC’s administration of Title VII claims.  This 
section proposes two reforms, adding a commission process and imposing mandatory 
time limits on the EEOC, that will help the classes currently protected by Title VII, and 
as a result, will help any future protected classes as well. 
Giving Plaintiffs a Choice: Adding a Commission Process 
 As Chapter II described, the EEOC already provides two opportunities for parties 
to settle before going to court: mediation and conciliation.  The mediation program, while 
free, is completely voluntary, so an employer can refuse to participate.  The conciliation 
process puts somewhat more pressure on the employer to negotiate with the complainant 
since the EEOC has reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred.  But the 
employer can still refuse to participate in conciliation. 
 Consequently, even if an employer knows that he has a weak case, he may still 
choose not to cooperate with the EEOC process by refusing to participate in both 
mediation and conciliation.  This choice would be perfectly rational in certain cases, 
especially in ones involving low damage amounts.  A rational employer knows that 
employment discrimination cases are very costly and time consuming to litigate.  For that 
reason, a rational employer also knows that employment discrimination attorneys are 
only willing to represent complainants with strong cases that involve high damage 
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amounts.  Thus, if a complainant has either a weak case or a case with low damages, the 
complainant will have difficulty finding a lawyer to represent her.   
Complainants who cannot find a lawyer are forced to choose between proceeding 
pro se or not proceeding at all.  The research by Nielsen et al. (2010) discussed in 
Chapter II demonstrates that pro se complainants almost never prevail in employment 
discrimination cases.302  Thus, under the current EEOC system of voluntary mediation 
and conciliation, a rational employer should refuse to participate in mediation and 
conciliation if he believes that the complainant’s case is weak or involves low damages.  
In such cases, the complainant is unlikely to prevail in court, so it makes little sense for 
the employer to give the complainant anything to avoid going to court. 
The fate of complainants with weak cases may not be so concerning.  But the fate 
of complainants with strong cases and low damages is concerning.  Low damages in an 
employment discrimination suit could still amount to a few thousand dollars.  Yet the 
prospect of winning even a few thousand dollars will not entice an employment 
discrimination lawyer.  The problem is not that lawyers in this field are greedy, but the 
problem is that they generally work on a contingency basis.   Thus, a percentage of a few 
thousand dollars would not fully compensate a lawyer for the amount of time it took her 
to win this money for her client. 
A good way to remedy this problem is for Congress to amend the EEOC statutory 
enforcement provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and establish an alternative adjudicatory 
process that does not require complainants to be represented by an attorney.303  As 
Chapter II described, the state of Michigan as well as the cities of Madison, WI, Urbana, 
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IL, Washington, DC, and San Francisco, CA have commission processes that provide an 
alternative to litigation.  Complainants in Madison and Urbana must have their claims 
adjudicated through the local commission; complainants in Michigan, Washington, and 
San Francisco can choose to have their claims adjudicated through the commission as an 
alternative to pursuing the traditional litigation process. 
In well-run commission processes, such as the ones in Madison and Urbana, there 
is not the same incentive for employers to refuse to cooperate.  Employers in these cities 
cannot take their chances that complainants with strong cases but low damages will not 
be able to find a lawyer, and thus, will not be able to prevail.  Complainants in these 
jurisdictions do not need a lawyer to pursue their claims successfully.  As a result, 
complainants with strong cases have a reliable remedy in these jurisdictions, even if their 
damages are low.  The commission processes in Madison and Urbana are successful 
because they supply the “small claims court” that the Federal adjudication process is so 
noticeably lacking.304 
Even though the Madison and Urbana processes are the only ones that seem to 
work, I am not advocating that the Federal government take away employment 
discrimination plaintiffs’ private right of action in Federal court and force them to have 
their claims adjudicated through an EEOC agency hearing.  Instead, I propose giving 
plaintiffs another option through which they can have their claims adjudicated.  Once the 
EEOC determines that a complaint presents reasonable cause, the complainant should be 
given two (and occasionally three) options.  First, the EEOC can issue a right to sue letter 
to the complainant (thus cutting out the conciliation process), and the complainant can 
bring her case in Federal court as she has always been allowed to do.  Second, the 
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complainant can alternatively pursue her complaint through an EEOC agency hearing.  
Third, in the rare case that the EEOC is willing, the EEOC can bring a case on the 
plaintiff’s behalf. 
Complainants who choose the new EEOC agency hearing process would first 
participate in a conciliation process with the employer.  But unlike the current EEOC 
conciliation process, where the employer can refuse to participate, the employer would 
now be forced to participate once the complainant chose the agency hearing process.  
Complaints not successfully resolved in conciliation would then proceed to an agency 
hearing in front of a committee.  The committee should be comprised of at least three 
members (with an odd number for tiebreaking) who have no involvement in the 
investigatory process.   
At the hearing, the EEOC should facilitate the complainant’s ability to represent 
herself.  Either the EEOC could allow the investigator who found reasonable cause to 
serve as the complainant’s advocate, or the EEOC could provide explicit, detailed 
instructions to the complainant on how to present her case at the hearing.  The committee 
would then make a decision, and this decision would be appealable to the Federal district 
court.  In order to make the appeals process more efficient and less costly, the Federal 
district court would review committee decisions under the same standards that Federal 
appellate courts review district court decisions: “clearly erroneous” review of findings of 
fact and de novo review of conclusions of law.305  Nevertheless, the key to this new 
agency hearing process working is that complainants must be able to represent 
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themselves.  As the results from San Francisco in Chapter II showed, having a committee 
hearing process does not benefit the complainant if she still has to hire an attorney. 
Giving complainants the option to pursue a commission enforcement process 
instead of litigation would make the EEOC more closely resemble many of the state and 
local employment discrimination agencies described in Chapter II.  It may appear strange 
that state and local agencies have developed these commission enforcement processes, 
while the EEOC has seemingly lagged behind.  Yet history has largely stood in the way 
of the EEOC’s ability to develop a commission enforcement process.  One of the 
compromises necessary to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which established the EEOC, 
was to minimize the agency’s enforcement powers.  Opponents feared the prospect of an 
overzealous, plaintiff-favoring agency that could impede nationwide business operations 
and commercial growth.  Thus, the final Civil Rights Act only gave the EEOC the power 
to do three things: receive complaints, investigate for reasonable cause, and conciliate 
claims with reasonable cause.  These limitations earned the agency the nickname of the 
“toothless tiger” in its early years.306  Although the EEOC’s enforcement powers have 
expanded somewhat over the last half century, they are still basically limited to the three 
items mentioned above.  Consequently, without Congressional action, the EEOC remains 
constrained by the history of its establishment, which is wrought with concerns about 
making it too easy for plaintiffs to win and about the risk of federal bureaucratic 
overreaching.  These historical concerns have caused the pendulum to swing in the 
opposite direction: now, the enforcement process makes it extremely difficult for 
plaintiffs to win. 
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As mentioned before, the plaintiffs who appear to have the most difficult time 
winning are the ones with low-damage claims.  The new commission process proposed 
here would particularly help these plaintiffs by providing the small claims court that the 
Federal process is currently lacking.  Congressional institution of this commission would 
undeniably generate additional costs for the EEOC.  However, eliminating the 
conciliation process for plaintiffs who wish to pursue litigation would also generate some 
cost savings for the agency.  Even if the costs of the new process exceed the savings, 
instituting a commission adjudication option for complainants with reasonable cause is 
vital.  Without it, many complainants with a strong case but low damages will continue to 
be left without any good options to seek redress for their claims. 
  Imposing Mandatory Time Limits on the EEOC 
 Of course, as Chapter II demonstrated, instituting a commission adjudication 
process is not enough.  In places like Michigan and San Francisco, the commissions have 
been ineffective because the commission process can drag on for an indefinite period of 
time.  The commissions in these jurisdictions are not bound by statutory time limits on 
how long the initial investigation can take and how soon a hearing must be held after 
probable cause is found.  As a result, the commission process in places like Michigan can 
take just as long as litigation. 
 For this reason, Congress should pass a law imposing mandatory time limits on 
the EEOC, particularly for the initial investigation period.  Congress needs to impose 
mandatory time limits regardless of whether it also decides to institute a commission 
adjudication process.  Currently, the Federal authorizing statute requires that the 
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reasonable cause determination be made “as promptly as possible and, so far as 
practicable, not later than one hundred and twenty days from the filing of the charge.”307   
Because the current statutory time limits are merely suggestive, not mandatory, 
the reasonable cause determination takes much longer than 120 days.  Indeed, Chapter II 
revealed that the EEOC’s initial investigation process can take as long as a year.  
According to Katharine Kores, an EEOC District Director, the initial investigation need 
not take so long; in fact, the agency’s current goal is to complete the initial investigation 
within 180 days (still sixty days longer than the suggested time in the statute).  In reality, 
the investigations take this long because EEOC is very understaffed.   Kores believes that 
“the more staff, the more we can reduce the time.”308  
 Thus, if Congress imposes time limits on the EEOC, Congress must also face 
tough questions about the resources currently dedicated to the agency.  Gaining 
additional funding from Congress is never easy for an agency, particularly in the current 
political climate, with candidates advocating cutting agencies’ funding and even 
eliminating agencies altogether.  But the results in Chapter II combined with the results 
of previous works such as Monroe (1995), Selmi (1996), Green (2000), Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001), and Moss et al. (2005) indicate that the EEOC’s situation is particularly 
dire.309  The EEOC is so underfunded that it is increasingly unable to achieve its central 
                                                
307 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 2000e-5(b) (2012). 
308 Katharine Kores, District Director of Memphis Office, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
telephone conversation with author, 09 Jan. 2012. 
309 Maurice E. R. Munroe, “The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect,” Yale Law & Policy Review 13 
(1995): 219-79; Michael Selmi, “The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment 
Discrimination Law,” Ohio State Law Journal (1996): 1-64; Michael Z. Green, “Proposing a New 
Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement after 35 Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory 
Mediation,” Dickinson Law Review 105 (2000): 305-64; Daron Acemoglu and Joshua D. Angrist, 
“Consequences of Employment Protection?  The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” Journal of 
Political Economy 109 (2001): 915-57; Kathryn Moss et al., “Prevalence and Outcomes of ADA 
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mission: to “promote equality of opportunity in the workplace and enforce federal laws 
prohibiting employment discrimination.”310  Through laws like Title VII, the Federal 
government has made a commitment to support anti-discrimination values, regardless of 
whether allowing such discrimination is efficient.  Thus, while my proposal for 
administrative reform may be costly, it is necessary to uphold the anti-discrimination 
values espoused by the Federal government.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 The principal message of this chapter and of this dissertation is the necessity of 
legal reform.  Because the overarching theme of this dissertation has been obesity, the 
most obvious call for reform has been to change the way that Federal law views weight in 
the workplace.  Taken together, the economic research on obesity in the workplace 
reviewed in Chapter I, my results in Chapter I, and the psychology research reviewed in 
this chapter all suggest one conclusion: the United States needs a law that prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of weight in the workplace.   
Yet this dissertation makes a less obvious, but perhaps more important call for 
reform.  Studying the way in which other jurisdictions have handled obesity 
discrimination claims has exposed larger problems in how the Federal government 
currently handles all discrimination claims.  The agency in charge of administering 
Federal discrimination claims is understaffed and underfunded, leading to long delays.  
                                                
Employment Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts,” Mental & Physical Disability Law Reporter 29 
(2005): 303-11. 
310 U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, “Overview,” Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission Online, last viewed 02 Mar. 2012, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc. 
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Individuals with legitimate discrimination claims who endure these long delays may still 
come out of the agency process with only a right to sue letter to show for their endurance.  
With a right to sue letter, these individuals may not find an attorney.  And as a result, 
these individuals may be prohibited from gaining relief. 
Thus, as much as Congress needs to pass a law prohibiting weight discrimination 
in employment, it may need to reform the adjudication and administration of 
discrimination claims even more.  The reforms suggested in this chapter will ensure that 
protected classes—both present and future—will be able to gain relief for legitimate 
claims of discrimination in the workplace. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Original Variables and Coding Information for the CPS-ATUS-EHM-O*NET Data 
Variable Name in Chapter I 
Regressions 
Data Source Variable Name in 
Original Data Source 
Variable > 0 If 
Respondent 
Variable = 0 If 
Respondent 
Dropped from Sample If 
Respondent 
Hourly Wages (Transformed into 
the Natural Logarithm of Real 
2008 Wages)311 
CPS Weekly workers: 
Computed using 
trernwa, ttwk, trwernal 
Hourly workers: 
Computed using 
wkearn, teernh1o, 
teernhry, trdpftpt, 
tehruslt, tehrusl1, 
tehrusl2 
Is employed and earns 
positive wages 
--- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Major Industry (For Controls in 
Robustness Check Four) 
CPS trimjind1 Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Major Occupation (For Controls 
in Robustness Check Four) 
CPS trmjocc1 Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Detailed Occupation (For 
Matching O*NET Data) 
CPS teio1ocd Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Communicating 
with Persons Outside the 
Organization 
O*NET Work Activity File, 
element_id=4.A.4.a.3 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Communicating 
with Supervisors, Peers, or 
Subordinates 
O*NET Work Activity File, 
element_id=4.A.4.a.2 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
                                                
311 Reported wages from 2006 and 2007 were converted into 2008 dollars using the BLS Consumer Price Index Calculator. 
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How Much Contact with Others 
Required by the Job 
O*NET Work Context File, 
element_id=4.C.1.a.4 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Establishing and 
Maintaining Interpersonal 
Relationships 
O*NET Work Activity File, 
element_id=4.A.4.a.4 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Performing for or 
Working Directly with the Public 
O*NET Work Activity File, 
element_id=4.A.4.a.8 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Selling or 
Influencing Others 
O*NET Work Activity File, 
element_id=4.A.4.a.6 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Performing 
General Physical Activities 
O*NET Work Activity File, 
element_id=4.A.3.a.1 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Speed of Limb 
Movement 
O*NET Ability File, 
element_id=1.A.2.c.3 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Stamina O*NET Ability File, 
element_id=1.A.3.b.1 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Explosive 
Strength 
O*NET Ability File, 
element_id=1.A.3.a.2 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Dynamic Strength O*NET Ability File, 
element_id=1.A.3.a.3 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Static Strength O*NET Ability File, 
element_id=1.A.3.a.1 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Importance of Trunk Strength O*NET Ability File, 
element_id=1.A.3.a.4 
Is employed --- Refused to answer, or 
respondent is not employed 
Underweight EHM Erbmi Has BMI < 18.5 Has BMI ! 18.5 Refused to answer 
Normal Weight EHM Erbmi Has 18.5 " BMI < 25 Has BMI < 18.5 
Has BMI ! 25 
Refused to answer 
Overweight EHM Erbmi Has 25 " BMI < 30 Has BMI < 25 
Has BMI ! 30 
Refused to answer 
Obese EHM Erbmi Has 30 " BMI < 40 Has BMI < 30 
Has BMI ! 40 
Refused to answer 
Morbidly Obese EHM Erbmi Has BMI ! 40 Has BMI < 40 
 
Refused to answer 
Years of education CPS peeduca, pecyc, 
pems123 
Completed at least first 
grade (see coding values 
in Table II) 
Completed less than 
first grade 
Refused to answer 
Age CPS Prtage Provides her age --- Refused to answer 
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Female CPS Pesex Is female Is male Refused to answer 
White CPS ptdtrace, pehspnon Is white, non-Hispanic Is black, another 
race, or Hispanic 
Refused to answer 
Black CPS ptdtrace, pehspnon Is black, non-Hispanic Is white, another 
race, or Hispanic 
Refused to answer 
Hispanic CPS ptdtrace, pehspnon Is any race and Hispanic Is not Hispanic Refused to answer 
Children Present CPS erc19num Has at least one child 
less than 19 living in the 
household 
Does not have any 
children less than 19 
living in the 
household 
Refused to answer 
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Table 2. Years of Education Variable Coded Values 
Highest Level of Education Completed Years of Education Coded Value 
Less Than First Grade 0.0 
First, Second, Third, or Fourth Grade 2.5 
Fifth or Sixth Grade 5.5 
Seventh or Eighth Grade 7.5 
Ninth Grade 9.0 
Tenth Grade 10.0 
Eleventh Grade 11.0 
Twelfth Grade (No Diploma) 11.5 
High School Diploma 12.0 
Less than One Year of College 12.5 
One Year of College 13.0 
Two Years of College 14.0 
Three Years of College 15.0 
Four Years of College (No Degree) 15.5 
College Degree 16.0 
One-Year Master’s Degree 17.0 
Two-Year Master’s Degree 18.0 
Three-Year Master’s Degree 19.0 
Professional School Degree 20.0 
Doctoral Degree 21.0 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
Table 1. Original Variables and Coding Information for the BRFSS Data 
Variable Name in 
Chapter II Regressions 
Variable Name in Original 
Data Source 
Variable > 0 If Respondent Variable = 0 If Respondent Dropped from 
Sample If Respondent 
Employed for Wages employ Is employed for wages Is out of work, self-employed, 
homemaker, a student, retired, or 
unable to work 
Refused to answer 
Underweight 1984-86: weight, hti, htf 
1987-98: _bmi 
1999-2002: _bmi2 
2003: _bmi3 
2004-2009: _bmi4 
2010: a_bmi4 
Has BMI < 18.5 Has BMI ! 18.5 Refused to answer 
Normal Weight 1984-86: weight, hti, htf 
1987-98: _bmi 
1999-2002: _bmi2 
2003: _bmi3 
2004-2009: _bmi4 
2010: a_bmi4 
Has 18.5 " BMI < 25 Has BMI < 18.5 
Has BMI ! 25 
Refused to answer 
Overweight 1984-86: weight, hti, htf 
1987-98: _bmi 
1999-2002: _bmi2 
2003: _bmi3 
2004-2009: _bmi4 
2010: a_bmi4 
Has 25 " BMI < 30 Has BMI < 25 
Has BMI ! 30 
Refused to answer 
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Obese 1984-86: weight, hti, htf 
1987-98: _bmi 
1999-2002: _bmi2 
2003: _bmi3 
2004-2009: _bmi4 
2010: a_bmi4 
Has 30 " BMI < 40 Has BMI < 30 
Has BMI ! 40 
Refused to answer 
Morbidly Obese 1984-86: weight, hti, htf 
1987-98: _bmi 
1999-2002: _bmi2 
2003: _bmi3 
2004-2009: _bmi4 
2010: a_bmi4 
Has BMI ! 40 Has BMI < 40 
 
Refused to answer 
White 1984-2000: orace, hispanic 
2001-2010: race2, hispanc2 
Is white, non-Hispanic Is black, another race, or Hispanic Refused to answer 
Black 1984-2000: orace, hispanic 
2001-2010: race2, hispanc2 
Is black, non-Hispanic Is white, another race, or Hispanic Refused to answer 
Other Race 1984-2000: orace, hispanic 
2001-2010: race2, hispanc2 
Is any other race, non-Hispanic Is white, black, or Hispanic Refused to answer 
Hispanic 1984-2000: orace, hispanic 
2001-2010: race2, hispanc2 
Is any race and Hispanic Is not Hispanic Refused to answer 
Female sex Is female Is male Refused to answer 
Age age Provides her age --- Refused to answer 
Married marital Is married Is divorced, widowed, separated, 
never married, or a member of an 
unmarried couple 
Refused to answer 
Less than High School educa 1984-92: Does not have a high school 
diploma or a technical school diploma 
1993-2010: Does not have a high 
school diploma 
1984-2010: Has a Has a high school 
diploma or a technical school diploma 
Refused to answer 
High School Graduate educa 1984-92: Has a high school diploma 
or a technical school diploma 
1993-2010: Has a high school 
diploma 
1984-2010: Does not have a high 
school diploma or technical school 
diploma, or has a diploma plus 
additional college education 
Refused to answer 
Some College educa 1984-2010: Has a high school 
diploma but not a college degree 
1984-2010: Does not have a high 
school diploma or technical school 
diploma, or has a diploma plus a 
college degree 
Refused to answer 
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College Graduate educa 1984-2010: Has a college degree 1984-2010: Has less than a college 
degree 
Refused to answer 
 
 
 
 
